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‘This is the showing-forth of inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, so that neither what has 
come to be from man in time might become faded, nor that great and wondrous deeds, those 
shown forth by Greeks and those by barbarians, might be without their glory; and together 
with all this, also through what cause they warred with each other.’ 
Herodotus, The Histories 
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 Abstract 
 
One of the most understudied frontiers, the Kentucky frontier was also one of the most 
violent.  For twenty years this region was affected by a bloody war that came to involve the 
new settler population, numerous Indian tribes, the British, and the American government.  
More than a border war, the battle for Kentucky and the trans-Appalachian west came to 
define the communities which grew up in its midst, altering world views, attitudes, and 
compounding prejudices.  It is the purpose of this thesis to accomplish two goals: first, this 
work will tackle the lack of recent scholarship on this region by providing a detailed history of 
the Kentucky frontier during the American Revolution and its subsequent period.  The second 
goal of this thesis is to study, analyse and understand how the violence generated by the war 
with the Indians helped to shape settler society.  By thinking of violence not purely as the 
result of other, more potent social forces – racism, economic fears, competition for land – it is 
possible to study and understand its formative impact upon early American society.  From the 
short term development of vendetta fuelled warfare to the long term impact this war had 
upon relations between white and Native America, the war for the trans-Appalachian west saw 
violence taking on a particularly important, particularly formative role. 
 
 
 
Map of Kentucky and the surrounding country
 Introduction 
 
September, 1786.  Under the command of Benjamin Logan over three hundred settlers 
departed the hotly contested borderland of Kentucky, bound for the Indian territories north of 
the Ohio River.  This movement of civilians was not an attempt to the settle the northern part 
of the country.  Nor was it an attempt to explore, scout, or chart the Indians’ remaining lands.  
Instead, Logan’s forces crossed the Ohio River with the intention of attacking, defeating and – 
hopefully – crippling the Indian tribes with whom the settlers of the trans-Appalachian west 
had been locked in an unrestricted war for more than a decade.1  By the time Logan led his 
followers into Ohio thousands of settlers had been killed, injured, or taken into captivity during 
the course of the frontier war.2  Like the other settler campaigns which had been launched 
against the Indians since the outbreak of hostilities, Logan’s campaign had been designed to 
push the war’s centre of gravity away from the burgeoning settlements of the frontier – of 
central Kentucky, western Pennsylvania, western Virginia, and Tennessee – and into the 
Indian’s heartland.  In this regard, however, the expedition was largely a failure.3  A few minor 
skirmishes and casualties aside, the Indians had simply evacuated their towns ahead of the 
advancing settlers, denying them the chance to inflict the defeat they so desperately sought.  
Instead, Logan and his followers had to settle for a paltry number of prisoners, mostly women, 
children and the elderly, who had been discovered in the otherwise deserted townships upon 
which they had marched.4   
Thus denied the opportunity to engage their enemies, it was not unusual for settlers to 
visit their frustrations upon their prisoners.  In this context the actions taken by Hugh McGary 
during this campaign were not extraordinary.  His victim, an elderly chief named Moluntha, 
may have harboured pro-American sentiments, but to McGary all that seemed to matter was 
his affiliation with the Shawnee tribe, one of the most consistent and aggressive anti-settler 
groups in the Ohio valley.5  According witnesses, McGary had attempted to interrogate the 
                                                            
1 William Sudduth and John D. Shane (ed.) ‘A Sketch of the Life of William Sudduth’ Draper Manuscripts 
12CC82-83 
2 John Mack Faragher Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 1992), p. 144.  For the perceived level of violence in 1786 alone see ‘Appeal from the 
Inhabitants of Jefferson County, July 1786’ Bullitt Family Papers A/B 937C, Box 6, Filson Historical Society 
3 R. Douglas Hurt The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 98-99 
4 William Sudduth and John D. Shane (ed.) ‘A Sketch of the Life of William Sudduth’ Draper Manuscripts 
12CC82-83 
5 The Shawnee, it should be noted, attempted to maintain peace throughout 1760s.   However the 
gradual expansion of the settlers into their hunting grounds forced a change in policy which would see 
 
 
10 
chief over his involvement in the disastrous Battle of the Blue Licks fought four years earlier in 
Kentucky.  Apparently, Moluntha – who was able to communicate only by patting his chest and 
saying the word ‘Keeing,’ probably a mispronunciation of King – had nodded passively in 
response to the settler’s questions.  Taking this as confirmation that the old chief had indeed 
been involved in the battle, McGary had become enraged at his prisoner, shouting ‘d[am]n 
you, I will show you Blue Lick-play,’ before smashing in the old man’s skull with a tomahawk.6  
Unsurprisingly, this act was not McGary’s first contact with the type of unrestricted violence 
which defined the war fought on the frontier between 1774 and 1795.  Indeed, McGary was no 
stranger to warfare, conflict and loss and, since his arrival in the Kentucky country in the mid-
1770s, a string of violent incidents had helped to turn McGary into the ruthless Indian fighter 
he now was. 
August, 1782.  Four years before Moluntha’s murder, McGary had been present at the 
Blue Licks defeat, an episode which saw over one hundred and eighty Kentuckians absolutely 
defeated by a force of northern Indians supported by a small band of British rangers.7  More 
than a defeat, the Blue Licks had been a disaster, the largest near-simultaneous loss of life to 
occur within the Kentucky country since the settlement of that region.  Worse still, it had been 
McGary’s unqualified desire to kill Indians that had led to this thrashing.8  Shortly before the 
battle, Daniel Boone, an experienced woodsman, had warned the settlers that they were 
walking into a trap.  McGary, however, had goaded his compatriots into marching against the 
Indians; ‘let’s fight them [and] They that ain’t cowards follow me.’9  It is perhaps unsurprising, 
then, that McGary referenced this defeat as he dashed out Moluntha’s brains.  The events of 
1782 and 1786 were thus linked in McGary’s mind, an indistinct series of happenings bound 
together by experience and perception that stretched back much further than even the 
disastrous Blue Licks affair.  Throughout his time upon the frontier, McGary had been unable 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the Shawnee consistently aligned against the settlers from the outbreak of Dunmore’s War until the 
Battle of Fallen Timbers.  Edmunds The Shawnee Prophet, pp. 9-25 and Clark The Shawnee 
(LexingtsdsPress, 2007), pp. 72-90 
6 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Isaac Clinkenbeard’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC3.  For a discussion 
surrounding this episode please see Faragher Daniel Boone, p. 254 
7 E.A. Cruikshank Butler’s Rangers, The Revolutionary Period (Welland: Tribune Printing, 1893), pp. 108-
109 
8 Lyman C. Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone’ in Neil O. Hammon (ed.) My Father, Daniel 
Boone: The Draper Interviews with Nathan Boone (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 
75-78 
9 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Jacob Stevens’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC134.  For details of this battle 
see also ‘Letter from Daniel Boone to the Governor of Virginia, August 30th, 1782’ in William P. Palmer 
Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts from January 1, 1782, to December 31, 1784, 
Vol. 3 (Richmond: James E. Goode: 1883), pp. 275-276 and , and Peter Houston ‘A Sketch of the Life of 
Daniel Boone’ in Ted Franklin Belue (ed.) A Sketch of the Life of Daniel Boone: A Memoir by Peter 
Houston (Mechanicsburgh: Stackpole Books, 1997), pp. 23-26 
 
 
 
11 
to escape the war with the Indians and on an innumerable number of occasions he had found 
himself connected, directly and indirectly, to the fallout of the conflict.   
March, 1777.  Perhaps no single incident, however, had as large an impact upon him 
as the murder of his stepson in the precipitous year of 1777.10  Although he had found – and 
executed – the Indian who killed the boy shortly after his murder, McGary was evidently left 
unsatisfied by this act of revenge; rather than scalping the Indian or committing some other 
act of hasty mutilation he had instead set about the lengthy and gory task of butchering, 
slicing, dicing, and ultimately feeding the body to the dogs at the township in which he lived.11  
If McGary’s volatile reaction indicated the depth of his anger or anguish, then he was certainly 
not alone.  Following the death of his stepson, McGary’s wife confined herself to her bed 
where she appears to have wallowed in grief before finally dying a year later.  To cap this 
episode, it even appears that McGary came to believe that he was haunted by his stepson’s 
ghost, a ‘spectre’ that literally and figuratively reminded him of his shortcomings and the 
realities of life during a frontier war.12  This is the context in which McGary’s later actions – in 
both 1782 and 1786 – must be understood.  McGary’s actions may have been extreme, but 
they were not unique; the settlers’ pasts informed their presents, and in many instances both 
were defined by violence, loss, and bloodletting.  More than the product of war, acts of 
violence could be highly formative experiences, warping and shaping perceptions, sparking or 
reinforcing prejudices, and producing experiences, traumas, which individuals – and ultimately 
communities – would seek to redress in the future. 
 At both the individual and the communal level, contact with consistently high levels of 
violence had shaped and moulded the inhabitants of the frontier, influencing how they 
interpreted their past experiences, their present circumstances, and their future prospects.  
From how they conceptualised the Indians, to how they interpreted dreams, the environment, 
and even their relationships to one another, the settlers’ understanding of their world was 
profoundly influenced by the impact of violence.  This alteration in world views was a 
fundamental process which would have both short and long term consequences, expressed 
particularly in the shape of the society which the settlers constructed for themselves and the 
shape of their enduring attitude towards the Indians.  Throughout this thesis the role played by 
                                                            
10 For the perceived state of the settlements in Kentucky this year see ‘Petition from Hugh McGary to 
the Honourable Speaker & Gentleman of the House of Delegates, December 1st, 1777’ in James Rood 
Robertson (ed.) Petitions of the Early Inhabitants of Kentucky to the General Assembly of Virginia, 1769-
1792 (Louisville: John P. Morton & Company, 1914), pp. 42-43, ‘Journal of William Calk’ Calk Family 
Collection 2005M14, Kentucky Historical Society and Otis K. Rice Frontier Kentucky (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1993), pp. 88-94 
11 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Jacob Stevens’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC135 
12 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Sarah Graham’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC45 and Faragher Daniel Boone, 
p. 147 
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violence as a formative force will thus be studied in relation to the development of settler 
society in the trans-Appalachian region – particularly Kentucky.  Rather than thinking of 
violence as a consequence – the result of racism, economic competition, or disputes over land 
ownership – its ability to shape and mould society will be at the core of this study.  Put simply, 
violence was not necessarily an aftermath or symptom of other underlying social forces but an 
active entity in its own right which influenced settler society from the bottom-up.   
It is not being argued here that when McGary sunk his tomahawk into Moluntha’s skull 
he was doing so in any way for his lost stepchild per se, but rather that the connection can 
instead be found in a social context which had helped to shape him and which he, in turn, had 
helped to shape.  The violence generated by the war often forced individuals to react.  
Sometimes those reactions made sense: marching into Ohio in large numbers in an attempt to 
force the northern tribes to end their hostilities.  Other times – dicing the remains of the man 
who killed your stepson and then feeding them to the dogs – those reactions were 
fundamentally personal in nature.  Either way, they could inspire further acts of violence in 
their wake, fuelling much of the fighting that defined the war for the trans-Appalachian 
country.  None of the events in McGary’s life stood in isolation, each having been built upon 
the last, a chain of violence which had shaped, affected, and defined the man; aside from the 
incidents highlighted here, he seemingly took every available opportunity to confront his new 
enemies.13  To be sure, his life is a severe example of this process but for all that it was hardly 
distinct.   All across the frontier individuals on both sides reacted, sometimes very strongly 
indeed, to the violence which marred their daily existence. 
As a collective attempt to avenge years of past raids and attacks, Logan’s campaign 
was, in many ways, the communal equivalent of Mountha’s murder.  The overall campaign 
may have lacked the coldblooded brutality of McGary’s attack, but its purpose was broadly 
comparable.  Like every other member of that ad hoc army, McGary had found himself 
departing his home in order to confront the Indians.  As with his compatriots, McGary had 
volunteered for this campaign not because some whim or personal fancy had inspired him to 
do so, but because a complex personal history had helped lead him towards making that 
decision.  Of course personal agency had its role to play and McGary, like his fellow 
combatants, made a conscious decision to volunteer for the campaign, or at any rate not to 
desert.  However, other forces – equally powerful – to which he and his contemporaries were 
largely oblivious had already laid a groundwork which would make McGary’s decision to take 
                                                            
13 Joseph P. Elliot A History of Evansville and Vanderburgh County, Indiana: A Complete and Concise 
Account from the Earliest Times to the Present, Embracing Reminiscences of the Pioneers and 
Biographical Sketches of the Men Who Have Been Leaders in Commercial and Other Enterprises 
(Evansville: Keller Printing Company, 1897), pp. 25-29 
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part in this expedition much more likely, if not exactly inevitable.  More than a decade of 
attacks, confrontations, atrocities, and wartime experiences had shaped McGary into the 
individual he now was, and it was that individual – a product of his wartime experiences – who 
had volunteered for the opportunity to hunt, kill, and destroy Indians.  Similarly, thousands of 
individuals living in Kentucky had, by the mid-1780s, long and complex personal histories 
which had been fundamentally shaped and moulded by violence.  Lost relatives, companions, 
and scalps were the obvious fallout of the frontier war, but those who survived carried with 
them memories, interpretations, and new perspectives formed by these events.  When Logan 
called for volunteers to march into Ohio in 1786, many of those affected by the war marched 
under his banner.  The settlers were the sum total of their violent experiences, and those 
experiences would lead them to pursue new opportunities for further conflict and hostilities.14 
On the trans-Appalachian frontier of the late eighteenth century, violence was not 
merely a side effect of war, but a potent force which drove many of the individual 
confrontations which made up the overall conflict.  Although the war for the Kentucky frontier 
was initially driven by a confrontation over who controlled the territory, it quickly developed 
into something else as entrenched settlers and Indians began initiating campaigns, or personal 
vendettas, which were driven instead by their personal experiences with violence.  From a top 
down perspective, the war for the Kentucky and wider trans-Appalachian territories can be 
seen or interpreted as the result of a number of potent socio-cultural forces; issues over 
landownership, the outbreak of the American Revolution, and continuing Euro-American 
expansion over the continent all played a role.  However, when one instead analyses the war 
for Kentucky from the bottom-up, a distinct set of forces responsible for not only the 
perpetuation of the war, but its escalation, can also be identified.  When Hugh McGary diced 
up the body of his stepson’s murderer, his motives cannot be explained by top-down thinking.  
Similarly, when he led the charge at the Blue Licks it was not the Revolution, a proto-concept 
of the manifest destiny, or a desire to increase the value of his lands (by removing their 
principle threat), which appears to have driven him – and his followers – forward.  Among both 
the settlers and the Indians, individuals affected by violence often attempted to revisit harm 
with harm and, in this way, drove the war forward.  More accurately, at least among the 
                                                            
14 For a record of the sheer extent of fighting in Kentucky see the John D. Shane’s interviews with former 
settlers – these are contained in volumes 11CC, 12CC, 13CC, 14CC, 15CC, 16CC and 17CC of the Draper 
manuscripts.  For an analysis of how the conflict was reflected in these accounts please see the 
dénouement of this thesis.  Other sources worth consulting for an impression of how widespread the 
war was during this period include ‘An Open Letter from Henry Knox on the Causes of the Indian War 
(I),’ Kentucky Gazette (Bradford), June 23rd, 1792, pp. 1-2, ‘An Open Letter from Henry Knox on the 
Causes of the Indian War (II),’ Kentucky Gazette (Bradford), June 30th, 1792, p. 2, ‘Letter from Annie 
Christian to Elizabeth Christian, August 17th, 1787’ Bullitt Family Papers A/B937c, Filson Historical Society 
and ‘Appeal for Aid Against the Indians, a Petition to the Inhabitants of Lincoln and Fayette Counties, 
July 1786’ Bullitt Family Papers A/B 937c, Filson Historical Society 
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settlers, harm was often revisited with excessive or disproportionate levels of retributive 
violence; one death did not necessarily demand only one murder in return.  The result was a 
spiral of conflict which escalated as settlers and Indians alike sought to atone for past losses, 
sometimes proportionately, sometimes disproportionately.  This resulting spiral of war 
became a social force unto its self, a self perpetuating mechanism which would drive the war 
in Kentucky long after the conclusion of the American Revolution.  More than mere historical 
actors, the settlers and the Indians who fought to control Kentucky and the trans-Appalachian 
west were the engine of the frontier war and as such it is the forces which drove them to fight 
– for over twenty continuous years – that are of the greatest importance when this war is 
analysed and studied. 
Attitudes formed as the result of attacks – or physical violations – upon the settlers 
helped to fundamentally inform the world views, cosmologies and cultural expectations of 
individuals and communities alike.  Like McGary, a broad spectrum of the frontier’s population 
was exposed to events which would guide how they interpreted and reacted to the continued 
violence which unfurled around them.  McGary’s murder of Moluntha did not occur in a 
vacuum, nor was it an isolated incident.15  Instead, his actions must be seen as the sum total of 
his personal experiences to that date, the latest reaction to a social context which had forced 
McGary, along with many others on the frontier, to adapt to the specific challenges of the 
world in which he lived.  The actions of the individual are tied to their understanding of the 
past and, in the context of the late eighteenth century Ohio Valley, past experiences were 
often inseparably bound to warfare with the Indians.  Moreover, individuals make up 
communities, communities make up societies, and ultimately, cultural patterns are generated 
within such social organisations.  Put simply, violence is not a single event but a process which 
begins with a physical confrontation which can, given the correct conditions, lead society 
towards its own future acts of aggression (see figure 1).  In the specific case of Kentucky and 
the trans-Appalachian west, over two decades of continuous violence served to inform both 
the individual and the larger community, providing ample reason for both to continue, and 
even escalate, the frontier war.  Although the American Revolution and Dunmore’s War had 
served to catalyse the fighting in this region, the conflict which took place in this territory was 
neither defined nor limited by these geo-political struggles.  Instead the struggle for the 
Kentucky and trans-Appalachian frontiers developed as a parallel to these wars, the fighting 
concurrent rather than co-dependent.  Indeed, the system of ground-up fighting which 
perpetuated the frontier war was so distinct from the American Revolution that hostilities  
                                                            
15 For examples of this type of reactionary violence in a broader backcountry and oral history context 
see Raymond W. Thorp and Robert Bunker Crow Killer: The Saga of Liver-Eating Johnson (1958; reprint, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 43-48 
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Figure 1 – Illustration of the role the violent episode, as a contact point, played in affecting the actions of both 
settlers and Indians.  In this model experiences in combat affect the later actions of both parties whilst the 
experiences, real and perceived, of others also influence the attitudes, and hence later actions, of the warring 
parties. 
 
continued even when treaty makers and politicians brought the larger conflict to a close.  
Settlers and Indians alike may have been associated with larger political forces, but they each 
fought for their own best interests, not those of some abstract body of power.16  
 From a particular top-down perspective the battle for the Ohio Valley can be explained 
simply as a conflict over relentless Euro-American expansion across the continent, but even 
this all encompassing explanation fails to effectively explain the nature and shape of the 
resultant war.  Why, for instance, did the war come to an end in 1795 when the question of 
American expansion in the Ohio Valley was far from being answered? Moreover, why did the 
war come to an end when there remained a significant Indian population north of the Ohio 
River, an area which was already drawing thousands of settlers to it by the conclusion of the 
conflict? Evidently, American expansion did not inevitably lead to warfare – even if this was 
                                                            
16 The relationship, for instance, between the Indians and the British is often emphasised to the point 
where it is sometimes placed above the Indians’ own goals and aspirations – see Rice Frontier Kentucky, 
Ted Franklin Belue The Hunters of Kentucky: A Narrative History of America’s First Far West 
(Mechanicsburgh: Stackpole books, 2003), pp. 171-172 and Phillip W. Hoffman Simon Girty, Turncoat 
Hero: The Most Hated Man on the Early American Frontier (Franklin: American History Imprints, 2009).  
For a study which seeks to balance the agency of these groups see Alan Taylor The Divided Ground: 
Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 
2007) 
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often the case.17  Though top-down explanations can offer insights into the various factors 
which catalysed frontier conflicts, they fail to account for the specific circumstances which 
defined the war in the Kentucky country.  Understanding why the fighting was as brutal as it 
was in this region, why it ended when it did, and why it continued even when the geo-political 
struggles which initiated it came to an end requires an understanding of the ground-up forces 
which drove the day-to-day, month-to-month, and year-to-year fighting which comprised the 
larger war.  Broad, sweeping forces such as geo-political struggles and resistance to American 
expansion certainly played a role in starting the war for the Kentucky and trans-Appalachian 
territories, but the indiscriminate violence which these conflicts generated was a potent force 
in its own right which would go on to drive the broader struggle within these regions.  From 
the ground-up, violence would inspire countless vendettas which, collectively, culminated in 
an intercultural feud.  More than the physical expression of war, the violence which appeared 
in Kentucky had served to fuel the conflict. 
Typically, however, violence is analysed only as a side effect of conflict, or of jilted 
honour, the influence of masculinity, as a consequence of imported border cultures, or as a 
component of inter-bodily contact.18  In his edited volume Men and Violence, Pieter 
Spierenburg examines the relationship between society and violence, arguing that the former 
sets limits and conditions for the latter.  However, Spierenburg never attempts to reverse his 
baser assumptions and concepts by asking whether violence could help to shape or alter 
accepted social norms.  In Spierenburg’s interpretation, society takes on the role of a 
controlling mechanism, limiting outbursts and even the methods through which violent 
interactions are expressed.19  Such arguments – in the context of the specific examples he 
                                                            
17 David T. Courtwright Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to the Inner City 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 55-73, 85 and John D. Unruh The Plains 
Across: Emigrants, Wagon Trains and the American West, 1840-1860 (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 98, 120-130 
18 Courtwright Violent Land, David Hackett Fischer Albion’s Seed: Four British Folk Ways in America 
(Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1989), Grady McWhiney Cracker Culture: Celtic Ways in the Old 
South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988) and Pieter Spierenburg (ed.) Men and Violence: 
Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1998) 
19 Pieter Spiernburgh ‘Masculinity, Violence and Honor: An Introduction’ in Pieter Spierenburg (ed.) Men 
and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1998), p. 2, 9-10, similarly Amy Sophia Greenberg, in the same volume, emphasises the 
role of society as a limiting factor that helps to restrain violence, whereas Stephen Kantrowitz looks at 
how society uses violence as a tool to enforce its own rules and social norms.  Although these 
arguments are interesting they fail to examine how the violence in these particular studies could have 
potentially affected their host societies in turn.  Amy Sophia Greenberg ‘Fights/Fires: Violent Firemen in 
the Nineteenth-Century American City’ in Pieter Spierenburg (ed.) Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, 
and Rituals in Modern Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 163-165, 
and Stephen Kantrowitz ‘White Supremacist Justice and the Rule of Law: Lynching, Honor, and the State 
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gives – are certainly persuading but, as general concepts designed to explain the relationship 
between violence and society, they are quite limited.  The relationship between violence and 
society is dynamic, not unilateral, with both of these components exerting forces upon one 
another.  Additionally, Spierenburg’s definition of violence is unnecessarily restrictive, placing 
artificial conditions upon it which limit potential analysis.  In his introduction to the volume, he 
defines acts of violence strictly as acts of aggression which affect the body, and, though this 
argument is not without some merit, it fails to acknowledge the full spectrum of violent 
experiences.20  Acts of violence are transitory phenomena often lasting little more than a few 
hurried seconds or minutes.  However, the effects of violence can last for much greater 
periods of time, often long outlasting the original act.  The physical act, then, is only one 
component in a much longer process.  Violence leaves its scars upon the body, true, but it can 
also leave its mark upon the mind.21 
 Like Spierenburg, Linda Colley – in her study of the international captivity experience – 
defines violence strictly in terms of the body without ever fully justifying this self-imposed 
limitation.  In her reading of frontier violence, attacks by Indians upon the ‘bodies’ of settlers, 
were, for the Indians initiating them, attacks upon Britain itself.22  But her addition of ‘body’ as 
a qualifier is never appropriately explained beyond its use as a text to be read and there is little 
discussion as to whether or not this recurrent practice is necessarily appropriate.  Like Jill 
Lepore who, in her study of King Philip’s War, argues that the settlers had an inherent 
advantage in any frontier conflict owing to their use of the pen as a propaganda weapon, 
Colley emphasises the readings conducted by contemporaries upon texts – particularly bodies 
– at the expense of the actual relationship between the individual, society, and the violent 
interactions which they encountered.23  Lepore makes an insightful point when she argues that 
wars produce both bodies and documents, but they also produce persons who are widowed, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in Ben Tillman’s South Carolina’ in Pieter Spierenburg (ed.) Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and 
Rituals in Modern Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), pp. 220-221 
20 Spiernburgh ‘Masculinity, Violence and Honor,’ pp. 4-5 
21 To separate the body and mind when one discusses violence and warfare is a self defeating 
proposition.  Over the course of the twentieth, twenty first and even parts of the nineteenth centuries, 
it has become increasingly clear that the body is not the only thing which can sustain wounds during 
warfare.  The Cambridge Dictionary, for instance, defines violence not with respect to physical contact, 
but in far broader terms which accept that violence is not necessarily a physical phenomenon (‘Violence 
noun.  1. Actions or words which are intended to hurt people. 2. Extreme force’).  See Eric T. Dean, Jr. 
Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, And the Civil War (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), Cambridge Dictionary Online 
(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/violence, Retrieved 18/06/2010, 11:48am) 
22 Linda Colley Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), p. 
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23 Jill Lepore The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1998), pp. x-xii and Colley Captives, p. 8-15 
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orphaned, terrorised, or connected to the fighting through some other ancillary mechanisms.24  
In these cases, persons are conditioned not by the reporting of war, and certainly not by the 
written word, but by their own direct and indirect experiences with the fighting – this is 
something historians should not forget.  Deconstruction of the body and an emphasis upon the 
written word can have its benefits, but it can also deflect from the interaction which occurred 
between violence and the mind.  By qualifying settler or captive ‘bodies’ Colley is, at least on 
some level, drawing a clear distinction between attacks upon the body, and attacks upon the 
mind.  This assumption, in turn, suggests that violations of one do not necessarily affect the 
other.  As a baser assumption, this is inherently problematic as it creates a separation that did 
not exist, and even Colley herself demonstrates that she is sensitive to this on several 
occasions, a practice which makes the recurring qualification of ‘bodies’ all the more jarring.25   
Most importantly, her analysis of the captivity narrative as a method of cultural transmission, 
transferring the experiences of captives to a larger public, is certainly insightful but to suggest 
that contemporaries read only bodily damage in these documents, enjoying the descriptions as 
a type of ‘pornography,’ is both contentious and difficult to sustain.26 
 Of course, arguing that contemporaries read these sources in a different manner is 
equally problematic.  At the very least, however, it is necessary to acknowledge that these 
narratives can be interpreted in such as a way as to demonstrate that the authors of these 
documents wished to impart more to their audience than a mere ‘pornography’ of physical 
violation.  In her often studied captivity narrative, Mary Rowland’s confession that her 
experience among the Indians quite literally kept her awake at night suggests that this victim 
counted physical abuse as only one consequence of her captivity among the Indians.  As she 
put it, ‘I can remember the time, when I used to sleep quietly without working in my thoughts, 
whole nights together; but now it is other ways with me.’ One can only speculate as to how 
Rowlandson’s husband felt about this nocturnal change in his wife.27  Moreover, this 
                                                            
24 Lepore The Name of War, pp. x-xxii 
25 For a Discussion of the enslavement process as a (mental) trauma, see Colley Captives, pp. 55-56, and 
for a discussion of the impact of fear, an inherently internalised emotional response not necessarily 
attached to any direct bodily experience, with particular reference to Braddock’s Defeat in the Seven 
Years War, see Colley Captives, pp. 179 
26 Colley Captives, p. 177 
27 Mary Rowlandson A Narrative of the Captivity, Suffering, and Removes of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, 
Who was Taken Prisoner by the Indian; with Several Others; and Treated in the Most Barbarous and 
Cruel Manner by the Wild Savages: With Many Other Remarkable Events During her Travels. Written by 
her Own Hand, for her Private Use, and Since Made Public at the Earnest Desire of Some Friends, and for 
the Benefit of the Afflicted (Boston: Massachusetts School Society, 1856), p. 118.  For examples of 
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confession suggests a belief that such an admission would elicit a sympathetic response among 
her readers, suggesting that they would be able to empathise with her – as an individual – 
even though her bodily violations were few in number.  Instead of direct physical abuse, 
Rowlandson’s greatest victimhood comes from losing her personal autonomy for a period of 
time, and her internalisation of the abuses and deaths suffered by her fellow settlers and 
family members.  True, there is an argument to be made that it was the violation of other 
bodies which defined her experience, but there is also a strong argument to be made that 
Rowlandson defined herself among her readership not merely as a conduit for the suffering of 
others but as a person who had suffered in her own right through the loss of her ‘sweet babe’ 
of a child and her post-restoration bouts of insomnia.28  There can be no doubt that victims of 
physical abuse stirred strong emotions among contemporaries but to argue that victims of 
other, non-bodily abuses did not receive empathy raises some serious theoretical questions.29 
 By limiting one’s study to that of the body, one implies that the lasting effects of 
certain encounters upon the mind – and their related impact upon a person’s social outlook 
and worldly expectations – are of little consequence.  This is, however, a problematic set of 
assumptions from which to begin studying the relationship between violence and society.  
When a large cross section of a given community is affected by warfare or conflict the 
experiences and alterations in the individual can potentially become the experiences and 
alterations of society.  As Spierenburg correctly argues, society sets rules by which violent 
encounters are executed, but – taking this argument further – large scale exposure to conflict 
can alter society and its baser assumptions, and thus alter the social relationship between the 
group, the individual, and the conflict.30  The conscious separation of the body from the 
abstraction that is the individual appears to be an unnecessary qualification which necessarily 
excludes the effects of non-physical violence.  Psychological warfare is not an alien concept in 
the modern world and though the phrase may be comparatively new, evidence of it can, 
nonetheless, be identified in sources generated by frontier hostilities.31  In his study of the 
Seven Years War, Matthew C. Ward makes this argument and, in so doing, goes some way 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Threaten”: Indian Malice and Individual Liberty in Mary Rowlandson’s Captivity Narrative’ American 
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29 In this regard both Philippe Ariès and Lawrence Stone have cast long shadows, but their interpretation 
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30 Spiernburgh ‘Masculinity, Violence and Honor,’ pp. 9-10 
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towards reconnecting the mind and the body.32  But even in cases where conscious 
psychological warfare appears to be absent, it should be understood that on some level, all 
warfare is psychological.  When one studies violence the body cannot be studied in isolation.  
The human body is nothing without the mind just as the converse is also true.  Put simply, 
when studying the history of violence, one should not look upon the human body at the 
expense of the human being. 
Similarly, associating violence too closely with one specific gender can also be 
problematic as violence does not necessarily have an inherent relationship with a given sex.  
David T. Courtwright in his study of violence in America – Violent Land – focuses upon what he 
believes to be a natural link between masculinity and conflict, the result of a theoretical 
understanding which is steeped heavily in evolutionary psychology.33  Where Courtwright 
identifies large amounts of violence in a particular context he thus also identifies a hyper-
masculine society.  While there are certainly merits to such an argument his strict theoretical 
position limits any questions regarding the impact violence had, in its own un-gendered right, 
upon society.  Courtwright’s interpretation does not give violence in society any particular 
power, only the men within it and an increase in violence would hence mark, as Courtwright 
argues, increased male domination.34  The issue being identified here is that Courtwright’s 
argument suggests that societies can only become more violent when they become hyper-
masculine and, superficially, most frontiers – including the Kentucky frontier – appear to fit 
that description.  However, women were far from powerless entities on the frontier and, in 
many instances, they could drive violence and conflict forward in their own right.35  The 
necessities of war on the frontier often forced certain gender barriers into retreat.  In 
particular, attacks upon frontier forts quite naturally involved every person within the 
stockade, but not necessarily as victims.  Women were often found in non-traditional roles 
running bullets, firing weapons, sometimes dressing as men, but most importantly they were 
instigators of fighting when they repeatedly – and apparently with some regularity – shamed 
‘cowards’ into joining the fray.36  Of course, there were marked differences in the roles played 
by men and women on the frontier, but even with this being the case women often took 
surprising and sometimes prominent roles, not only in actual combat situations but as 
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35 Elizabeth A. Perkins Border Life: Experience and Memory in the Revolutionary Ohio Valley (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 141-146 
36 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Nathaniel Hart’ Draper Manuscripts 17CC191-209 and Stephen Aron 
How the West was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 34-35 
 
 
21 
instigators of violent episodes.37  Native American women, for instance, could demand physical 
retribution for the loss of a child in the form of a prisoner, to be killed or adopted at their 
discretion.  In such cases it may well have been parties of men who engaged in the actual 
combat, but it was women who set the beat to which those warriors, and their enemies, had 
to dance.38 
Honour, too, is another recurring theme in the historiography of backcountry violence 
with Spierenburg and his collaborators, David Courtwright, and Elliot J. Gorn, among others, all 
drawing heavily upon – and adding to – this idea.39  There can be no doubt from the rich 
scholarship which has developed around this subject that honour was an integral part of many 
violent interactions but, as tempting as it can be, one must move beyond this social condition 
when examining intercultural conflict in the Ohio Valley.  As enlightening as studies of honour 
often are, they can – if applied without qualification to an inappropriate context – be just as 
limiting.  Hugh McGary’s murder of Moluntha, for instance, could be interpreted as having 
undertones of dented honour but his actions are far better explained when the role of honour 
is minimised and the longer impact of violence is emphasised.  Honour certainly played a role 
in some conflicts, particularly those between settlers – although evidence for honour based 
fighting in Kentucky during the late eighteenth century is surprisingly thin on the ground – but 
it was rarely a significant force in driving the settlers and the Indians to arms against one 
another.40  Daniel Boone, for instance, was widely believed by his family to have shot and 
                                                            
37 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Martin Wymore’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC128-132 
38 Theda Perdue Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 49-51 
39 Elliot J. Gorn ‘“Gouge and Bite, Pull Hair and Scratch”: The Social Significance of Fighting in the 
Southern Backcountry’ The American Historical Review, Vol. 90 (1985): 18-43, pp. 18-22, Spierenburg 
(ed.) Men and Violence, Courtwright Violent Land, pp. 28-29, and Kenneth S. Greenberg ‘The Nose, the 
Lie, and the Duel in the Antebellum South’ American Historical Review, Vol. 95 (1990): 57-74 
40 One of the only instances of an honour-inspired conflict appeared in the Kentucky Gazette in the late 
summer of 1790.  In this ‘sunrise...duel’ one man was killed and another injured.  One set of sources 
which consistently suggests honour-inspired combat was relatively common in the backcountry are 
traveller accounts, a source set which Elliot J. Gorn liberally employed in his study of ‘rough and tumble’ 
frontier fighting.  Traveller accounts, however, are far from problematic sources and a certain difficulty 
occurs when one attempts to square these accounts with other primary source material.  Elias Pym 
Fordham, on his travels through the west in the nineteenth century, describes how Kentuckians – 
apparently – turned to pistols and dirks alike in order to settle arguments, an idea perfectly consistent 
with Gorn’s thesis.  However, it is worth noting that the period Fordham describes takes place following 
the conclusion of the war with the Indians.  Indeed, Gorn’s paper is very vague when it comes to 
suggesting which periods his thesis is best applied to and it is worth noting that his work fails to account 
for how Indian wars may or may not impact intra-white violence.  There was certainly strife among the 
settlers of Kentucky, but at least during the period of the frontier war, the rough and tumble fighting 
Gorn describes was not as widespread his paper suggests.  For ‘sunrise...duel’ see Kentucky Gazette 
(Bradford), August 2nd, 1790, p. 3, see also Gorn ‘Gouge and Bite, Pull Hair and Scratch,’ pp. 23-25 and 
Elias Pym Fordham and Frederic Austin Ogg (ed.) Personal Narrative of Travels in Virginia, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky; and a Residence in the Illinois Territory: 1817-1818 (Cleveland: 
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), pp. 180-181 
 
 
22 
killed a defenceless Indian he had found fishing upon a river bank following the disappearance, 
and presumed murder, of his brother-in-law and best friend, John Stewart.  According to 
Boone’s son, Nathan, ‘he saw an Indian fishing, sitting upon the part of a fallen tree projecting 
over the water, and he afterward simply said, “While I was looking at him he tumbled into the 
river and I saw no more of him.” It was understood from the way in which he spoke of it that 
he had shot and killed the Indian; yet he seemed not to care about alluding particularly to it.’41  
Boone acted, in this instance, not to restore any dented honour on his or anyone else’s part 
but to avenge a fallen companion.  Apparently there was no honour to be had in boasting 
about this or any of the other deaths he was responsible for.42   
Concepts such as honour are often employed in order to explain how society 
managed, controlled and even generated violence.  However some historians have attempted 
to demonstrate that past experiences with violence have had, at least some, formative effect 
upon the shape of society, most notably David Hackett Fischer in his expansive work on 
cultural transference from Britain to America, Albion’s Seed.  The issue with Fischer’s 
interpretation of the violence-society relationship is that it tends to depict cultures affected by 
violence as relatively unchanging entities which can be transplanted from one region to 
another without undergoing significant changes.43  Indeed, the underlying thesis behind 
Albion’s Seed is that modern day American culture can essentially be traced back to just four 
British folk ways which were transferred, almost wholesale, to colonial America.  In the case of 
the backcountry, Fischer identifies a British border culture made up of lowland Scots, Irish, and 
border English whose experiences of borderland warfare – a tradition which, Fischer 
controversially argues, lasted for centuries – was transferred to colonial America where it was 
replicated on the frontier.44  There are, however, a number of serious issues with these 
arguments.  For one, Fischer depicts a British borderland culture which exaggerates the extent 
to which violence affected this group, offering a false impression of something close to a 
warrior culture steeped in combat and animosity which was then transplanted to the American 
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backcountry.45  This group of borderers, Fischer argues, created a cultural hegemony that 
dominated other minority groups in the region, thus removing the agency of frontier violence.  
According to this argument, the violence of the frontier was not the result of local conditions 
but instead found its roots in century old conflicts institutionalised and moved to a new 
geographic locale.  Quite aside from the serious issues relating to Fischer’s interpretation of 
violence in the British borderlands, the idea that something akin to a warrior society develops 
when violence is applied to a given social group is too simplistic.  Though this thesis is arguing 
that violence shapes society, it is specifically identifying social outlooks, world views, and 
cultural expectations as its principle fodder for modification.  To be sure, cultural animosity 
generated by the frontier war would continue to shape how the settlers perceived the Indians 
well into the nineteenth century, particularly with regards to the issue of their removal, but it 
did not breed the type of society one would expect had Fischer’s interpretation of violence and 
culture held true.  Similarly, Grady McWhiney’s Cracker Culture is equally problematic, arguing, 
as it does, that attitudes towards violence in the southern colonies were the result of a ‘Celtic’ 
cultural transference from the British Isles.46  Once again, the idea that the conflict which 
dominated the backcountry had, essentially, been imported from Britain is problematic and, 
though the cultural impact of groups such as the Scots and the Irish should not be dismissed, it 
must be handled with care.47  It certainly should not be emphasised to the point where the 
agency and actions of the North America’s aboriginal population is all but deemed irrelevant. 
Violence, then, is rarely viewed on its own terms – not as a cultural aftermath, but as a 
social starting point.  When it is treated as a force capable of shaping society, historians tend 
to make this argument in the context of wholesale cultural transference from mainland Britain 
to the colonies.  Rather than being informed by their violent pasts, historians such as Fischer 
and McWhiney instead argue that groups such as the Scots and the Irish were absolutely 
defined by them.  Markus Rediker, however, presents an alternative, more nuanced approach 
to conceptualising early modern subcultures in his study of eighteenth century merchant 
mariners.   In his work, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, Rediker describes an 
eloquent process which allowed a lower class maritime subculture to develop in the trans-
Atlantic world which emphasised collective experience over ethnic origins.  Throughout his 
work, Rediker convincingly argues that this subculture was the product of two specific pressure 
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points between which seafaring men, both as individuals and as a community, had to live, 
operate, and, most importantly, adapt.  In Rediker’s specific case study, the two pressure 
points which he identifies are the autocratic powers wielded by a ship’s captain, and the 
environmental hardships and dangers posed by life on the ocean.48  For Rediker, the cultural 
birthplace of a given sea farer was unimportant compared to these two principle pressure 
points.  Unlike Fischer and McWhiney, Rediker proposes a model for society which accounts 
for not only cultural changes, but even cultural creation.  In this case, Rediker demonstrates 
how excessive use of a captain’s near-unrestricted authority led to the development of a 
distinct early eighteenth century pirate culture.49  Of course, the creation of maritime 
subcultures is a very specific study but the concept Ridiker employs – that cultures are shaped 
and created by both their environment and the actions of other human beings who wield 
significant, even life or death, levels of power – is an important one.  Indeed, it is particularly 
relevant in any context where similar pressure points can be identified. 
Where Rediker’s argument is somewhat limited is in its identification of only two 
cultural pressure points.  Of course, Rediker is identifying the two specific conditions which he 
believed formed the basis of a maritime subculture but it is important, nonetheless, to at least 
acknowledge that other conditions, or pressure points  – such as the political sphere, the 
economy, and existing concepts of identity – all would have played some role in forming the 
subculture’s final shape.  The issue is not that cultures and communities form between two 
given points.  Rather, they form between spectrums of such points, some of which were 
unique to a given context, some of which were more typical of the early modern trans-Atlantic 
world.  Where Rediker succeeds is in demonstrating that his chosen two pressure points acted 
as the principle forces behind the reshaping of his subjects’ distinctive world views.50  Similarly, 
upon the frontier an array of cultural influences from the colonies and Europe helped to 
inform settler society, but conditions which were not only distinct to the region, but 
pronounced by circumstance and necessity, helped to create a context which gave this time 
and place – and the people who lived there – a distinct character from the rest of early 
America.  The presence of a significant wilderness posed a major challenge to many settlers.   
It increased the amount of labour required to initiate farming activities, limited mobility, 
offered some resources in abundance whilst denying others, and provided an environment 
which allowed one’s enemies the opportunity to travel extensively without detection.  As 
important as these conditions were, the wildernesses was not a distinct characteristic of the 
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trans-Appalachian west alone.  However, the frontier war which affected this region did serve 
to compound many of the challenges posed by such an environment whilst providing 
significantly more of its own.  Violence alone did not shape society in locales such as Kentucky, 
but it was the most important of the region’s distinctive pressure points.  The wilderness, 
though less distinct, served as another and together they amounted to a socio-cultural 
ecosystem that was more than the sum of its parts. 
Violent interactions thus became one of the most significant contact points – to 
commandeer a turn of phrase utilized by Andrew R. L Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute – between 
the settlers and the Indians of the Ohio Valley.51  Prior to 1774 the frontier was hardly a 
stranger to intercultural violence, particularly after the outbreak of the Seven Years War.  
However, for much of the eighteenth century a spectrum of other contact points had helped 
to facilitate a wide range of non-violent interactions between the settlers and the Indians.   In 
his study of go-between culture in the Pennsylvania backcountry, James H. Merrell 
demonstrates that violence did not need to become the principle contact point between these 
two groups.  In Merrell’s work the go-betweens effectively function as contact points, or 
cultural bridges, allowing two very different peoples the opportunity to interact successfully.  
But even in this context, much of the work carried out by Merrell’s go-betweens involved the 
aversion of violence, or the abatement of tensions.  Thus, it is easy to see how the lack of an 
effective go-between class, particularly when combined with the contentious issue of land 
ownership, could lead to the resumption of the type of highly personalised warfare Jane 
Merritt identified in her monograph At the Crossroads.52  Moreover, the continued presence of 
go-betweens operating between the British and Indian spheres during the American 
Revolution served to compound the development of conflict on frontier from the 1770s 
onwards.  Rather than alleviating tensions between settlers and Indians, the Revolution 
instead saw this same group consciously escalating them.53  
 Even as non-violent contact points between the British and the Indians flourished, 
those between the Indians and the settlers entered a state of near-fatal decline.  In his oft 
cited work, The Middle Ground, Richard White describes a concept of necessary compromise 
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which facilitated peaceful contact between the settlers and the Indians where the dominance 
of one party over the other seemed either unlikely or impossible, an idea echoed in Michael 
McConnell’s A Country Between.54  In Kentucky, however, no effective Middle Ground, no 
attempt to understand the ‘values and the practices’ of the other group, developed during the 
course of the frontier war because both sides worked ceaselessly throughout the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century to remove their enemies from many of the most contested 
territories.55  White’s Middle Ground may have developed as a method of averting destructive 
– and unwinnable – wars around the Great Lakes, but throughout Kentucky and the trans-
Appalachian regions something of a Battle Ground developed instead.  Without any effective 
go-between class or any other bridging system, and, more importantly, no clear method by 
which one might arise, violence in this area was able to spiral to the point of self perpetuation. 
With the collapse of any system analogous to the mediating mechanisms Merrell, 
White and McConnell identified, the path was cleared for two important parallel 
developments to occur among the settlers.  The first, and perhaps most important, went 
beyond simply conceptualising the Indians as Others against whom the settlers could define 
their own identity.56  Instead, the Otherness of the Indians became something much more 
precise in the settler imagination.  The Indians became their enemies, which is to say they 
were conceptualized not just as different, but fundamentally acrimonious and aggressive.  The 
development of this perception occurred in tandem with the collective development of what 
can best be described, to borrow a turn phrase from A.T.Q Stewart, as a siege mentality.57  
Throughout the frontier war, the sheer mastery wielded by the Indians over the landscape 
meant that even when direct attacks were not forthcoming the use of psychological warfare 
and the destruction of essential resources served to keep the settlers off balance.  The 
cumulative effect of these practices resulted in the creation – in the collective settler 
imagination – of the idea that the community was subject to a near constant state of attrition 
and attack.  The relative isolation of the trans-Appalachian region, largely as a result of the 
territory’s namesake mountain range, limited contact with the east, further compounding the 
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development of this besieged perspective.  The isolation of Kentucky in particular has led 
historian Ted Franklin Belue to describe that country as something of an inland island, but it is 
perhaps more accurate to describe it as an inland ocean – a territory defined by isolated 
islands of settlement separated from one another by a sea of wilderness controlled by the 
Indians.58  This siege mentality – combined with the growing idea that the Indians were the 
settlers’ natural enemy – is a potent example of how the frontier war led to changes in the 
settlers’ world view.  Not only did the settlers modify how they viewed their opponents, but 
also how they viewed the world around them and their place within it. 
The creation of these shared ideas was an important development for settlers across 
the trans-Appalachian west, particularly in those areas of the frontier – such as Kentucky – 
which were most affected by the war.  These ideas were the common intellectual property of 
the community and, as such, they helped to erode divisions between different, non-Indian, 
ethnic groups in the region.  Elizabeth Perkins argued that the converse was true.  Rather than 
identifying the ways in which the war dissolved perceived ethnic barriers, Perkins instead 
emphasises relatively static boundaries between the peoples of the frontier, noting instances 
of division in her study rather than engaging with the larger context of communal coalescence 
which occurred within the region.  In one case, for instance, Perkins argues that the recording 
of an Irish accent was evidence that the settlers were defined by perceived divisions amongst 
themselves, however an analysis of the context surrounding this quote suggests a contrary 
interpretation is more appropriate.59  ‘By Jasus,’ Jim Wilson, the Irishman in question, was 
recorded as having said, ‘I’ll kill him.’  The ‘him’ in question was the Shawnee war chief, Blue 
Jacket, and the people with whom Wilson was conversing were a group of settlers – of mixed 
ethnicity – who had set out together in order to hunt Indians.  Whilst it is true, in this instance, 
that the Irishman’s accent was recorded it is also true that, regardless of accent, all of the 
settlers in this example were working together in one of the most important collective 
enterprises which could be undertaken during this time on the frontier: the protection of the 
community from the Indians.  True, the settlers recognised different dialects, accents, 
ethnicities, and different European origins – as Perkins is correct to demonstrate – but they 
also recognised a far more important commonality which they defined against their collective 
enemy.60  It mattered little that Michael Stoner hailed from Germanic stock and spoke with a 
thick accent.61  What mattered to the settlers – among whom he became one of the most 
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renowned and respected hunters in all of Kentucky – was his mastery of the rifle.62  Peter 
Silver made this argument explicit in his study of the mid-Atlantic colonies, Our Savage 
Neighbours, when he argued that the ‘fear and horror’ generated by the Indian wars served to 
break down the barriers which separated different European groups, rather than allowing 
them to remain static and unchallenged.63  In a very real way then, the realities of the frontier 
war eroded ethnic divisions among the settler community, altering the larger group in order to 
accommodate the particular challenges posed by the conflict. 
For Perkins, however, violence and warfare did not play a defining role in bringing 
change to the frontier community.  Instead, Perkins emphasises a consistency among existing 
attitudes rather than analysing the change which this specific context both offers and 
demands.  Certainly, Perkins’ study offers numerous invaluable insights and much sound 
analysis but it nonetheless does not account for the formative forces created by the frontier 
war and the changes which they brought about in the settler community.  In contrast to 
Perkins’ emphasised consistency, Stephen Aron’s How the West was Lost instead 
demonstrates that society in Kentucky was dynamic, changing to accommodate new forces 
which were introduced during the country’s formative years.  Aron’s study, however, explains 
those changes largely in terms of economic and political development with little regard for the 
lasting effects of the frontier war.64  In particular, the tendency to view the Indians in ever 
more racial terms – something which gained significant traction over the course of the war – is 
largely absent from Aron’s analysis.  In contrast, Patrick Griffin has placed the transformation 
of Indian perception at the centre of his study of the Revolutionary Ohio Valley, American 
Leviathan.  According to Griffin, social forces unleashed during the American Revolution served 
to transform how the settlers perceived the Indians.  Griffin’s argument – that the ‘racist 
impulse’ was ‘unleashed, revealed, or refashioned at the moment of revolution’ – certainly 
makes an important assertion, but it also suggests a sudden transformation where a more 
subtle argument would be more appropriate.65   
The late eighteenth century certainly saw a significant shift in how western settlers 
perceived the Indians, but the process was hardly straightforward or inevitable.  Even in the 
first part of the nineteenth century, men such as Matthew Elliot and Simon Girty were seen by 
many westerners as being close, if not identical, to the Indians in spite of their white 
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parentage.66  This conscious recognition among contemporaries – that characteristics could be 
learned, rather than inherited – muddies the racial waters considerably.  When men and 
women described Girty and his ilk as ‘savages’ they were suggesting an important alternative 
to pure racism which saw culture and personal actions, rather than inherited biological traits, 
placed at the centre of how the Indians were conceptualised and understood.67  That said the 
war for the trans-Appalachian region and its fallout in the early nineteenth century – not just 
the Revolutionary war, as Griffin argues – served as something of a racial crucible in the west, 
crystallizing proto-racist ideas which had been set in motion by the Seven Years War.68  
Although Jane Merritt has argued that the Indians were already perceived as a race by the 
1760s, the period prior to the outbreak of the frontier war in Kentucky and the Ohio Valley was 
a time of numerous racial possibilities as settlers expressed muddied and sometimes 
contradictory perspectives which demonstrated a remarkable lack of uniform clarity on the 
subject.69  The transformation of the Indians into a race was never inevitable, even if it did 
seem likely.  By the end of the frontier war in 1795, however, twenty years of continuous 
hostilities with the Indians had helped to enforce the idea that all members of this group 
shared a particular set of hostile and aggressive characteristics.  More than any single conflict 
before it, the frontier war in the trans-Appalachian west served to fundamentally transform 
how the Indians were perceived by western settlers, and – as a result – how western settlers 
perceived themselves.  As the last part of this thesis will demonstrate, this transformation in 
perception would have serious repercussions for the Indians throughout the nineteenth 
century elongating the impact of the war long past its actual conclusion.  The frontier war thus 
altered how the settlers understood themselves, their enemies and the roles played by both in 
the wider world.  Perhaps, then, the west endured, even when it appeared to have been 
transformed beyond recognition.  True, the original pioneers struggled to prosper as the 
region was changed from a frontier to a state, but the ideological children of the frontier war 
would continue to play a significant role not only in the development of the region, but in the 
development of the nation.70  
The settlers who found themselves in Kentucky in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century were fundamentally informed by their pasts.  The actions which they undertook were 
tied to how they understood their prior experiences and, in Kentucky and across the trans-
Appalachian territories, those experiences tended to revolve around the sights, sounds, and 
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emotions of war.  Formed in the space between numerous cultural pressure points – including 
conflict, the wilderness, resistance to Euro-American expansion, and pre-existing cultural 
trends imported from Europe and the east – the resultant settler society was the sum of both 
its past experiences and its anticipated future.  However, of all the pressure points which 
exerted an influence on this community, it was the impact of violence which was by far the 
most significant.  From the outbreak of Dunmore’s War in 1774 until the Treaty of Greenville in 
1795, the world the settlers built was one defined by the impact of conflict and, in both the 
long and the short term, the society which developed in this region reflected that reality.  
Settlers who had been affected by warfare with the Indians saw the world from a different 
perspective to those who had not.  In many cases they looked through eyes which had seen 
their relatives and companions killed or mutilated, they carried with them weapons which had 
been used in battle against their enemies, and they lived in communities filled with homes 
emptied by raids and with families shattered by loss.  It is the purpose of this thesis to explore 
the relationship which existed during this period between warfare and the frontier community, 
examining how each affected the other.  The violence of the frontier war was no impotent 
entity, but a force which exerted fundamental changes upon the communities it touched, just 
as those communities – in turn – helped to shape the particular character of the war.  The 
relationship between violence and society on the Kentucky and trans-Appalachian frontiers 
was both dynamic and fundamental and, as such, it is impossible to understand one without 
fully understanding the other. 
Although the Ohio Valley has been widely studied, the specific focus of this work will 
be upon Kentucky – an area which has received comparatively little academic attention to date 
– and, to a lesser extent, southern Ohio.71  There are a number of reasons why Kentucky, in 
particular, will form the main focus of this study including issues relating to the historical 
context, as well issues relating to the available source material.  With regards to the context, 
Kentucky as a region has been the victim of a drought of major academic monographs with 
only Elizabeth Perkin’s Borderlife and Stephen Aron’s How the West was Lost offering 
significant studies focusing upon the region’s frontier period in recent years.72  These studies 
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illuminate aspects of this region’s frontier period but neither provides an analysis which also 
reflects the chronology of Kentucky during the Revolutionary War, something this work will 
rectify.  Reflecting the lack of modern academic focus, if one were to look for another major 
academic work analysing the Kentucky frontier one would have to turn to John Mack 
Faragher’s biography of Daniel Boone.  Whilst this work is probably the best individual analysis 
of the man, it is necessarily restricted in its scope when it comes to representing Kentucky’s 
frontier period as a whole.73  In broad terms, far more has been written about the 
Pennsylvania backcountry than has been written about the frontier in Kentucky.74  This lack of 
focused micro-studies has left a significant blind spot in the Ohio Valley’s historiography, 
particularly concerning the development of the war with the Indians in the late eighteenth 
century; by taking Kentucky as the focus of this study and providing a chronological framework 
for the analysis contained within this thesis, this work aims to offset this issue.   
Kentucky also occupies an interesting space in backcountry historiography as it cannot 
be studied without specific reference to areas north of the Ohio River and south of the 
Cumberland Gap, particularly the territories which now comprise Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, West 
Virginia and Tennessee.  As such it fits awkwardly into the existing historiography of the 
southern backcountry, at once demanding analysis in the context of the north even as its 
immigrant population – the same migratory tide which served to populate western Virginia 
and Tennessee – demands analysis in the context of the south.75  Kentucky, then, forms a 
keystone in the trans-Appalachian region, an area which is neither southern nor northern but 
was instead fundamentally western.  In addition to Kentucky, southern Ohio – from 1788 to 
1795 – also forms an important region within this study for the following two reasons.   
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First, the migratory tide from Kentucky to Ohio was significant with a major south to 
north movement occurring during the last years of the frontier war.  This movement of 
individuals north of the Ohio River saw the settlers taking not only their property out of 
Kentucky, but their war-formed ideas and world views.76  Large areas of southern Ohio thus 
became a cultural and social extension of Kentucky, a reality compounded by the significant 
amount of conflict which surrounded the development of these settlements.  After 1795, 
however, the Ohio frontier would develop under different conditions from those which had 
affected Kentucky during its formative period.  To be sure, hostilities between the settlers and 
the Indians did not disappear entirely but following the treaty of Greenville the process of 
Euro-American expansion across Ohio took a very different course to the settlement of 
Kentucky.77  During the frontier war, Kentucky and southern Ohio can be considered – more or 
less – as one, but following the end of hostilities the Ohio frontier was affected by various 
forms of non-violent contact with the Indians which had largely eluded Kentucky during its 
time as a borderland.  In the post-Greenville era, then, the formative experiences of the 
Kentucky and Ohio frontiers diverged sharply.  The second reason Ohio plays an important role 
in this thesis is that it comprised the home territory of a significant number of the Indians who 
were involved in the frontier war.  Like the setters upon whom this work will primarily focus, 
the Indians of Ohio were fundamentally affected by this conflict.  Although this study will 
engage with the social impact this war had upon the tribes of the Ohio Valley, they will not be 
the principle subject of this analysis, deserving as they are of a full and complete treatment of 
their own.  The settlers of Kentucky and southern Ohio will form the principle case studies of 
this thesis, but the ideas and concepts employed in this work can be applied to other areas of 
the trans-Appalachian west, particularly western Virginia, Tennessee and western 
Pennsylvania. 
A detailed study of the impact of violence upon frontier society in Kentucky is possible 
because a wide array of letters, diaries, newspapers, court depositions, and oral histories 
which relate directly to the Kentucky-Ohio region exist which allow this largely neglected area 
to be studied in some depth.   Although Gregory Nobles has argued that – outside of New 
England – there are few sources which provide a non-elite perspective of the frontier, this is 
simply not the case for the Kentucky, particularly when recorded oral traditions are 
considered.78  Collections of letters also offer an intriguing insight into family life upon the 
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frontier and, specifically, how the war with the Indians affected it.  The Flemings-Edmunds 
Papers, for instance, contain a remarkable collection of letters written by members of William 
Fleming’s family from the 1760s until the early 1800s which give a particularly interesting 
insight into how William’s adventures on the frontier affected those closely related to him, 
whilst a number of other letters and one off documents from a variety of family collections 
provide insights into how the death of friends and compatriots impacted the lives of those who 
survived.79  As with most areas in the Ohio Valley, a massive number of documents are 
contained within the voluminous Draper manuscripts such as military records, reports, letters 
and journals which shed significant light upon both the intensity of the frontier war and its 
wider effect upon the population.80  For insights into everyday life during this period, family 
papers again tend to be one of the best sources with court depositions relating to land 
disputes also providing some useful information.  Published narratives and autobiographies, 
particularly when used in tandem with newspapers, have provided much information about 
specific events and the development of general attitudes throughout the region with 
newspapers in particular demonstrating both continuity and discontinuity over time.81 
 As with most histories, the most problematic aspect of gathering source material for 
this thesis has come from finding documents which reflect the experiences of the illiterate 
masses – this category includes the majority of settlers and Indians.  For the Indians, captivity 
narratives have proven an interesting source particularly as several dating from the first half of 
the nineteenth century were written by settlers who had spent decades living among the 
Indians as fully naturalised cultural converts.  In particular, the narrative of Jonathan Alder and 
the – much more obscure – narrative of John Tanner have provided some significant insights 
into how the Indians viewed the war for the frontier.  Of course, captivity narratives are far 
from problematic but read closely and with an awareness of the prejudices and motivations 
which underline these sources, much valuable information can be gleaned from them.  
Similarly, other settler-centric sources which concern or feature the Indians can also provide 
important insights when analysed, weighed, and studied appropriately.82  Records relating to 
treaty negotiations or the influence of the British among the Indians have proven to have some 
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particular value in interpreting their experiences, along with missionary accounts by David 
Zeisberger and John Heckewelder.83  
 As for the illiterate settler masses, a subset within the Draper Manuscripts known as 
the John D. Shane Interviews has acted to give a voice to a large portion of this group which 
would otherwise have remained utterly silent; in a very real way these sources are the eye into 
the non-literate majority.  Shane, a Presbyterian Minister living in the early nineteenth 
century, spent a large portion of his life collecting interviews from former pioneers, a practice 
which should not be alien to anyone familiar with the overall Draper manuscripts collection.  
Shane, however, took an unusually far sighted approach to his collection by rarely engaging in 
the type of interviews for which Lyman Draper is best known.84  Rather than mining his 
subjects on particular characters and events, Shane instead allowed those with whom he 
spoke the opportunity to talk about the subjects which they deemed most relevant.85   
This process resulted in a curious and distinct collection which reflects the 
remembered experiences of the interviewee in a much more accurate manner.  As a collector 
of personal histories, Shane makes his presence known in these sources in a very obvious way 
and at numerous points he scribbles his thoughts and reflections regarding the collection 
process – and his subjects – in the margins of his notes.  This practice allows historians to 
understand his methodology in some considerable detail.  On more than one occasion, for 
instance, Shane makes it known that he did indeed have prejudices and that he found some of 
the accounts which he was recording to be distasteful in nature.  When he interviewed Joe 
Taylor, for instance, he commented in his notes that Taylor’s account of butchering Indians 
had left him feeling ‘disgusted.’   According to Shane, this particular settler ‘had more of the air 
of one loving to tell stories, than of a simple hearted pioneer.’86  Obviously Shane had 
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particular ideas about the character of the settlers whom he interviewed, but that did not stop 
him from recording accounts which did not fit easily with that view.  If his interviews were not 
taken down verbatim, he at least recorded the major details, even when they failed to live up 
to his own expectations.87  Elizabeth Perkins correctly identified a further method of Shane’s 
for ensuring accuracy: he made every attempt to read the interviews back to his subjects, a 
practice which is born out in the scribbled notes which dot the final documents.88  Setting 
aside issues relating to memory and interpretation for a moment, Shane made every attempt 
to accurately reflect the narratives which were delivered to him and, though his sensibilities 
were obviously affected by some stories – the occasional, but never arbitrary, absent word in 
these documents demonstrates Shane’s offended sensibilities when his subjects swore – he 
nonetheless recorded numerous accounts of violence, sex, abuse, and moral deviation.89 
The issue with this source collection does not lie with the man who recorded it.  
Instead, the primary issue with any collection of oral histories, as Elizabeth Tonkins and Ivan 
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Jaksic have acknowledged, concerns memory and, ultimately, interpretation.90  What, for 
instance, did the settlers fail to recall, what did they choose to omit, and why did they choose 
to tell the stories they ultimately did? First, it is essential to accept that these oral accounts do 
not provide a three hundred and sixty degree view of life on the frontier.  Even if they had 
tried, the settlers could not have presented a complete window into their own pasts.  As a 
collection of sources, however, the Shane interviews do offer distinctive insights into a wide 
range of experiences and – crucially – they can offer the type of insights which were not 
recorded in most other documents or sources.  For example, marital infidelity and sexual 
promiscuity were discussed by the settlers but not readily recorded in most traditional written 
materials.  In other examples, Shane recorded accounts of interpersonal incidents which, 
otherwise, would have been completely lost to history.  Hugh McGary’s second wife, for 
example, was prone to violent ‘tantrums’ which often played out in public.91  This is the type of 
information which is often distinct to personal oral histories however it is telling that no other 
significant insights are given into the relationship shared by the McGarys: how often did these 
tantrums occur? Were they irrational episodes or brought on by the actions of her husband? 
Did the couple enjoy one another’s company out with the context of these outbursts? 
Evidently, these accounts do not provide a complete picture – the question that remains, then, 
is what is missing from these sources? The Shane interviews certainly have their limits, but 
when they are used in conjunction with other sources, these interviews help to add significant 
depth, often adding additional context and personal perspective where otherwise there would 
be none.  These sources do not provide historians with a complete view into the world of the 
illiterate masses, but they do provide a glimpse which – if handled with care, caution and 
critical scepticism – can illuminate the actions and world views of those whose voice would 
have otherwise been lost. 
The fallibility of memory is another issue which historians must address where oral 
histories are concerned.  Put simply, people forget or misremember and, as such, some of the 
information contained within the Shane interviews could be inaccurate.  Indeed, this would be 
a particular problem in a lone interview, or a collection which included only a small number of 
samples.  However, the size of Shane’s collection – he collected no less than three hundred 
distinct interviews – allows for a significant amount of narrative overlap which provides some 
level of verification between accounts, not to mention the ability to verify these sources by 
                                                            
90 Elizabeth Tonkin ‘Investigating Oral Traditions’ The Journal of African History, Vol. 27 (1986): 203-213.  
See also Ivan Jaksic ‘Oral History in the Americas’ The Journal of American History, Vol. 79 (1992): 590-
600 
91 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Sarah Graham’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC45 
 
 
 
37 
comparing them to other primary materials.92  Of course, particulars and details are often lost 
or confused, however the Shane interviews demonstrate, for the most part, a strong degree of 
consistency.93  Far more problematic than misremembering incidental details, however, is the 
potential of the individual being interviewed to reinterpret past events based upon their later 
experiences.  Why, in particular, did so many of Shane’s subjects focus – almost exclusively – 
upon the war with the Indians rather than other aspects related to life on the frontier? To be 
sure, some imparted details of family life, others mentioned the process of whiskey making, 
and others still touched upon courtship between the sexes but, in almost every instance, even 
these expanded topics occur within a context of violence and bloodshed.94  This raises 
something of a quandary for historians using this material.  Did Shane’s subjects focus upon 
violence because it was one of the most important and dominant aspects of their lives or did 
they focus upon it because later events had led them to dwell upon the war 
disproportionately? There are no simple answers for these issues but it appears that both of 
these possibilities go some way to forming an overall explanation.  The process of producing a 
personal oral history is not as simple as offering an interpretation of past events filtered 
through a contemporary lens.  Rather, it must be recognised – first and foremost – that the 
past being discussed by a given settler had some direct relationship with the period in which 
they were being questioned; the latter, quite literally, came into being from the former.  The 
Indian removals of the 1830s along with more recent conflicts with the Indians, such as the 
Black Hawk War, likely gave most former settlers a framework in which they could 
contextualise their past, but these later events – as will be demonstrated in the last part of this 
thesis – were also born out of this period. 
Nevertheless, it remains telling that details of battles, lost relatives, and ruined lives 
came so readily to mind.  It is not that the present does not in some way help us to reinterpret 
our pasts, but it is equally true, if not more so, that our pasts are the bedrock upon which our 
presents come to be.  When Shane asked his subjects to tell him of their time on the frontier 
they tellingly dwelled upon the losses they as individuals – or as members of a larger 
                                                            
92 John D. Shane’s interviews can be found in volumes 11-17CC of the Draper manuscripts.  In addition 
to interviews, Shane also transcribed letters, church records, and other source materials. 
93 A good example of narrative overlap occurred between the various accounts which Shane collected of 
Blue Jacket’s capture, revealing – as they do – a significant level of consistency between the different 
memories of this event recorded by Shane.  See John D. Shane ‘Interview with John Hanks’ Draper 
Manuscripts 12CC138-144, John D. Shane ‘Interview with William Clinkenbeard’ Draper Manuscripts 
11CC54-66,  and John D. Shane ‘Interview with Patrick Scott’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC9 
94 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Sarah Graham’ 12CC47 and John D. Shane ‘Interview with David Deron’ 
Draper Manuscripts 12CC242 
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community – had sustained.95  They did this, in part, because of what was happening between 
the United States and the remaining eastern Indian tribes throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, but they also did this because those memories had stayed with them and 
were deemed important enough to share.  Whilst later events in the United States may have 
dictated the memories which the settlers shared or emphasised, they did not create them.  
Although problematic, the Shane interviews provide the largest part of the settler community 
with a voice which they otherwise would have been denied.  When compared with 
contemporary documentary materials, these oral accounts compliment rather than conflict.  
Of course, there was more to the frontier war, or life on the frontier, than these testimonies 
could ever hope to represent but their existence adds additional depth to the surviving 
documentary evidence,  providing perspectives and context which otherwise would have been 
lacking.  As significant as this interview collection is in recovering the voice of illiterate settlers, 
it should be noted that Shane’s collection will provide only one component in a broad selection 
of primary materials which will be employed throughout this thesis.  Letters, narratives, 
published accounts, newspapers, court records, diaries, journals, and oral histories will provide 
the overall concert of evidence which this thesis will employ. 
The relationship between violence and society was a core dynamic on the Kentucky, 
southern Ohio, and wider trans-Appalachian frontiers.  As a community, the settlers were 
fundamentally affected by the impact violence had upon their lives, realigning how they 
conceived of themselves, their enemies, and the world they inhabited.  More than an event, 
violence was instead a process which helped to define the early settler community in regions 
such as Kentucky, whilst in the long term it helped to realign how white Americans would 
perceive, and ultimately deal with Indians throughout the nineteenth century.  Chapter one of 
this thesis will demonstrate how personal vendettas between relatively small groups of 
settlers and Indians were able to escalate into much larger conflicts by looking specifically at 
the case of Dunmore’s War in 1774.  In chapter two, the specific impact of psychological 
warfare in Kentucky will be considered in order to demonstrate how the vendettas sparked in 
1774 were able to spread throughout the larger community, creating a spiral of violence that 
could grow independent of other top-down forces.  Chapter three will examine how the 
settlers perceived their new environment, particularly with regard to how Indian military 
control over the wilderness encouraged a sense of commonality throughout the community 
and forced ethnic divisions among the settlers into retreat.  The fourth chapter will analyse 
how the development of widespread communal revenge was responsible for perpetuating 
                                                            
95 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Captain John Wilson’ Draper Manuscripts 17CC6-25, John D. Shane 
‘Interview with unknown person’ Draper 11CC279-283 and Shane ‘Interview with George Fearis’ Draper 
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violence in the region throughout the late 1770s and 1780s.  This chapter will also 
demonstrate that an escalating series of violent events brought the conflict to the point of self 
perpetuation even as the Revolutionary War was beginning to wind down.  Chapter five will 
analyse the importance of the family and other interpersonal relationships in driving warfare in 
the region forward.  Whilst chapter four examines how violence against an individual drove 
them to fight – even beyond the limits of the Revolution – chapter five will analyse how and 
why violations of families, kin and companion groups further fuelled the drive to fight.  
Chapter six will examine how the political élite, unable to restrain the war in the west, 
ultimately came to take advantage of it in order to secure vast amounts of land from the 
Indians.   
Although each chapter of this thesis will focus upon a specific theme, it will also frame 
those specific ideas in a chronological context.  This will be done for two reasons.  First, the 
narrative of the frontier war in Kentucky is not at all well established.  Indeed, no specific 
micro-study of the effects of the American Revolution upon Kentucky’s frontier community 
exists.  As such this vacuum will thus be filled by this work.  Secondly, though the themes 
described in each individual chapter tended to affect the period as a whole, certain concepts 
were most visible or most significant during the specific times emphasised in a given chapter.  
For instance, the importance of ground-up vendettas between small groups of settlers and 
Indians is most relevantly expressed during the context of Dunmore’s War – and hence chapter 
one.  In contrast, the role played by a much wider desire for revenge among the community is 
expressed particularly well in the period immediately before the end of the Revolution in order 
to demonstrate why the war continued even when policy makers and the government sought 
to bring it to a close – hence this subject is addressed largely in chapter four.  Other themes, 
such as the role played by the environment and the importance of the family apply equally 
well throughout the period studied in this thesis, however they have been placed within the 
chronological structure during periods when the arguments expressed in those chapters can 
be made most effectively.  
It is worth making a final note regarding the limits of this thesis.  Although a social 
history of the Kentucky and southern Ohio frontiers, it does not attempt to offer a complete 
analysis of all aspects of the community which developed in this region.  Specifically, it is a 
social history of war in the region rather than a complete social history of the people.  For this 
reason certain aspects of the community fully deserving of study, such as gender and the 
relationship between white settlers and African-American slaves, are not analysed in any 
particular detail.  To be sure, these subjects are engaged with to a limited degree – where 
deemed appropriate – but to offer the full analysis which they deserve would require a 
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finished volume two or possibly three times larger than this.  Instead of considering gender or 
race, this thesis looks instead at the relationship between violence and people.  Of course, the 
experiences of men and women – for instance – were not uniform but the central argument of 
this thesis is that the violence of the frontier affected and altered the community as a whole, 
not one component part.  Likewise, this thesis will not attempt to offer a detailed study of how 
violence affected the Indian communities who took part in this conflict.  Although this subject 
does appear at numerous points, with some conclusions drawn, the Native American 
experience requires, demands, and deserves a full study of its own.  This thesis, then, does not 
contain all of the answers – however it does aspire to pose some new, or under realised 
questions for contexts affected by significant levels of violence.  First, in what ways did 
violence impact the individual? Secondly, when a large body of individuals were affected by 
conflict, how was that impact expressed in the communities which they collectively formed? 
Thirdly, did widespread exposure to conflict influence whether or not a community would 
react with further violence of its own? The settlers of Kentucky are thus a case study for these 
broader questions and it is very much the frontier settler community as a whole which is being 
considered within this work.  There can be no doubt that specific studies of gender, race and 
other theoretical divisions will shed further light upon these questions in the future, but a 
study of the community as a whole is in no way less deserving or significant because of this. 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
The People’s War for the Ohio Valley 
 
Yellow Creek, April 30th, 1774.  Since the beginning of spring, reports of Indian attacks, 
violations and raids upon the frontier had become increasingly common.1  Stories of 
ambushed settlers, captured pioneers, and victimized hunters had spread through the 
backcountry and, by April, rumours had started to appear concerning the inhabitants of Yellow 
Creek; specifically, it was said that hostile Indians were planning a massacre of the region’s 
burgeoning settler population.2  Responding to this anticipated attack, Daniel Greathouse and 
a band of like minded settlers prepared an assault of their own at the site.  The subsequent 
ambush of Indian men, women and children did not, however, help to secure the frontier or its 
inhabitants from further danger.  Instead, it laid the foundation for a series of comparable 
responses from enraged members of the Mingo tribe – particularly the war chief, Logan – thus 
triggering the conflict that would come to be known as Dunmore’s War.3  Since the end of 
Pontiac’s Rebellion ten years prior, the backcountry had been affected by a steady but 
relatively low level of intercultural conflict.  Both settlers and Indians had died at one another’s 
hands throughout this period but until 1774 these fatalities had not yet erupted into a more 
pervasive state of hostilities.4  They had, however, served to embitter, condition, and alienate 
individuals on both sides of the frontier.   
Building upon a social foundation laid by the Seven Years War, the continuing violence 
which afflicted the backcountry during this period helped to lay the groundwork for both 
settler and Indian led campaigns of vendetta.  It was within this context that men such as 
Daniel Greathouse and Michael Cresap launched their respective attacks upon the northern 
tribes.  Although Virginia – led by Lord Dunmore, the last royal governor of the colony – was 
not yet at war with any of the northern Indians, by spring the situation was beginning to look 
very different on the ground.  Shortly before Greathouse initiated his infamous Yellow Creek 
                                                            
1 ‘Letter from John Floyd to William Preston, April 26th, 1774’ Draper Manuscripts 3QQ19 
2 ‘Certification of Charles Polke’ in Thomas Jefferson Notes on the State of Virginia: Illustrated with a 
Map, Including the States of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware and Pennsylvania.  A New Edition, Prepared 
by the Author (J.W. Randolph: Richmond, 1853), p. 254 
3 William R. Nester The Frontier War for American Independence (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 
2004), pp. 56-57 
4 ‘Letter from Hugh Mercer to Colonel William Preston, January 8th, 1774’ Draper Manuscripts 3QQI, 
‘Letter from Captain Daniel Smith to Colonel William Preston, March 22nd, 1774’ Draper Manuscripts 
3QQ15, Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), October 8th, 1767, p. 1, Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 
June 16th, 1768, p. 1, and Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), April 15th, 1773, p. 1 
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massacre Cresap and a band of likeminded settlers had begun indiscriminately ambushing, 
attacking and killing whatever Indians they could find near the town of Wheeling.5  Similarly, 
war parties from the northern tribes were already beginning a limited – but no less potent – 
campaign against some of the most remote backcountry settlements.6  Although Lord 
Dunmore was months away from entering the fray, war on the frontier was already a reality, 
the product of the region’s inhabitants and the specific forces which drove them to fight. 
Accordingly, this chapter will analyse how a comparatively minor clash of vendettas 
affecting a relatively small number of combatants during the spring of 1774 was able to drive 
the frontier population to spark not only Dunmore’s so-called war but one of the most 
enduring and violent conflicts in the history of the American frontier.  By building upon the 
legacy of the Seven Years War, Pontiac’s Rebellion and the confrontations which had marred 
the frontier throughout the late 1760s and early 1770s, this latest outbreak of fighting served 
to crystallize and focus enmities and past grievances, a bottom-up tide which quickly moved 
the frontier away from peace towards chaos and warfare.  Far from being an impotent force, 
fear of a perceived enemy – particularly when combined with a negative preconception and a 
strong desire to live in safety – was a key bottom-up driving force and a significant after effect 
of the vendetta system which characterised the frontier in the early months of 1774.  More 
than a mere background detail, communal fear sparked by the escalating conflict helped to 
reinforce the notion among the settlers that war was not only a desirable course of action but 
an unavoidable one.  By the spring of 1774 high levels of violence had not yet resurfaced in the 
backcountry, even as massacres and retaliations were beginning to be carried out.7  However, 
the events leading up to Dunmore’s War served to infuse the backcountry with ideas and 
images of atrocities, stirring communal preconceptions, expectations and memories.  The 
number of active vendettas in the spring may have been small, but the ferocity of the violence 
which accompanied them served to prime the larger population for war.  As the conflict 
                                                            
5 ‘Letter from Ebenezer Zane to John Brown, February 4th, 1800’ in Jefferson Notes on the State of 
Virginia, pp. 249-250 
6 Virginia Gazette (Rind), December 9th, 1773, p. 1 and Virginia Gazette (Rind), March 24th, 1774, p. 3 
7 The Virginia Gazette, although not an objective measure of frontier warfare, reflects in its coverage 
between 1764 and 1774 a comparatively low level of conflict between western settlers and Indian 
tribes.  Between 1764 and 1766 accounts of Indian attacks in the paper (or accounts where such attacks 
were feared) largely disappear.  Although this absence does not necessarily indicate zero hostile 
interactions between Indians and frontier settlers, it does suggest that violent incidents reached a 
particularly low level.  Accounts of Indian attacks reappear in 1767, 1768 and 1769 before once again 
disappearing and remerging in 1772.  The average number of reported Indian attacks from 1767 until 
1773 – the eve of Dunmore’s War – is 1.43 per year.  The number reported in the paper in 1774 alone 
(Dunmore’s War) was seven.  See Virginia Gazette (Rind),  October 5th and September 7th, 1769, 
December 2nd, 1773, March 24th, June 23rd, June 30th, August 25th, 1774, Virginia Gazette (Purdie & 
Dixon), October 8th, December 3rd, 1767, February 25th and June 16th, 1768, June 25th, 1772, April 15th 
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escalated through the summer, an ever widening portion of the frontier population was 
exposed to the conflict and its associated trappings, a process which helped to lay the 
groundwork for future confrontations in Kentucky and its neighbouring regions.8  
For most historians, the outbreak of Dunmore’s War – and the larger struggle for the 
trans-Appalachian west – can be explained as the result of powerful, largely top-down forces 
such as economic pressure, competition for land, racism, or the actions and desires of the 
political élite, particularly Lord Dunmore in 1774.9  However, the settlers and Indians of the 
west were not affected by top-down forces in isolation.  They were also the victims of 
concurrent bottom-up tides which helped to significantly shape their actions, reactions and 
worldviews.  In order to understand why war broke out – and why the fighting essentially 
continued until 1795, an unprecedented period of unbroken warfare in North America, it is 
necessary to understand the forces which drove the masses, not their political masters.  
Greathouse’s band did not commit the massacre at Yellow Creek because they were 
responding to larger economic forces, nor because of Lord Dunmore's machinations to gather 
further power, influence and wealth to himself.10  They committed this act of violence because 
a series of experiences and forces particular to their lives had led them to – and primed them 
for – that precise situation.11  Namely, these forces were a fear of Indian raids, paranoia, past 
experiences with violence, existing preconceptions and a strong desire to protect one's self, 
not to mention one's family and cohorts.  The war which started on the frontier in 1774 was 
not a political war or a conflict which can easily be classified through a traditional, top-down 
analysis.  It was a social war; one inspired, perpetuated and fought by the people.  In short, 
Dunmore’s War, like much of the conflict which would occur in the backcountry over the next 
two decades, was driven from the ground up, a product of frontier experience and perception.  
Certainly, top-down forces were never entirely absent and the growing sense of a conscious 
                                                            
8 Throughout the period 1774-1795, vendettas played a significant role in generating bottom-up social 
forces on both the large and small scale.  In the case of Dunmore’s War, vendettas were operating at a 
smaller level, serving to trigger confrontations which spiralled into a much larger – but relatively brief – 
intercultural conflict.  By the 1780s, however, their role had changed somewhat as they began to 
directly affect a much larger proportion of the settler population.  This vast increase in exposure meant 
that they served to perpetuate a self-sustaining mechanism of violence, separating the ongoing frontier 
war from the geo-political struggle – the American Revolution – which helped to trigger it.  This 
expanded role will be analysed extensively in Chapter Four. 
9 Woody Holton Force Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, & the Making of the American Revolution in 
Virginia (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 33-35, Eric Hinderaker 
and Peter C. Mancall At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore and 
London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 157-160, and Faragher Daniel Boone, p. 99 
10 John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore ‘Lord Dunmore’s Official Report to the Earl of Dartmouth, December 
24th, 1774’ in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg (eds.) Documentary History of Dunmore’s 
War (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), pp. 368-371 
11 ‘Declaration of John Sappington’ in Jefferson Notes on the State of Virginia, pp. 266-268, ‘Declaration 
of Samuel McKee, Junior’ in Jefferson Notes on the State of Virginia, p. 268, and ‘Declaration of William 
Robinson’ in Jefferson Notes on the State of Virginia, pp. 255-257 
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differentiation between the settlers and the Indians was certainly laying a solid groundwork for 
future expressions of racism but other, more specific forces cannot be ignored when analysing 
the outbreak and perpetuation of this conflict.12  It was men like Michael Cresap, Daniel 
Greathouse and even Logan of the Mingo, after all, who started this war, not Dunmore.  For his 
part, Dunmore merely exploited particular aspects of an existing situation for his own 
benefit.13  It is these other individuals, then, and the forces which drove them and their 
followers to think, act and fight as they did which require and demand the most careful study.    
In many ways, Dunmore’s War of 1774 was a microcosm for the conflict which would 
envelop the frontier for the next twenty years.  Although larger economic and political forces 
would play a role in shaping the overall confrontation, the development of a vendetta 
obsessed frontier population in western Virginia served to drive and even catalyse much of the 
larger conflict. Historians may attempt to explain the outbreak of Dunmore’s War as the result 
of numerous top-down factors, but for many of those involved in the fighting, the conflict had 
been set in motion long before Dunmore finally lumbered into the fray, a war de jure if not a 
war de facto.  Dunmore’s War – like the larger struggle for the trans-Appalachian region – 
owed much of its existence to the desire among settlers and Indians to seek and extract 
revenge from the other’s general population.  Although the later struggle for the western 
region would be underlined by a much more widespread system of vendettas, Dunmore’s War 
demonstrated how even a relatively small number of individuals – impacted by violence and 
acutely focused upon attaining revenge for perceived atrocities – were able to ignite serious 
confrontations across the frontier.14  As both microcosm and spark, Dunmore’s War was an 
                                                            
12 Even if race – for instance – was accepted as a driving force behind this conflict more questions are 
raised by such a conclusion than are put to rest.  Did Greathouse, his followers, and those like him 
inherit a racial attitude (and if so, where did they inherit it from) or were they agents of its creation? 
What of Lord Dunmore's influence upon the war which took his name? If historians – such as John Mack 
Faragher – who argue that Dunmore’s War was an attempt by the Governor to redirect pre-
Revolutionary tensions are correct, how do Greathouse and his followers fit into this analysis? Were 
they simply precursors to Dunmore's plan – individuals acting upon an impulse tied to overarching 
political and economic forces of which they were ignorant – or were they instead acting in response to a 
local socio-cultural ecosystem; victims of their own experiences, not victims prone to the whims of the 
political world? For Faragher’s argument see Faragher Daniel Boone, p. 99. 
13 ‘Declaration of John Heckewelder’ in Jefferson Note on the State of Virginia, pp. 260-261 
14 Revenge was not a new force on the frontier, enshrined – as it was – within the Indian practice of 
captive taking, adoption and ritualistic torture.  Unlike the settlers, Indian tribes tended to have cultural 
mechanisms in place which stopped their desire from revenge from escalating out of control.  In 1774, 
however, those mechanisms appear to have failed as Logan and his followers consciously attempted to 
kill a number of settlers far in excess of the number of Mingo lost at Yellow Creek.  Rather than settling 
for the largely like-for-like revenge which characterised many such campaigns, Logan demanded far 
more blood than he had lost. See Henry Jolly ‘Account of Judge Henry Jolly’ Draper Manuscripts 6NN22-
24 and ‘Letter from Judge Harry Innes to Thomas Jefferson, March 2nd, 1799’ in Jefferson Notes on the 
State of Virginia, p. 246.  For a discussion concerning the restraint of revenge among Indian tribes see 
Wayne E. Lee ‘Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-
1800’ The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71 (2007): 701-741 
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important first step in igniting one of the most distinct, violent and enduring frontier wars in 
American history.  Misleading moniker aside, this confrontation was an expression of the 
frontier masses and of the forces which drove them – even on the eve of Revolution – to take 
up arms under the banner of a British governor. 
When, in 1769, Daniel Boone and a small band of companions stared across the 
Cumberland Gap into the territory that would become the state of Kentucky, they did so 
during a time of relative peace and stability.15  Although it is easy to think in terms of violence 
when one considers the American frontier, historians should remember that peace between 
settlers and Indians was much more common than warfare throughout the colonial period.  
From the original Powhatan raids upon early Virginia until the Wounded Knee massacre, the 
image of warring frontier peoples – one expanding, the other fighting that expansion – has 
been both constant and stifling.  Even in the period between 1754 and 1814 – a time which 
some historians have described as a ‘Sixty Years War’ in the Ohio Valley – more time was spent 
in a state of peace than was spent at war.16  To be sure, the idea of unchecked, warring 
populations in the backcountry has certainly been challenged in recent decades but the idea 
remains an important component in how the frontier is conceptualised.17   
Although it has been in-print for over forty years, Dee Brown’s bestselling polemic 
Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee continues to enjoy widespread distribution and popular 
acceptance, emphasising not only violent interactions between the Indians and the 
                                                            
15 John Filson and Daniel Boone ‘The Adventures of Daniel Boon’ in John Filson The Discovery, 
Settlement and Present State of Kentucky to Which is Added the Adventures of Daniel Boon (Wilmington: 
James Adams, 1784), pp. 50-51 
16 The total period of all the wars described by David Curtis Skaggs, Larry L. Nelson, and their 
contributors in their anthology The Sixty Year War for the Great Lakes is less than thirty years.   Skaggs et 
al does not argue that the ‘Sixty Years War’ represented a true war in its own right, but an extended 
period in which a number of related conflicts occurred in succession.  Still, it is interesting to note that 
even during this period of increased hostilities, less than half of the total time was actually spent 
fighting.  That said, Skaggs draws a clear distinction between the American Revolution and the war for 
the North West Territory whereas this thesis instead recognises no real or significant peace breaking out 
in the trans-Appalachian region following the conclusion of the former conflict.  Reclassifying these two 
wars into one larger conflict increases the total amount of time spent fighting by approximately five 
years.  However, even this increase serves principally to underline the distinctive nature of the war for 
trans-Appalachian region.  This conflict alone contains two thirds of the fighting in ‘Sixty Years War’ in 
only one third of the total duration.  David Curtis Skaggs ‘The Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes, 1754-
1814: An Overview’ in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson (eds.) The Sixty Years War for the Great 
Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 2001) 
17 Warren R. Hofstra has demonstrated ably that studies of particular backcountry contexts need not 
become veiled histories of Indian wars.  Instead, Hofstra demonstrates that far from being an ever-
present threat, violence could be a comparatively unimportant force on the frontier compared to other 
factors and conditions.  Similarly, Kim M. Gruenwald demonstrated in her study of the Ohio frontier in 
the early nineteenth century that warfare and conflict with the Indians – even in the Ohio Valley – was 
not an ever-present force, even when a sizable Indian population remained in the region.  Warren R. 
Hofstra The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2004) and Gruenwald Rivers of Enterprise 
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newcomers to their lands, but also the culpability of white interlopers in the resulting events.18  
For Brown, the history of America’s westward expansion was also a history of American-led 
wartime atrocities; massacres of Indian populations, forced relocations, and the wanton and 
deliberate destruction of aboriginal cultures.19  For the last two decades within the academic 
sphere much attention has instead been paid to the non-violent forms of interaction which 
often dominated relations between American settlers and Indian tribes, particularly as 
analysed by Richard White in The Middle Ground and Michael McConnell in A Country 
Between.20  However, the impact and influence of Bury My Heart continues to be felt, 
particularly in the popular sphere – Brown’s book has sold no less than five million copies to-
date and even spawned a feature film in 2007.21  The modern perception of the American 
frontier as expressed in the media continues to echo Brown’s enduring work, a story of 
repression and imperialistic expansion.22  Whilst Brown’s aim to remedy what he saw as a 
                                                            
18 In his review of Bury My Heart, Francis Paul Prucha made an interesting observation that remains as 
applicable today as it did upon its first publication: ‘This is the kind of book that would ordinarily not be 
noticed by scholarly journals...but the wide sales of the book, the praise given it by uncritical and 
unknowledgeable reviewers, and the advertising of the publishers who hope to have the book used in 
college courses, prompts careful appraisal of the book and its author’s techniques.’ Francis Paul Prucha, 
Review of Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West by Dee Brown.  The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 77 (1972): 589-590 
19 Dee Brown Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (1970; reprint, 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), pp. xxiii-xxv 
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Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), James Axtell Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Francis Jennings Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes 
in the Seven Years War in America (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988) and Daniel 
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Colonization (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 
21 Hampton Sides, a modern author of popular western histories such as Ghost Soldiers wrote a new 
foreword for the 2007 (thirteenth) printing of Bury My Heart.  Although Sides’ attack upon the academic 
world (‘lacking the requisite Ph.D. in history, [Brown] wasn’t a member of their club.  How dare he put 
out a bestselling pop history without proper deference to the eminent gatekeepers of the field – and 
without conventional footnotes, to boot...But the joke was on the tweed coats, of course’) is intensely 
polemic and vitriolic it nonetheless makes an important insight into the enduring influence this work has 
had compared to most academic histories: ‘The book has outlasted its critics and held up over two full 
generations now, proving just as resonant and powerful today...How many conventional histories can 
boast a thirteenth printing?’ Hamton Sides, Foreword to Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian 
History of the American West (1970; reprint, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), pp. xv-xix 
22 To fully explore and contrast modern depictions of European expansion across America compared to 
those of previous decades would require a space far in excess of that which is available here.  Some of 
the more prominent examples which display this include Steven Spielberg’s Into the West, a multi-
generational answer to John Ford’s How the West was Won, David Milch’s Deadwood television series, 
and the videogame GUN which was lambasted by the American Indian Development Associates (AIDA) 
for allegedly displaying ‘derogatory, harmful and inaccurate depictions of American Indians,’ within its 
interactive space.  In spite of this criticism it is clear that the Indian characters within this game were 
instead designed to elicit sympathy from the user owing to their continued victimization.  Indeed, the 
main character is eventually revealed to be half-Indian.  See Into the West, DVD.  Produced by Steven 
Spielberg, 2005.  US: Dreamworks Television, 2005, How the West was Won, Blu Ray.  Directed by John 
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perennially westward facing historical perspective was certainly laudable, his work instead 
replaced one directional prejudice with another.  Put simply, Brown employed a tomahawk 
where a scalpel would have been far more appropriate.  Reading Brown’s work is certainly an 
evocative experience and, one could argue, a necessary remedy against the prevailing wind of 
anti-Indian prejudice which existed at the time of its original publication.23  However, as 
historians further explore the processes which fuelled the expansion of Europeans across the 
American continent it becomes increasingly evident that the greatest care must be taken to 
ensure that the violence created by this process be understood in context.24  Brown’s book 
may not summarize current academic interpretations of settler-Indian interactions but it does 
represent a significant undercurrent of thought nonetheless, symbolizing the modern day 
context in which many historians first come into contact with Native America.  So long as Kevin 
Costner remains the face of the American west historians studying violence on the frontier will 
have to pay particular attention to the potential prejudices and preconceptions of their 
readers.   
The settlement of Kentucky, western Virginia and the wider trans-Appalachian west 
often disappears into the larger mist of historiography but it is important nonetheless to place 
it firmly within the larger context of frontier history and the ever-changing struggle for the 
backcountry.  This is necessary not because the settlement of this region was typical in its 
violence, but because the level of violence which dominated this area was remarkable.25  It is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
2007, GUN, Xbox 360.  Developed by Neversoft, 2005.  Woodland Hills, CA: Activision, 2005-2006.  For 
more on the controversy surrounding GUN see Aleks Krotoski ‘Native Americans File Complaint Against 
GUN’ Guardian Newspaper (Online Edition), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
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23 Dean J. Kotlowski ‘Alcatraz, Wounded Knee, and Beyond: The Nixon and Ford Administrations 
Respond to Native American Protest’ Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 72 (2003): 201-227 
24 Joshua Piker ‘Colonists and Creeks: Rethinking the Southern Backcountry’ The Journal of Southern 
History, Vol. 70 (2004): 503-540, pp. 503-507 
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created in peace and interrupted by war; wars, rumours of war, and costs of war affected every 
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the colonial period.  Of course, much of what Steele is arguing is sound, however by painting his 
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early America is not enough.  Instead, it is important to understand that the impact had by violence was 
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Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. xiii-xiv 
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not being argued here that the violence which affected the frontier should in any way be 
played down.  On the contrary, this thesis will demonstrate that violence was a key concept in 
the formation of particular frontier societies.  Rather, what is being argued here is that there 
was no single type of violent experience which defined the American frontier and violence, 
where it existed, could vary immensely in terms of its reach, duration, and intensity.  The 
narrative of European expansion across America – such as it is – is a collective of 
interconnected experiences containing a surprising amount of variation within.  From war to 
war, the level of destruction and disruption created by violence could vary significantly and, as 
such, the impact had upon the involved societies was also prone to significant shifts.  For 
historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, frontiers and borderlands may have been, by 
their very definition, ‘contested’ zones but it does not follow that violence in the backcountry 
was thus a universal constant.26  Instead, violence on the frontier should be understood as the 
nuanced, varied and often subtle force that it is.  Conflict was neither rare nor particularly 
uncommon in the backcountry but it is equally true that the intensity of that conflict was 
prone to serious and fundamental variations.  In some cases violence on the frontier is 
conspicuous only by it absence, suggesting that a given context is either comparatively distinct 
within the broader history of the backcountry, or that the role played by violence has, 
potentially, been overstated.  Although violence is present and correct in many of America’s 
frontier contexts it is also true that those same areas were not necessarily affected by 
prolonged or long term confrontations.27  Indeed, even when large scale wars with the Indians 
did break out, they can rarely be said to have been a defining characteristic of a given region 
for more than a handful of years.   
New England and South Carolina, for example, were both affected by some of the 
bloodiest Indian wars in colonial history but as frontier interactions go these conflicts were the 
exception rather than the rule.  King Philip’s and the Yamasee Wars may have produced 
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copious numbers of casualties but each conflict lasted only a few years.28  Frontier wars may 
have occurred but actual physical contact with violence and periods of prolonged, intercultural 
conflict were, on balance, rare occurrences.29  Such a comparative lack of violent contact raises 
important questions for historians analysing contexts which were affected by wars that were 
not only bloody, but enduring.  Was the struggle for the Kentucky-Ohio region a part of the 
same broader context of frontier strife as King Philip’s War, or does a combination of its 
duration and intensity mark it as a distinct entity? In some ways the trans-Appalachian west 
exists in a paradoxical position, evasive though this may seem, as both a single link in a war 
wearied chain that stretched from 1607 to 1890, and as a distinctive episode which exposed 
the frontier to periods of unusually intense violence for much longer periods of time than was 
typically common.  This apparent dichotomy appears to demand much more precise 
categorisation but it is important that this war is seen at once within both of these contexts, 
simultaneously as a part of a much larger system which saw Europe’s children come to 
culturally and demographically dominate North America, and as a distinctive type of frontier 
war. 
Part of the reason this conflict must be seen in both of these contexts is that the 
character of not only the individual war but of the overall context is only made manifest when 
each is studied in relation to the other.  The war for Kentucky and its neighbouring regions was 
indeed a singular component in a much longer process, but its sheer duration reflects how far 
individual conflicts could differ from the meta-narrative of frontier strife.  Within the context 
of the colonial period the Seven Years War, the Powhatan Raids, and the war for the Kentucky-
Ohio region all stand as comparatively distinct episodes in the period before 1795; long term 
conflicts which massively affected specific frontiers for prolonged periods of time.  For the 
most part, frontier wars did not endure through continuous physical confrontation – King 
Philip’s War lasted less than two years, the Yamasee War less than three and the Tuscarora 
War less than one.  Nor does the apparently high frequency of war in North America negate 
the relatively short periods of combat.  Although a chronological list of backcountry conflicts 
would certainly present a formidable catalogue of warfare, different conflicts affected 
different geographic locales at different points in time.  King William’s War, for instance, may 
have ended just fourteen years before the outbreak of the Tuscarora War but a significant 
                                                            
28 Colley Captives, pp. 144-147.  For discussions concerning the (non-violent) cultural origins of New 
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physical distance separated the frontier peoples involved.  Even throughout the 
interconnected struggles between France and Britain during first half of the eighteenth 
century, different sections of the backcountry suffered at different points in time.30  Rather 
than a continuity of experience, then, the different frontier wars fought in North America were 
united by a continuity of perception, literature and thought.31  Captivity narratives, woodcuts 
and colonial newspapers all served to partially link the conflicts which had been fought on the 
continent’s frontiers but one should be careful not to overstate the true social meaning of such 
continuities – continuing warfare between Anglo-American settlers and the country’s 
aboriginal population was not inevitable.32   
In contrast to these earlier frontier wars, the Seven Years War was perhaps the first 
truly long term frontier conflict to develop in what is now the United States since the end of 
the original Powhatan raids over a century before.33  Like that earlier conflict, the Seven Years 
War was an enduring conflict which affected a significant proportion of the frontier population 
over an extended period of time.  Moreover, within the context of the later colonial period the 
Seven Years War also marked a significant departure from the intercultural status quo, as well 
as functioning as something of a turning point in settler-Indian relations.  In the period before 
1764 the Seven Years War was a remarkable occurrence, a conflict whose fallout would go on 
to affect how the settlers viewed the Indians in the future, not merely as something Other, but 
as something inherently dangerous.34  No doubt other settlers had come to similar conclusions 
over the grand continuity of the Indian wars, but the sheer duration of this conflict meant that 
large numbers had no choice but to engage with the realities – and fallout – of intercultural 
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warfare as opposed to merely engaging with recorded accounts of this phenomena.35  By the 
middle of the eighteenth century Indian wars were no longer limited to print, but a reality to 
which many were forced to adapt.  Certainly, narratives and other printed accounts relating to 
past conflicts served as a link between the contemporary population and past wars with the 
Indians.  However, the coming of a conflict as widespread and enduring as the Seven Years 
War served to significantly reduce the degree of separation between a given backcountry 
settler and the realities of combat.36   
By the mid-1750s the proportion of backcountry settlers who had directly experienced 
the effects of warfare against the Indians was rising rapidly, whilst those still not directly 
affected by the fighting often shared a familial or fraternal relationship with those who were.  
Although the substitution of one second-hand source for another may appear trivial, the 
information passed on by family members, friends and acquaintances – as opposed to writers 
to whom a given reader had no connection – served to further reduce the perceived distance 
between the frontier population and the war with the Indians.  By the early 1760s the printed 
word was no longer the sole or primary means through which backcountry settlers were 
exposed to intercultural warfare.  Instead, this medium was joined and, likely, superseded by 
widespread firsthand experience and oral accounts delivered by survivors and veterans of the 
fighting.37  Rufus Putnam, a key early settler of Ohio, carried memories of the Indian attacks he 
had witnessed during this war throughout his entire adult life and, when reflecting upon 
wartime massacres, he would lament that ‘I think there are few if any who can view such 
scenes with indifference.’38  This analysis was not inaccurate.  When Logan of the Mingo heard 
that his family had been slaughtered at Yellow Creek his response could be said to have been 
many things, but indifferent it certainly was not.39   
The Seven Years War may have marked an important turning point in settler-Indian 
relations but the war that was waiting to begin in 1774 would serve to irrevocably alienate 
these peoples.  Rather than years of fighting, the struggle for Kentucky and its neighbouring 
areas would be measured in decades; even among long term frontier wars the struggle for 
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Kentucky and its neighbours was distinct.  Although the entire period starting with the Seven 
Years War and ending with War of 1812 has been described convincingly by David Curtis 
Skaggs, Larry L. Nelson, and a spectrum of collaborators as a Sixty Years War, there is still much 
value in identifying within that period a number of self contained, distinct conflicts.40  Rather 
than a definitive category, the Sixty Years War is something of an umbrella concept, bringing 
numerous conflicts which occurred during a period of increased hostilities under the same 
conceptual banner.41  Even within this context, however, the battle to settle Kentucky and 
southern Ohio was made distinctive by its duration.  Indeed, the struggle to settle this region 
was not just a keystone event during this sixty year period but was a keystone in the 
overarching struggle between Anglo-Americans and the Indian population of North America, 
focusing earlier anti-Indian perspectives whilst laying a social foundation for later racial 
attitudes towards this group.  But where the Seven Years War developed out of a grand 
imperial struggle between Britain and France, the war for the Kentucky and the trans-
Appalachian west developed and perpetuated itself independently from a repressive or 
overbearing political framework, by far outlasting the two political wars – the American 
Revolution and Dunmore’s War – which catalysed it.   
Treaties may have been signed which brought both of these wars to an official end, 
but on the ground the efforts of diplomats, go-betweens, and politicians amounted to little 
more than the production of scraps of paper.  Quite literally this was a war driven from the 
ground-up, not the top down; a people’s war, not from a Marxist perspective but from a social 
one.  Top-down forces may explain why states, governments and international powers go to 
war but they rarely explain why a given member of the rank-and-file, such as those who pre-
empted Dunmore’s actions in 1774, did so.  Similarly, broad theoretical concepts such as the 
release of pre-Revolutionary tensions suggested by Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall fail to 
suitably account, in real terms, for the motivation of men such as Daniel Greathouse and 
Michael Cresap.  Worse still, such concepts are loaded, denying the Mingo and the Shawnee 
agency in this affair.  To be sure, Hinderaker and Mancall’s interpretation sheds much light on 
specific aspects surrounding the outbreak of Dunmore’s War, but it does not illuminate the 
full, or even the largest part of the picture.42  Dunmore’s War was not fought on one level 
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alone.  For different groups the war appeared as a very different beast, fulfilling very different 
agendas.  For the political élite it allowed them an opportunity to claim massive portions of 
hitherto forbidden lands in the west.  For Dunmore, it presented an opportunity to re-direct 
the pre-Revolutionary tensions of his subordinates.43  For the Shawnee it was an opportunity 
to assert their independence from the Iroquois Confederacy and, with that, their ownership of 
Kentucky.44  For the Mingo, Dunmore’s War concerned their desire to avenge the massacre at 
Yellow Creek and for many western settlers the war was an opportunity to attack the Indians 
responsible for the renewed violence which was now plaguing the frontier.45  Of course there 
could be significant overlap between these different perspectives, particularly where land 
ownership was concerned, but for many settlers this war developed because an increase in 
Indian raids seemed to demand a like response in order to ensure the continued security of 
their communities.46 
In the years since Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee’s original publication, Dee Brown’s 
claxon call for historians to face ‘eastward’ when writing frontier history has produced a 
copious and often seminal body of work in its wake, but to fully understand how social 
mechanisms helped to produce what was one of North America’s most violent frontier wars, 
one must neither face east nor west but must instead look from the bottom up, taking in all of 
the competing perspectives together.47  To look in any one direction is an action which 
necessarily takes place at the expense of another group, and the true social significance of 
these wars cannot be understood with one’s back to any group of people, settlers or Indians 
alike.  As individuals, Logan and Greathouse may have played significant roles in the outbreak 
of Dunmore’s War but these two men are more appropriately viewed as representatives of 
movements rather than agents of individual whim.  Neither Greathouse nor Logan was alone 
when they went to war.  Each represents a groundswell movement for war among their 
people, and each of those individuals represents the power of bottom-up forces in driving 
communities towards conflict. 
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From a broad perspective, the settlers targeting the Kentucky country in the early 
1770s were entering a world which they were largely convinced they had, if not a God given 
right then at least some legal basis upon which to settle and claim lands.48  In recent years a 
number of negotiations and treaties, particularly the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, appeared to have 
succeeded in undermining the Proclamation Line which divided Indian from colonial territories.  
Rather than being defined by the Appalachian Mountains, recent agreements between colonial 
authorities and specific tribal groups had instead redefined the dividing line as the Ohio River, 
brining Kentucky, western Virginia and western Pennsylvania firmly into the Anglo-American 
sphere.  Moreover, it even appeared that this circumvention had been achieved with 
significant tribal consent.49  The actual situation, however, was far more complex and from the 
perspective of most tribes residing in the Ohio country, the aspiring settlers of the west had no 
basis – legal or otherwise – to claim or settle their southern lands.  Although void of any 
permanent habitations or townships, Kentucky served as a key hunting ground for a number of 
northern tribes, none of whom had consented to the sale of this region.50  Similarly, the 
Cherokee in the south likewise claimed this territory for the same purpose.51  Thus caught 
between traditional enemies, the Shawnee and Cherokee, Kentucky became something of a 
communal no mans’ land between the northern and the southern Indians, at once a shared 
hunting ground and a buffer between these antagonistic groups.52  As key as this territory was 
within the aboriginal landscape, however, the lack of permanent habitation was fundamentally 
misunderstood by the newly arrived settlers.  Finding a region void of Indian townships 
appeared to confirm not only the availability of the land, but the recent treaties which had 
ostensibly renounced all Indian claims to the territory. 
 Beginning with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, members of the colonial élite 
initiated a process designed to circumvent the 1763 Proclamation Line.  Presuming to speak for 
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the Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware, the Iroquois Confederacy agreed at Fort Stanwix to cede 
its tenuous claims to lands south of the Ohio River in exchange for recognition of their own 
territorial borders.53  Iroquois claims to the Ohio Valley were based not upon actual use or 
occupation of the territory but stemmed instead from past military victories in the region.54  
With no provisions made in the negotiations for the opinions, desires and needs of the region’s 
actual inhabitants, the subsequent treaty was worth little in real terms, particularly as large 
portions of the Shawnee – one of the most conservative of the northern tribes – refused to 
recognise the right of the Iroquois to negotiate on their behalf.55  The treaty may have been a 
thinly veiled attempt on the part of the Iroquois to deflect illegal settlement away from their 
own lands and into the Ohio Valley but it did, nevertheless, provide the necessary pretence for 
a legitimate settler invasion of the Kentucky country.56  For both the land hungry farmers of 
the backcountry and speculators alike, the quasi-legal acquisition of an apparently vacant 
territory came as a significant boon.  Throughout the 1760s would-be western settlers had 
consistently ignored the Proclamation Line, squatting on lands which were officially recognised 
as Indian territories.57  Although attempts by the British army to evict squatters had proven to 
be a mostly futile exercise, the legal acquisition of the Kentucky country presented that same 
class of individuals with an opportunity to not only settle on high quality western lands, but – 
crucially – to claim legal ownership of them.58  For many of the Indians residing in the Ohio 
country, however, the idea that Kentucky had been transferred from aboriginal to Euro-
American control was rejected outright.  Indeed, resistance to the sale was so great that the 
Shawnee began the difficult process of transforming their traditional enemies, the Cherokee, 
into staunch allies.59  For many Indians, then, there was simply no question as to who 
controlled the coveted Kentucky country – in that one respect at least, it was status quo ante 
bellum for the tribes.  At least until the settlers arrived. 
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 Throughout the late 1760s explorers and long hunters such as Daniel Boone faced 
significant resistance from the Indians they encountered in the disputed territory and, on more 
than one occasion, such early explorers were taken into custody and relieved of the furs and 
skins which they had harnessed in the region.60  In other, more serious cases however, the 
tension over who had the right to hunt, explore and operate west of the Proclamation Line led 
to outbreaks of more pronounced episodes of violence.  In 1769 John Stewart, Daniel Boone’s 
brother-in-law and close companion, disappeared in the wilderness, the presumed victim of an 
Indian attack.  According to members of Boone’s family, the loss of Stewart led the pioneer to 
undertake an uncharacteristic act of petty revenge when he apparently shot and killed the first 
isolated Indian he encountered following his friend’s disappearance.61  In that same year ‘some 
evil disposed and disorderly persons’ were accredited with the killing no less than sixteen 
members of the Delaware and Mingo tribes, a series of atrocities which many on the frontier 
feared would bring about open hostilities.62  Such incidents certainly had the potential to spark 
wider conflicts but the tiny handful of Euro-American hunters and speculators actually in 
Kentucky, probably not more than one or two dozen persons, served to minimize violent 
contact and, for the most part, sporadic outbreaks of violence in the region remained highly 
localised affairs.63  By the early 1770s, however, the strong desire among many colonists for 
western lands led directly to a marked increase in the level of human traffic passing through 
the country, something which allowed the festering tensions of previous years to find new 
avenues of expression.64  In 1773, many of these tensions came to a head when Daniel Boone 
led an expedition to establish the first permanent Euro-American settlement in Kentucky.  For 
all concerned the expedition was a disaster. 
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 After travelling through the wilderness for a little of over two weeks, Boone’s party 
divided into three smaller groups which quickly became separated by a distance of some miles.  
On October the 10th the rear party, straggling behind the two leading bands, was attacked by a 
group of Indians – very possibly Cherokee.65  Until this point, growing tensions surrounding the 
ownership of western lands such as Kentucky had primarily affected long hunters and pioneers 
in isolation, not their families or wider social networks.  The attack upon the Boone party, 
however, served as something of a turning point not only because it left half a dozen settlers 
dead following a pseudo-massacre, but because the party as a whole included women and 
children among its number.  Although none of the expedition’s women were among the rear 
party, two teenage boys – Henry, the son of William Russell and James, Daniel Boone’s sixteen 
year old boy – were among the casualties.66  ‘[S]hot through his hips,’ the younger Boone was 
left helpless but alive next to a similarly injured Henry as almost all of their other companions 
were killed around them.  Of the men who comprised the rear party only one escaped 
unscathed, a slave who was forced to ‘hid[e] in the driftwood in the creek,’ where he observed 
Boone’s and Russell’s subsequent capture.67  Following the initial attack the two injured boys 
were taken prisoner by an Indian named Big Jim, a well known acquaintance of the Boone 
family.  Regardless of ‘old friendships,’ James’ pleas for mercy appear to have fallen upon deaf 
ears and in short order the attacking party proceeded to torture the two survivors by pulling 
‘out the[ir] toenails and fingernails.’  Initially, James had begged Big Jim for his life, but by the 
time the torture was applied he instead pleaded with the Indians to ‘kill him at once and put 
him out of his misery.’  Following an exhausting round of torture, the two boys were ‘severely 
stabbed all to pieces and...tomahawked.’68  The effect of this assault upon the rest of the 
group was devastating.  Confusion and fear ran rampant as the settlers gathered together, 
fortified themselves and awaited a follow-up attack which never materialised.  The Indians 
may not have reappeared but the near-complete destruction of the rear party combined with 
the returned slave’s firsthand account of the Boone and Russell boys’ capture, torture, and 
execution provided the remaining settlers with all the reason they needed to abandon their 
designs upon Kentucky.  To sharpen the group’s despair, they were informed by their returned 
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slave that James had died believing that his ‘mother, brothers and sisters were all killed by the 
Indians.’69 
 Driven back east, the Boone party carried panic in its wake.70  Incidents such as the 
massacre of the rear group served to spread fear and apprehension across the backcountry 
but the specific actions of Big Jim and his associates, particularly the torture and execution of 
Henry and James, served to develop the situation a stage further, radicalising portions of the 
frontier community.  Conflict and death had certainly occurred west of the Appalachians in the 
years immediately preceding this latest attack but the indiscriminate ferocity associated with 
this episode was seen by some as evidence that the Indians were initiating a new frontier war.  
As 1773 drew to a close, the attack upon the Boone party and the torture of the teenagers 
came to be powerful symbols in the settlers’ collective imagination, potent images which 
spoke of imminent raids and butchered communities.71  If, by their actions, the Indians had 
meant to send the settlers a warning concerning their attempts to settle on western lands, 
they had inadvertently sent them a declaration instead.72  Even as colonists across Virginia – 
Kentucky would form the western most portion of Virginia until it achieved statehood in 1792 
– watched events building towards Revolution, they were made all too aware that the 
inhabitants of the backcountry were anticipating a fresh wave of Indian raids the following 
spring.73  Indian war parties rarely formed in the winter and, as such, the period following the 
return of the Boone party and the next seasonal change became a kind of historical blind spot 
– until the winter passed, revealing the Indians’ intentions, the inhabitants of the backcountry 
simply did not know whether the massacre of Boone’s rear party was an isolated incident or 
evidence of renewed warfare on the frontier.   
In the colonial imagination the line between what had actually occurred and what 
might happen was often paper thin and the resulting belief that a war could very well be 
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inevitable – or that one had already broken out – did not bode well for intercultural relations 
the following year.  Indeed, news of the Boone Party’s defeat and, specifically, the death and 
torture of Henry Russell were quickly ‘disseminated through the country’ before being 
encapsulated in a public call to arms against the backcountry’s ‘treacherous and clandestine 
foes’ which appeared in the Virginia Gazette the following March.  According to the 
newspaper’s enraged correspondent, the conflict which he envisioned was ‘necessary, nay, 
inevitable.’  Failing to recognise that the Boone party had been attacked whilst trespassing 
with the intention of illegally settling upon Indian land, or that numerous Indians had been 
killed in a series of atrocities over the preceding decade, the writer of this incendiary piece 
demanded a pre-emptive strike against the colony’s presumed enemies.  ‘[S]hould we,’ he 
demanded incredulously, ‘tamely suffer those savages to be the first invaders[?]’74  Of course, 
the ‘first invaders’ in this episode were the Boone party, not the Indians.  Crucially, this 
correspondent was not alone in ignoring this factor. 
 Around the same time that the author of this anti-Indian tirade was preparing his 
words for publication a number of settlers were preparing to take the security of the 
backcountry into their own hands.75  The context surrounding the attack upon the Boone party 
was of little consequence to these individuals and prior atrocities committed by the settlers 
were quickly forgotten or ignored.  Conversely, acts of aggression made by the Indians – real 
and imagined – quickly found a canonical place within the community’s vibrant oral culture.76  
All across the backcountry the war with the Indians, something which had yet to actually begin, 
started to take on a life of its own, even as Dunmore procrastinated and schemed about how 
he might best employ such a scenario to suit his own ends.  In Castlewood, in the south 
western portion of Virginia, families were beginning to abandon their homes and possessions, 
convinced as they were that a war with the Indians had, essentially, already begun.77   
From the perspective of most western Indians, however, the situation had not 
advanced so far.  Although many among the northern tribes perceived themselves as victims of 
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an illegal attempt to usurp their lands they often demonstrated significant levels of restraint 
when confronted with the vanguards of settlement.  When a group of Indians spied Lawrence 
Darnell, Thomas Glen, and William Nash moving down the southern edge of the Ohio River 
near the end of April, for instance, they made no attempt to lay in ambush or to otherwise 
physically harm the group.  Instead the three men were apprehended and simply ‘ordered off’ 
of Indian land.78  Of this group, Lawrence Darnell was actually a double recipient of Indian 
restraint – several weeks prior to this incident he had been captured along with half a dozen 
other settlers under similar circumstances by the Shawnee.  Like his later capture, neither 
Darnell nor any of his companions came to any harm.  Instead the group was relieved of their 
property following a three day detention before being sent back to the colonies.79  True, these 
incidents certainly suggest a high level of tension in the region, but for the most part the 
northern Indians were able to manage their grievances internally whilst still resisting the land 
violations which were becoming increasingly common.  It should also be remembered that the 
incendiary attack upon the Boone party appears to have been carried out by the southern 
Cherokee rather than their northern counterparts.80  Although significant factions within a 
number of the northern tribes were beginning to agitate for war, the internal diplomatic 
efforts made by chiefs such as Logan of the Mingo and White Eyes of the Delaware served to 
assuage most young warriors from brash action or irresponsible retribution.81  Only on one 
side of the frontier was the war already beginning to be perceived as a reality. 
 Whether justified or not, an increasing number of settlers were beginning to identify a 
state of open hostilities in the backcountry and, accordingly, many began readying themselves 
to strike back against their adversaries.  Michael Cresap, a veteran of Pontiac’s Rebellion 
whose brother had been killed by the Indians, took up the burgeoning frontier war with 
aplomb, leading a band of followers in a series of attacks upon the Indians near the town of 
Wheeling, western Virginia.82  By far the most prominent of these early wartime atrocities, 
however, was the Yellow Creek massacre carried out by Daniel Greathouse and his followers at 
the end of April upon the unsuspecting relatives – women and children included – of the 
Mingo peace advocate, Logan.83  Although Cresap was not present at this massacre, he and his 
men did compound the incident by attacking a group of retreating Mingo Indians who had 
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witnessed the slaughter from a hidden vantage point on the opposite side of the river.  
Gathering men at Wheeling, Cresap had set off down the Ohio on a self proclaimed mission to 
destroy Indians and it is perhaps an unfortunate coincidence that the first group he and his 
party encountered were witnesses to the Yellow Creek affair.  Although Cresap’s band 
succeeded in taking the life of another Mingo, they failed to stop the remainder of the 
retreating party from returning to their village and delivering the news of the massacre – and 
its follow up attack – to Logan.  Although most of the northern Indians had continued to 
demonstrate significant levels of restraint in the early spring, the news of the Yellow Creek 
massacre sparked Logan’s personal war against the inhabitants of the frontier, a campaign 
which would grow to involve not only members of the Mingo, but large numbers of the 
Shawnee as well.84  By May, then, an increasing number of individuals – settlers and Indians 
alike – were operating in a state of open but undeclared hostilities.  Settling in for the long 
haul, Michael Cresap began informing the inhabitants of Grave Creek that the ‘Indians wo’d kill 
them all,’ inspiring many to fall back to more secure locations.  He even asked one retreating 
father to surrender his son to him so that he might ‘raise [the boy] for the war.’85  Even from 
this early stage, the battle for the Ohio Valley was taking on shades of an intercultural blood 
feud. 
 With Logan set on the path for war and Cresap and his followers summarily 
ambushing, executing, and killing Indians, panic spread further across the frontier and even in 
locations where the conflict was yet to leave a physical mark, it was beginning to leave a 
mental one.  When eighteen settlers were killed by the Shawnee in June it was reported in the 
Virginia Gazette that as many as ‘1500 families’ were on the verge of abandoning the 
backcountry as a result.86  Although this figure appears grossly excessive, it underlines how a 
comparatively limited number of casualties could help to generate an endemic sense of alarm 
on the frontier.  The number of families who fled the backcountry likely did not approach 
fifteen hundred, but a significant number did flee the region nonetheless with many more 
abandoning farms in order to take refuge in communal fortifications.87  Indeed, James Harrod 
founded the first Euro-American settlement in Kentucky that year but as hostilities between 
the colonists and Indians spiralled out of control he was forced to abandon it, and the 
Kentucky country, until the following spring.88  The actual level of fighting was, by this point, 
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still relatively limited but, this notwithstanding, a growing number of frontier inhabitants were 
beginning to perceive a state of open hostilities that required immediate action.89  As 
Dunmore contemplated entering the fray, Cresap and his followers continued to wreak havoc 
up and down the Ohio River, firing upon any Indian they encountered.   In one particular 
instance, a settler named Stephens was almost killed when Cresap and his men opened fire 
upon the two peaceful Indians with whom he was travelling.  According to Stephens, his near 
death experience stemmed from Cresap’s promise ‘to put every Indian to Death he should 
meet,’ an action which would almost certainly produce grievances much like those which were 
– even then – driving Logan to wage war on the settlers of the backcountry.90   
With every casualty sustained, the early combatants of Dunmore’s War ensured that 
grievances were stacked upon grievances, opening up the conflict to larger groups on both 
sides.  When Dunmore finally entered the fray in the autumn, he forced that system to its 
natural conclusion.  By fielding large numbers of settlers against the Indians at the Battle of 
Point Pleasant, he was drawing upon one tidal movement of social forces whilst laying the 
foundation for another by providing thousands of individuals with a near-simultaneous 
opportunity to inflict and receive multiple harms of their own.  For that reason alone, the 
battle of Point Pleasant became the most far reaching event to occur on the frontier that year, 
bringing together thousands of settlers and Indians in shared animosity.91  Problematically, 
that animosity was not laid to rest by the confrontation and, through casualties sustained, new 
resentments were able to plant roots on the battlefield.  Dunmore’s settler army ultimately 
claimed the field at Point Pleasant but the day-long battle nonetheless took a significant toll 
upon the governor’s force.  More than one settler commented upon the ferocity of the Indians 
during the battle, whilst the bodies generated by the confrontation were a vivid, unavoidable 
reminder to the settlers that, even in victory, they had lost much at Indian hands.  Boasts of 
battlefield bravado may have abounded following the Indians’ retreat but the sights and 
sounds of the claimed field served to check unqualified celebrations.92   
According to one field officer, William Fleming, ‘[t]he cries of the wounded prevented 
our resting’ the night of the battle.  Indeed, Fleming had firsthand experience of the distressing 
mutilations and wounds which were created by the confrontation; after being shot, he had to 
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push part of his own lung ‘as long as one of my fingers,’ back into his own chest.93  Victory may 
have been attained, but so too was there no shortage of horrors to be dwelled upon in letters, 
and later in thought.94  Similarly, the defeated Shawnee returned to Ohio with experience, 
memory, and perceptions which had been sharpened, not dulled, by the battle.95  Point 
Pleasant may have effectively brought Dunmore’s War to a close but in real terms it had 
served to exponentially expand the number of persons affected by frontier combat.96  
Superficially, Dunmore and the settlers of the backcountry had won the war.  In real terms, 
however, they had helped to lay the groundwork for continuing resentment and intercultural 
animosity between themselves, the Shawnee, and the Mingo. 
Such realties, however, were not evident to those on the ground.97  Having gained the 
field at Point Pleasant, Dunmore was quick to press his advantage and, in short order, he led 
his forces north of the Ohio River to the Shawnee town of Chillicothe.  Having already suffered 
defeat, the tribe quickly capitulated and, as a means of securing their town from destruction, a 
number of chiefs agreed to confirm the controversial terms of the Fort Stanwix treaty.98  This 
final legislative victory, however, all but ensured a continuation of hostilities between the most 
militant Indians and settlers.  Dunmore may have ostensibly secured a renewed legal basis 
upon which the settlement of western lands could resume, but the treaty upon which he relied 
meant little to a significant proportion of the Shawnee and Mingo.99  Moreover, by apparently 
securing regions such as Kentucky which were – in reality – hotly disputed, Dunmore 
effectively helped to facilitate regular contact between settlers and Indians who shared very 
recent experiences fighting and killing one another.  Although Dunmore’s War is typically 
considered to be a distinct conflict from the American Revolution, for many on the ground 
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there was little to differentiate the fighting which occurred in 1774 from that which took place 
from 1775 onwards.100  Logan may have ‘fully glutted [his] vengeance’ by the end of that 
conflict but many of his fellow tribesmen were far from sated.101   
Rather than drawing a line under Dunmore’s War, it is important that the continuity 
between this conflict and the subsequent battle for the Ohio Valley be emphasised.  Fighting 
may have stopped for the winter, but this was not an unusual situation as Indian hunting 
habits, not to mention the difficulties of travelling during this season, tended to ensure that 
seasonal breaks from combat were regular occurrences.  By re-legitimizing the settler presence 
in the west, however, Dunmore set the stage for continued contact between groups of 
aggrieved individuals in the disputed territory.  Veterans of Dunmore’s War – settlers and 
Indians alike – found themselves competing for resources and, ultimately, control of the 
Kentucky country the following year, a situation which made the resumption of hostilities all 
the more likely.  Declarations of victory against the settlers’ ‘cruel and insidious enemy’ could 
not have been more premature.102 
Throughout 1775 a renewed settler push west of Appalachian Mountains saw the 
setbacks of the preceding years reversed in a fashion that, whilst not spectacular, was certainly 
convincing.  Throughout this year settlers streamed into the Kentucky country at a slow but 
steady rate, founding a number of important settlements which collectively acted as a 
beachhead for further colonisation.  Although disproportionately male in its demographic 
makeup, this movement onto western lands, which probably amounted to less than two 
hundred persons, carried with it the basic components required of a stable society; families.103  
Although family groups may have made up a minority of the early population, they generally 
entered the region in order to form permanent habitations and communities.  Profiteering in 
the form of land speculation and ownership was certainly a motivation for many of those 
heading west, but once there their day-to-day lives often tended to concern the survival of 
both of the individual and of the community.  With wagons unable to pass through the 
Cumberland Gap, early settlers could bring with them only a limited amount of resources and, 
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as such, they became heavily reliant upon the local area to furnish their needs.104  Similarly, 
specific skill sets were limited by the individuals that travelled into the country, a situation 
which made the sustainability of a stable society in the new west a precarious proposition.  
The arrival of families in the region certainly demonstrated the permanent designs the settlers 
had for the country, but the pressure placed upon these groups by acute resource poverty and 
renewed Indian raids served to undermine the viability of this goal.  Almost from the very 
beginning of continuous settlement in the region, Native American resistance continued to 
challenge and exasperate every facet of the operation and as early as the spring of that year a 
number of early pioneers were heading back across the mountains.105  Treaties may have been 
signed and declarations of peace issued, but hostilities between the settlers and Indians 
resumed almost as soon as winter passed.  
When William Calk and his companions made the journey west in March, they had 
already undergone no insignificant amount of hardships before news of Indian raids finally 
reached their ears.  On one particularly arduous leg of the journey the group had been forced 
to travel over a ‘terrible mountain that tired [them] all almost half to death,’ an experience 
which, along with bouts of snow and other bad weather, was repeated numerous times on the 
journey.  In spite, or perhaps because, of the hardships the party had already endured the 
mere mention of Indian hostilities was enough to send many would-be pioneers back over the 
mountains, facing those same hardships again and incurring significant losses as a result of 
their failed journey.  These consequences notwithstanding, ‘a great many people’ belonging to 
Calk’s party did just that when word was received from Daniel Boone on the 7th of April 
informing them that hostile Indians were at large throughout the country.  As the party 
pressed on they continued to encounter men fleeing Kentucky who informed them of the 
latest news regarding Indian raids, a practice which acted to thin the party further.  One 
retreating group told ‘such news’ that Abraham Hanks and Philip Drake, two of Calk’s original 
companions, were too ‘afraid to go any further’ and instead cut their losses and returned east.  
For those who remained, signs of strife with the Indians continued to grow more common and 
when a group of settlers were sent from Boonesborough to guide the party on the last leg of 
their journey they were careful to point out the location where the ‘Indians [had] fired on 
Boone’s company and killed 2 men...and wounded one man in the thigh.’106  By the time Calk 
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and his diminished party arrived at their destination they had been haemorrhaging members 
for weeks, a situation which ensured that the remaining party members had already felt the 
effects of Indian warfare without having  been involved in or even witnessing the events 
themselves.  In this respect, at least, the situation was remarkably similar to that which 
plagued the frontier twelve months earlier. 
Over the course of this first year in Kentucky, the number of physical confrontations 
which occurred between the Indians and settlers remained relatively limited owing partly to 
the small settler population, the divided nature of numerous tribes following the end of 
Dunmore’s War, and a genuine reluctance on the part of many Indians to reignite a 
widespread and destructive conflict on their proverbial doorstep.107  Such reluctance was 
hardly universal, however, with the atrocities and land violations of the preceding years having 
served to radicalise a core group who ensured that their impact was felt south of the Ohio 
River.108  Throughout 1775 and the first part of 1776, individual settlers and small groups were 
attacked and harassed in the wilderness but no pitched battles or large scale raids were 
conducted.  In spite of this, the level of violence – in real terms – which these Indians were 
able to leverage remained high from the settlers’ perspective with each death or physical 
violation plainly visible to the entirety of the community.  Although only a small number of 
settlers were killed in 1775, these deaths were felt keenly by the diminutive population and 
hence, throughout this year, reverse migration away from the west became increasingly 
common.109  In overall terms the fighting which occurred during this period was less intense 
than the open hostilities of the preceding year, but for those in the Kentucky country the 
relative level of violence remained high.   
For some, the continuing clash with the Indians was a manageable affair; the number 
of raids remained low, even though the tiny settler population increased their impact upon the 
overall community.  More importantly, the renewed raids had not yet culminated in a direct 
assault upon any of the new settlements, a situation which reflected the reluctance of many 
Indians to escalate the conflict further.  As such, a number of the settlers’ defensive 
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fortifications remained incomplete throughout 1775 and 1776.110  For many other settlers, 
however, the small number of raids meant little compared to the increased probability that 
whatever assaults did occur were more likely to involve them directly.  The settlements 
themselves may have been relatively secure, but the wilderness which most had come to 
claim, divide and sell was an area of heightened threat.  Open hostilities may not have 
resumed in 1775, but the presence of even a small number of hostile Indians provided more 
than enough motivation to drive many settlers back across the mountains carrying with them 
rumours, stories and firsthand experiences of continued violence in the west.111  Having 
abstained from launching any large scale assaults, the destructive power of the Indians rested 
largely in the settler imagination which vacillated wildly between cautious apathy and acute 
fear.112 
In spite of being an altogether elusive component of war fear was one of the key 
driving forces behind the developing frontier conflict.  In 1773 and early 1774 it had been fear 
of open warfare with the Indians that had helped to initiate those very same hostilities and in 
1775 and 1776 similar fears abounded throughout the Kentucky country.113  When Abraham 
Hanks and Philip Drake abandoned their attempt upon Kentucky days before entering the 
region, they did so because they feared the Indians far more than they valued the opportunity 
to survey western lands or to settle in the region.  Even for William Calk and those who stayed 
the course, a decision to finish the journey did not demonstrate an absence of fear.  Rather, 
these settlers instead believed that the potential benefits of completing their journey 
outweighed the risks.114  In this respect, fear served to suppress the growing conflict as 
potential combatants fled the disputed area before they had an opportunity to become victims 
of raids.  For those who stayed, however, trapped by the lure of land and economic prosperity, 
fear was instead transformed into communal outrage and a desire to attain retribution.  When 
the ongoing conflict did cause fatalities, every death served to strip the struggling community 
of valuable human capital and, potentially, an invaluable skill set.115  Such losses thus served to 
                                                            
110 Filson and Boone ‘The Adventures of Daniel Boon,’ pp. 55-63 
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increase the hardships being suffered by the larger group.  Moreover, these victims were not 
faceless abstracts but friends, family members and old travelling companions.  Such close 
relationships served only to accentuate the seriousness of the growing conflict in the settlers’ 
collective mindset (see Chapter Five).   
By the summer of 1776 the undercurrent of aggression which defined Kentucky’s first 
year of settlement was beginning to be transformed in a manner that mirrored the symbolic 
shift which had occurred following the attack upon the Boone party in 1773.  Like the period 
immediately preceding Dunmore’s War, the first year of settlement saw hostilities between 
settlers and Indians largely confined to groups of men.116  Women and children were certainly 
present in the country throughout this period but their confinement to townships – coupled 
with their small numbers – ensured that Kentucky’s early casualty list was predominately filled 
with adult males.117  By the summer of 1776, however, a series of attacks were initiated that 
signalled something of a sea change in the on-going conflict.  On the same day that a series of 
near-simultaneous surprise raids were launched against most of the Kentucky settlements, 
two of Colonel Richard Calloway’s daughters along with one of Daniel Boone’s were kidnapped 
by the Shawnee, an act which appeared to signify a declaration of unrestricted warfare; 
regardless of their age or gender all settlers in Kentucky were now at risk.118  Indeed, the 
kidnapping of these three girls came to be one of the most powerful symbols around which 
early Kentuckians rallied against the Indians.  Although numerous settlements were attacked 
and Andrew McConnell’s twin sons were also taken into captivity around the same time, the 
focus of that summer would thereafter be remembered and symbolized by the Calloway and 
Boone girls.119  Regardless of the disproportionate importance this particular episode took in 
the settler imagination, it was only one event in a series of clashes which occurred across the 
frontier that year, pointing towards a renewal of open hostilities.  When two settlers were 
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killed at Big Bone Lick, their contemporaries were quick to move for revenge and at least two 
of the Indians involved in this incident were killed and scalped as a result.120  All across the 
Ohio River basin vulnerable frontier areas began to feel the pressure of renewed hostilities and 
the political élite soon found themselves attempting to defuse another war before it gained 
too much momentum to be easily managed.121 
In theory, this task should have been aided by a convergence in the goals shared by 
political and aboriginal leaders over the issue of open hostilities, with both sets of leadership 
largely keen to avoid renewed warfare in the backcountry.  For chiefs such as Cornstalk and 
White Eyes, peace, not war, was the goal.  Similarly, Revolutionary authorities and even the 
British were keen to avoid the possibility of an open Indian war on the frontier.122  However, 
continuing raids south of the Ohio River coupled with the ascent of war chiefs who sought to 
resist continued settlement with physical confrontations all but ensured further radicalisation 
of the settlers and, ultimately, an escalation in the conflict.  The outbreak of the American 
Revolution and later attempts by the British to turn the Indians upon western settlers served 
to throw fuel onto the fire, but one should be careful not to overstate the role played by the 
British.123  The Indians acted with Britain not because they were imperial puppets or because 
the British had somehow convinced or bribed them to go to war; they acted with the British 
because their goals happened to converge making the two groups ideal allies.  The Indians of 
this period did not fight for the failing political system of a foreign power, but instead engaged 
in hostilities to satisfy their own individual and collective agendas.  As winter set in and 
hostilities took their customary seasonal break the forces competing for control of the Ohio 
Valley took stock of their respective positions and, like many of their Indian adversaries, many 
settlers began to develop ideas separate from their leadership regarding the role conflict was 
to play in their collective futures.124  With peaceful interactions between settlers and Indians in 
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regions such as Kentucky already extremely rare, it was not a significant step for the settlers to 
begin contemplating retributive attacks of their own.125  Similarly, the escalating conflict in the 
region moved many more Indians to side with those who sought to remove the invading forces 
from their territory.  The Indians and the settlers may have continued fighting one another in a 
comparatively limited fashion following the end of Dunmore’s War, but by the summer of 
1776 the conflict had begun escalating noticeably.126  As 1777 dawned, so too did a period of 
renewed, open warfare. 
 
Closure 
When analysing the outbreak of Dunmore’s War in the early 1780s, Thomas Jefferson went to 
some considerable effort in order to demonstrate that this conflict was brought about by the 
murder of Logan’s family at Yellow Creek.127  In so doing, Jefferson recognised that serious 
conflagrations in the backcountry could be brought about not necessarily by the masters of the 
political world, but the agency of those on the ground.  Jefferson’s analysis, however, was a 
one sided affair.  Although he demonstrated sympathy for the losses which drove Logan to 
fight, he made no specific effort to understand the comparable forces which drove settlers to 
commit atrocities such as the Yellow Creek massacre.  This approach has been repeated often 
by historians who have been content to label such settlers as Indian haters.128  Problematically, 
modern historians rarely – if ever – describe Indians who committed comparable acts in 
similarly loaded terms.  Logan may have been the victim of a wartime atrocity, but he likewise 
committed many of his own.  Of course, it is absolutely not being argued here that historians 
should begin applying loaded, unbalanced labels to Indians as well as settlers.  Rather, it is 
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necessary to understand, not celebrate, and analyse, not condemn the violence which was 
committed by both sides of this conflict.  The actions of men such as Cresap, Greathouse, and 
their followers are easily labelled as murderous – indeed, many contemporaries agreed with 
such an assessment – but to do so is little better than labelling Indians as ‘savages,’ a practice 
which modern historians have long since outgrown.129   
As chapters four and five of this thesis will demonstrate, the use of the word ‘hate’ 
cannot possibly encapsulate the spectrum of concurrent and often contradictory emotions 
which drove one group to attack another.  More problematic still, such a description implies 
much whilst proving little; if settlers were Indian haters, the absence of settler-haters among 
the Indians – at least within the context of modern historiography – surely suggests that these 
two groups were driven to fight by fundamentally different forces, at least from a ground-up 
perspective.  This was not, however, the case.  An acute fear of future hostilities, past 
experiences with violence, and familial losses affected all the peoples of the backcountry – 
regardless of which side of the frontier they dwelled upon – to commit further acts of 
aggression.  Neither Indians nor settlers were immune to this and neither group should be 
unduly judged because of it or labelled in such a way as to imply that one side was more prone 
to committing atrocities – acts designated as demonstrating ‘hate’ – than the other.  The wider 
conflict which grew out of Dunmore’s War and the sheer breadth of participation in that 
struggle is too complicated and too nuanced to be deserving of such over-simplification.  
Indeed, anti-Indian radicals would be a far more accurate way to describe those same settlers 
who might otherwise be described as Indian haters, just as a significant number of Indians 
could equally be described as anti-settler radicals.130   
The war for the frontier was a bitter, visceral and potent experience which stayed with 
many of its combatants, regardless of their cultural heritage or mode of living, for the rest of 
their lives.131  Both settlers and Indians were impacted by the experiences, processes, and 
systems which developed around frontier violence with no one group experiencing 
radicalisation alone.  Put simply, the war for the frontier had the potential to radicalise 
individuals on both sides simultaneously, a process which laid the groundwork not only for 
continued violence, but even an escalation of the conflict in the future.  In the early years of 
the frontier war, small numbers of combatants operated in a context of highly personal 
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vendettas, attempting to avenge deaths or violations deemed particularly atrocious.  The 
cause of these vendettas may have been personal, but their execution was anything but – 
rather than targeting only those directly responsible, settlers and Indians both attacked 
comparative innocents in order to satiate their desire for revenge.  In so doing, however, these 
small groups spread their vendettas across the frontier, inspiring retributive attacks from their 
now outraged enemies which, in turn, demanded further violence.  In a relatively short period 
of time, a limited confrontation between very small numbers was thus able to spiral out of 
control, drawing in larger and larger numbers on both sides.  The issue of who controlled the 
trans-Appalachian west was undoubtedly the grand framing device within which Dunmore’s 
War erupted.  Likewise, the machinations of Dunmore himself and the growing Revolutionary 
sentiment of the settlers helped to mould this conflict.132  However, the clashes between 
settlers and Indians which occurred throughout the early 1770s were far more than window 
dressing for the war.  Disputes over landownership certainly set the stage, but it was the 
actions and reactions of those on the ground which provided the fuel for this confrontation.  It 
is simply not possible to understand the processes which drove warfare in the backcountry 
from 1774 without understanding the forces which drove the settlers and Indians.  Neither is it 
enough to understand these ground-up forces in the context of Dunmore’s War alone.  
Confrontations such as the battle of Point Pleasant multiplied the reach of the war across its 
thousands of participants, a collective of individuals who would form the core groups who 
would face off in Kentucky and other western regions in the coming years.  Even where 
individuals had had little or no direct contact with Dunmore’s War, other circumstances often 
served to bond those who settled west of the Appalachians from 1775 to those who fought in 
1774.133   
To be sure, tensions over who had the right operate within the trans-Appalachian 
region would continue to exert significant influence across the west but as more individuals 
were exposed to greater levels of violence over an increasing period of time, the bottom-up 
forces encapsulated by a few vendettas in 1774 took on a juggernaut-like quality.  It would be 
a number of years before these ground-up forces reached something approaching a critical 
mass that would allow the frontier war to move down a path independent from the American 
Revolution, but the necessary groundwork was laid between 1774 and 1776.  Dunmore’s War 
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played the part of both spark and microcosm, but the process which drove it and the 
subsequent battle for the Ohio Valley was layered and deeply intricate and has, thus far, only 
been touched upon.  As such chapter two of this thesis will begin the process of answering the 
following fundamental question; why did violence radicalise the settlers? Of course the need 
for revenge has been somewhat addressed within this chapter, but it is important to 
understand that revenge is not as simple as a desire to kill one’s enemies because one’s 
compatriots have suffered a similar fate.  The type of death, post – and sometimes pre – 
mortem mutilations, torture, scalping, and the impact upon the deceased’s surviving family all 
helped to sharpen, extenuate and multiply the desire among affected individuals to extract 
potentially disproportionate  levels of retribution from their enemies.  So too did the combat 
experiences of the individual affect the relative ferocity with which both sides pursued their 
retributive goals.  Near death experiences, the sight of mutilated bodies, dead companions, 
eviscerated children, the ashes of those burned alive, and even the damage sustained to one’s 
own self were powerful forces which will be explored in some detail throughout chapter two 
and, to some extent, throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Living with War 
 
For Jemima Boone, her brief captivity among the Indians with Betsy and Fanny Calloway in the 
summer of 1776 was as contradictory and confusing as it was distressing.  On the one hand, 
the girls were prisoners of war, victims of a kidnap attempt which had left their families 
reeling.  Forced to undertake an arduous journey through the wilderness, torn skirts, forced 
marches, and the ever present threat of the tomahawk were all the order of the day.1  On the 
other hand, each of the girls appears to have been treated well; kindness was shown and a 
form of companionship between captors and captives appears to have developed.  Indeed, 
one Indian in particular, a Cherokee named Hanging Maw, appears to have taken a shine to 
young Jemima, constantly paying the young lady compliments on her long hair.  The three girls 
may have been prisoners, but it appears that they were treated as humanely as the 
circumstances allowed.2  Of course, such relative kindness did not alter the girls’ position and, 
throughout their captivity, they worked ceaselessly to hinder the efforts of their captors.  But 
even as they attempted to slow the Indians’ retreat, the girls began to recognise a common 
humanity in those who had taken them.3  It may appear to be a small point, but such 
recognition – such empathy – was becoming increasingly rare on the frontier, particularly 
within those regions most affected by the continuing hostilities with the Indians.  Victims of a 
violent encounter, the girls may have been, but their capture provided them with an 
opportunity that was actively being denied to most of Kentucky’s new inhabitants; the 
opportunity to spend a period of time in the company of one’s enemies without a barrier of 
continued violence separating them further.  In this respect, the girls’ experience was relatively 
distinct from that of the larger community. 
 By the summer of 1776, an ever increasing level of violent contact between the 
settlers and Indians was serving to drive these two peoples further apart, but aside from a 
growing number of physical clashes, the type of fighting being carried out, particularly by the 
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Indians, was serving to create a mental chasm between these peoples.4  Fear, paranoia, and 
exposure to wartime atrocities were all being deliberately fostered by the Indians, a campaign 
of psychological warfare designed to chase the settlers back across the mountains.  In many 
instances, this campaign was a success, something to which waves of retreating settlers 
attested.5  Indeed, by fostering an acute sense of fear in regions such as Kentucky, it could be 
argued that the Indians’ campaign was a relatively humane one; they may have flooded the 
backcountry with adrenaline but in so doing they avoided the need to flood it with blood.  
From the settlers’ perspective, however, such a situation rarely presented its softer side.  
Whilst the use of psychological warfare was certainly an established wartime practice, its use 
upon a civilian population – even a militarised one – created deep and long lasting lines in the 
proverbial sand.6  By deliberately terrorising the settlers in the wilderness, targeting their 
children, and mutilating their dead, the Indians helped to erode any sense of empathy or 
shared humanity held for them by the settler community.  True, this nuanced approach to 
warfare proved to be remarkably successful, but that success was never absolute.  The settlers 
never entirely abandoned their new western territories and, as such, the Indians never fully 
attained their desired goal.  Instead, the practice of psychological warfare, the focus of this 
chapter, ultimately served to embitter, condition, and subvert those who remained, creating a 
social groundwork upon which the Indians’ future vilification would be constructed.  By 
targeting the settlers’ minds, the Indians came within a hair’s breadth of emptying the 
Kentucky country in 1777.  However, the employment of such tactics ultimately served to instil 
a sense of permanent communal anger among the settlers, underlining existing grievances, 
emphasising perceived cultural differences, and fundamentally alienating the peoples of the 
frontier. 
 The relationship between the individual, the group, and conflict is a complex 
interaction that cannot and should not be explained in simple terms.  Physical violence is often 
augmented by the idea of war and the potential dangers that accompany it but even acts 
which were deemed justified or righteous by their executors could produce complex and 
seemingly contradictory feelings.  For the Boone and Calloway girls, their eventual rescue was 
undoubtedly a happy and joyous affair but there are some hints that their rescue was 
undermined by the growing relationship between captors and captives.  Even during the heat 
of the rescue, a time when captives were often executed by their Indian captors, the girls were 
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left alone and unharmed.7  Happy to be alive and restored to their families, the joy of the 
rescue was writ large across the girls’ subsequent actions, with hastily arranged marriages 
following in quick succession; carpe diem, indeed.  But for all the elation on display – 
apparently ‘there was not a dry eye in the [rescue] company’ – memories of kind treatment at 
Indian hands continued to linger.8  If Jemima experienced any guilt over the fate of her kindly 
captors then she was not experiencing anything that William Bradford did not feel in 1637 
when English colonists, along with their Narragansett allies, set fire to one of the largest 
Pequot villages in New England.  Like most of his contemporaries, Bradford viewed this action 
as a necessary act of war, but that did not make the sight of his enemies ‘thus frying in the fire’ 
any less ‘fearful [a] sight,’ nor the sounds, sights and smells which accompanied this incident 
any more bearable.  The outcome may have been ‘sweet’ but the means through which it was 
achieved were, according to Bradford, ‘horrible.’9  Similarly, Jemima and the other captive girls 
would have to reconcile their treatment – ‘the Indians were really kind to us’ – with memories 
of their captors falling into campfires and bullets exploding from their chests.10  Combat on the 
frontier was no simple interaction between peoples and those who experienced it directly 
were often exposed to its problematic nature, particularly where a common humanity was 
recognised, no matter how briefly, in one’s enemy.   
Problematically, there was a significant degree of separation, often brought about by 
acts of deliberate psychological warfare, which meant for many the common humanity of 
one’s enemy was rarely recognised or evident.  Jemima, Fanny and Betsy were all exposed to 
an enemy who displayed both ruthless determination and significant levels of kindness, but to 
those who joined the rescue attempt such fair treatment was hidden and even once exposed it 
provided only cold comfort.11  To the rescuers and larger community alike, the kidnapping of 
the three young girls was the dominant act, not their treatment.  True, Jemima would her 
captors in subsequent years but among the settlers no act of kindness could make up for 
attempting to spirit their children across the frontier.12  Warfare may have produced a series 
of intercultural contact points, but to the larger community a single act of aggression very 
                                                            
7 Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone’ pp. 49-50, John D. Shane ‘Interview with Josiah 
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often overshadowed multiple acts of compassion.  Jemima and the Calloway girls may have 
recognised a common ground of human experience amongst their captors but the settler 
community, for the most part, could not.  The girls may have been treated well but Hanging 
Maws’ gloating over Jemima’s father was not forgotten: ‘We have done pretty well for old 
Boone this time.’13 
Similarly, Native Americans – both as individuals and communities – were prone to 
reacting in a like manner.  There is a certain argument to be made that Daniel Greathouse and 
his men showed a degree of mercy when they did not butcher the infant Mingo they captured 
at Yellow Creek.14  This action, however, appears to have meant little to Logan; it certainly did 
not mediate the vendetta he subsequently embarked upon.15  Although the sources simply do 
not speak of the Indian perspective surrounding the capture of the Boone and Calloway girls it 
is important to bear in mind that those killed by the settlers did not die in a vacuum.  At least 
some members of their tribe must have looked for a return that simply did not happen.  
Whether these deaths particularly affected any of their family is a matter that is lost to history, 
but to the community as a whole the vacant wigwam and empty hunter’s rack likely spoke 
volumes.  Like the settlers they were aligning against, the basic kindnesses and courtesies the 
captives and captors showed one another likely meant little compared to the subsequent 
violation of the community.  Hanging Maw may have conceived a day when he and a girl with 
hair like Jemima’s could develop a relationship, but, as a whole, the settlers and Indians were 
being pushed further apart even as their cultural experiences converged around episodes of 
violence.16   
This ever widening gap was partly the natural result of a conflict which saw both sides 
enact deliberate and ancillary psychological warfare upon each other.  Where the experiences 
of the Calloway and Boone girls diverge from the experiences of many others was in the 
consciously compassionate treatment they received.  For Jemima it was possible to recognise 
her captors as both people and as abstract aggressors, but for many others the use of 
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psychological warfare became a divisive issue that significantly compounded perceived cultural 
differences.  Attacks and actions designed to create chaos, confusion, and to affect the 
collective morale of the settlers helped to deepen this divide; when Samuel Henderson heard 
the panicked shouts of his fellow Kentuckians the morning the Boone and Calloway girls were 
kidnapped, he was so overcome with fear that he burst into tears.17  This situation was 
magnified by other actions which, though not strictly designed to affect the settlers’ mental 
wellbeing, nonetheless had some effect upon communal morale.  Scalping is a good example 
of this; although the taking of scalps served its own cultural purpose – and was carried out 
extensively by the settlers also – the sight of scalped bodies, sometimes still living, was 
interpreted by many as a horrific or atrocious act.18  Certainly, the cultural importance of 
scalping means that it cannot strictly be considered a wartime atrocity but many settlers 
nevertheless interpreted it as such; atrocities were identified by those who counted 
themselves as victims.19  It seems unlikely that most Indians carried out scalping as a method 
of deliberate psychological sabotage, but they did recognise that many types of violent acts – 
such as kidnapping one’s children or the mutilation of a relation – could fulfil such criteria.20   
The kidnapping of the Boone and Calloway girls illustrates the importance of this 
psychological aspect of warfare.21  Hanging Maw had predicted that the emotional fallout of 
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his raid would land upon Boone’s head and panic, indeed, appears to have been the order of 
the day with Boone not even stopping to put on moccasins before hastily setting out to rescue 
the girls.22  Similarly, Richard Calloway, the father of two of the girls, was driven almost to 
distraction by the thought of what might have occurred to his children whilst they were with 
the Indians.  What actually happened was of relatively little importance because it was the 
idea that drove Richard Calloway to so desperately seek the rescue of his girls, just as the idea 
of what could happen at Indians hands would help to drive the community as a whole during 
the war.23  On balance, the kidnapping of the Boone and Calloway girls was a minor 
intercultural encounter but it was given significant weight in the settler and popular 
imagination that, when combined with perceptions of other raids and losses, helped to create 
something of an ideological juggernaut.  Although this incident was hardly a turning point, it 
did help to bring past acts of aggression into sharp focus.  This was partly a deliberate ploy by 
the Indians, a method by which they could drain the settlers’ morale and their desire for the 
region; the girls were, after all, known to every inhabitant of Boonesborough and between one 
third and one half of the town’s men took part in the attempt to rescue them.  It was also, 
however, something of an incidental after effect caused by more traditional types of warfare.  
On the one hand the Indians who initiated the raid understood that it would have an 
immeasurable effect upon the families of those kidnapped whilst, on the other, the kind 
treatment shown to the girls demonstrated an attempt to show restraint in warfare.24  
Regardless of intentions, the kidnapping of these girls was a sign which the entire community 
could read, a statement of intent that spoke of future violence that would cross gender and 
age lines.  The kidnapping of the Boone and Calloway girls may have been a minor incident, but 
to the diminutive population of a frontier town, such as Boonesborough, it was anything but. 
By the end of 1776 psychological warfare was already somewhat of a feature in the 
Kentucky country but as 1777 dawned it became far more common place, both as a deliberate 
tactic and as a natural repercussion of the fighting.  With the Indians of the Ohio Valley 
seriously divided over how to deal with the region’s growing settler population the use of 
tactics that did not require large numbers of warriors whilst simultaneously maximising the 
impact of those who did initiate raids became a core practice that grew in step with Native 
American support for war.25  By employing these tactics the Indians were able to greatly 
increase the effectiveness of their raids by affecting large swathes of the settler community in 
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addition to their immediate victims.  The result was the development of a siege mentality 
among the settlers which helped to dictate and guide how this group perceived the world 
around them.  By employing only a comparatively small number of warriors, the Indians were 
able to besiege the Ohio Valley not necessarily with bullets, but with ideas.  Both the individual 
and the community as a whole were subject to a siege that was likely far worse in their 
collective imagination than it was in reality, but the division of the real and the imagined on 
the frontier was never particularly surefooted in the first place.  To quote one historian 
reflecting upon confederate guerrilla raids in Missouri almost a century later, it was the 
‘immense scale of possibilities, not the miniscule size of probabilities, that dominated the 
thinking of’ the settlers.26  Indian groups prosecuted the war in a variety of manners, with 
psychological warfare only one tool in their available arsenal.  It was, however, one of their 
most effective techniques and the idea that the frontier was essentially besieged throughout 
the late 1770s was fostered expertly by this group.  Unfortunately for the Indians, the result 
was not an abandonment of the west but an increase in resolve and enmity. 
As winter set in at the end of 1776 the fighting which had bothered the frontier over 
the previous months began its seasonal hiatus, a period of wound licking and reflection forced 
upon both groups by the rigours of cold weather and the lack of cover offered by the 
territory’s now leafless trees.  Indian raiding parties broke up and returned to their homes 
whilst the settlers now fortified themselves against the elements.27  Physical confrontations 
during the winter months of early 1777 were largely absent but memories of the preceding 
year’s confrontations remained fresh among the community, relived time and again in a 
vibrant and dynamic oral culture.  Those killed were conspicuous by their absence, whilst 
survivors of attacks freely shared their experience and perspective, punctuating their tales 
with showcases of the wounds which they or their companions had received.  Victims, 
survivors, and the larger community struggled collectively to make sense of the events in 
which they had become entangled and over the course of the winter months the small, 
concentrated population of the frontier began the process of forging a communal canon in 
which all members of the community could share.  The immediate danger may have been 
over, but the creation of an ongoing communal narrative ensured that the settlers remained 
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acutely aware of the threat they faced.  Hannibal was no longer at the gates, but to many it 
appeared that he continued to peer through the window.28 
1777 has often been described by historians as one of the most violent years in 
Kentucky’s frontier history.29  The actual level of violence the country endured, however, fell 
well below that which would plague the region from 1778 onwards.30  In almost every respect 
the settler population suffered far less from physical attacks during this year than it would 
throughout the subsequent twelve months.  This discrepancy between historical perception 
and reality thus begs an important question.  If 1777 was not the landmark year of conflict that 
some historians and contemporaries have portrayed, why is it described as such? The simplest 
and most direct answer to this question is that what many historians have identified was not a 
year of particularly prominent violence, but a year that was perceived by many settlers to have 
been more violent than it actually was.31  This, in its own right, is an important observation 
because it demonstrates how pervasive the idea of conflict can be.  It is not that 1777 was in 
any way peaceful, but rather that the use of psychological warfare helped to sharpen any 
sense of danger to a razor edge.32  This was a social phenomenon that brought the settler 
community to the point of crisis even where the actual level of danger failed to necessarily 
justify this.  Relatively isolated incidents were no longer perceived as attacks upon individuals 
but instead came to be seen as assaults upon the community.  In such a context, actual 
mortality and casualty rates meant little compared to the perceived assault suffered by the 
community as a whole, the ‘secret mischief’ of non-direct combat.33  Rather than being 
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victimized by any major confrontations with the Indians, this year saw the settlers come to 
view an array of comparatively minor assaults as an interconnected web of dangers; dangers 
that threatened to overturn their burgeoning community.  Studying 1777 in isolation is no easy 
task and actually pinning down specific incidents to which mass panic can attributed is nearly 
impossible.34  Unlike 1778, there would be no high profile or significant assaults upon the 
settlements, but the Indians were, nevertheless, able to generate enough general panic to 
cause a voluntary population collapse.  Rather than face dangers which were partly real and 
partly imagined, a significant proportion of the settler community chose simply to flee the 
region instead.35  
 In truth, Indian-inspired reverse migration had been a feature of the Kentucky country 
since its initial settlement, first with the abandonment of Harrodsburgh in 1774, followed by a 
steady stream of traffic out of the country since its resettlement in 1775.36  Of course 
migration into Kentucky was significant also with the lure of land bringing in more than enough 
settlers to compensate for the numbers exiting the country.  A chronic lack of applicable 
source material dealing with this subject makes estimating the country’s population at the 
beginning of 1777 a difficult and necessarily inaccurate affair but it would be reasonable to 
suggest that by the end of 1776 Kentucky may have been home to around five hundred 
settlers.37  Early in 1777, however, the flow of movement away from the region had increased 
significantly and for the first time since Dunmore’s War, Kentucky was in real danger of 
emptying as the population shrank to around two or three hundred persons, a reduction which 
saw numerous townships and farms completely abandoned.38  With ever dwindling numbers, 
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losses sustained in combat became more apparent to those who remained, even as the actual 
number of casualties remained low.  In this manner, a relatively unremarkable series of Indian 
raids came to be interpreted by the community as evidence of an Indian surge against the 
frontier.  Over the spring and summer months two attacks were launched upon the town of 
Boonesborough, however contemporary assertions that these assaults amounted to sieges 
reflects not the intensity of the violence which accompanied them, but the power of 
psychological warfare.39  Rather than making any attempt to systematically isolate the town, 
the Indians had instead employed extensive guerrilla tactics, taking up intermittent and 
obscured positions in the surrounding woodlands, a process which disguised both their 
numbers and the true level of danger they represented.  Hardly sieges, these incidents could 
be described more accurately as periods of enhanced harassment with both assaults, between 
them, producing only two settler fatalities.40  Regardless, the presence of a large number of 
Indians in the vicinity of a major settlement – even if many of them were imaginary – was likely 
a sobering thought for many aspiring settlers and it is unsurprising that events such as this 
inspired something of an exodus from the frontier.  Daniel Boone, in a narrative recorded by 
John Filson, would later describe a period of general chaos brought about by a slew of 
relatively minor Indian assaults but, tellingly, he did so without ever giving the specific or 
detailed accounts he was more than capable of delivering.  For Boone and Filson, this year was 
a period when ‘the innocent husbandman,’ an abstract figure, was the Indians’ chief victim.41  
Violence was certainly present throughout the year, but the numbers killed or even attacked 
during this period does not reflect the growing panic which was starting to cripple the 
Kentucky settlements.   
In the specific case of Boonesborough, the two attacks which took place in 1777 
demonstrated this growing disconnect between real and imagined conflict.  Although Boone 
and Filson would later describe these events in comparatively grandiose terms, the settlers 
residing in the town did not deem it necessary to complete work upon their defensive 
stockade.  To confuse matters further, Boone would claim that these two attacks utilized a 
combined force of around three hundred Indians.42  It would be reasonable to expect, 
therefore, that necessity – if not prudence – would have demanded that the settlers complete 
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their town’s defences had they undergone assaults of the magnitude later described.43  To 
compound matters, when Boone’s son, Nathan, was asked about these same attacks he did 
not describe them in anything resembling the sweeping terms that Filson had committed to 
print, but instead described what little fighting there was as ‘skirmishing.’44  It appears, then, 
that the attack upon the town in April was really nothing of the sort.  Instead two men – out 
with the town’s limits – were ambushed, resulting in one death and the panicked rescue of his 
companion.  Thereafter the Indians remained in the surrounding wilderness for a period of no 
more than two days, harassing the settlement but showing little real evidence to support 
Boone’s later claims surrounding their number.  The second attack in July followed a similar 
pattern.  Other than the two men who were killed in these so called sieges, one of the most 
serious outcomes for the Boone family appears to have been the broken ankle that Daniel 
received whilst attempting to rescue a pair of settlers caught outside the town.45  In physical 
terms, the fighting appears to have been relatively limited but, importantly, what combat 
there was ‘was extremely distressing to the new settlers’ who left the country in droves 
throughout the first half of the year.  The Indians may not have left the level of mass 
destruction in their wake which was later hinted at by Boone and Filson, but they did succeed 
in leaving significant levels of mass disruption instead.46 
It thus seems unlikely that accounts detailing widespread attacks in 1777 should be 
taken at face value.  Rather than a direct assault or traditional siege it seems far more likely 
that these attacks were handled by much smaller groups of Indians than the setters realised or 
later reported.47  It is also quite likely that the Indians did not set up positions within easy view 
of the settlement precisely because they wished to generate a false impression of their 
numbers.  By employing guerrilla tactics, taking cover in the wilderness, and only showing 
themselves at inconsistent intervals the Indians were thus able to give the settlers’ a false 
impression of the scope of the force which had been aligned against them.  In physical terms 
the impact upon the settlers was limited; with only two persons killed and a handful more 
injured these exercises could hardly be described as unqualified victories.  They did, however, 
produce a crisis of confidence among the settlers who reacted to what appeared to be an 
overwhelming force in the surrounding woodlands.  This situation was repeated all across the 
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frontier as the Indians practiced their ‘secret mischief’ throughout the year, deliberately 
harassing settlers whilst helping them to construct the idea that danger lay behind almost 
every tree or beneath every crest.48  William Haymond, a settler in western Virginia in the 
1790s, summed up the attitude many early settlers held when travelling through the 
wilderness: ‘If you will consider yourself behind a tree and hearing an Indian howl, and expect 
to see one or more every minute, you may judge of my feelings...I will only say that it was the 
most trying time of my life.’49   
It is problematic to suggest that 1777 was a particularly violent year on the Kentucky 
frontier, at least in traditional terms, but it is reasonable to analyse this period as one not 
dominated by the gun or tomahawk but the threat or the thought of them.  When word 
reached the settlements in March that a soldier named Elijah Matthews had been burned alive 
by the Shawnee, panic quickly spread.  Matthews, a largely anonymous figure, became an 
unlikely cause célèbre and like many others who suffered, or were perceived to have suffered 
at Indian hands, he became symbolic of the escalating danger blossoming west of the 
Appalachians.  His death may not have been witnessed by anyone in Kentucky or western 
Virginia, but knowledge of his demise was enough to spark endemic panic in both regions.50  
No individual settlement in Kentucky suffered through a true siege in 1777, but the Indians’ 
expert use of guerrilla tactics combined with a growing folk narrative concerning frontier 
casualties helped to ensure that the country was effectively subjected to what is best 
described as a meta-siege.  This siege was not one enforced by mass violence, but rather a 
series of indistinct incidents which merged together in the settlers’ collective imagination to 
become a series of mass strikes which targeted the larger community.  Danger was not behind 
every tree, but many settlers were very quickly coming to fear that this was indeed the case. 
By appearing and disappearing, seemingly into nothingness and at will, the Indians 
were able to foster the impression among the settlers that they were never truly safe, 
particularly beyond the limits of the country’s few towns and fortifications; the entire 
wilderness was thus claimed as the Indians’ domain.  In real terms this meant that the settlers 
only perceived safe zones within the limits of their fortifications but even then, such zones 
were hardly sacrosanct or impervious to attack.51  Settlements thus became isolated islands 
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adrift in a sea of potential harm, an image readily fostered by the Indians occupying the 
surrounding woodlands.  This tactic proved remarkably successful, helping to spread further 
panic whilst undermining the community’s confidence that it would be able to successfully 
settle the region.  Patrick Henry would write at that time of the ‘most distressing and 
deplorable condition of the surviving inhabitants’ in the region, but in actuality the survivors 
were not those who had yet to be killed, but those who had not yet fled.52  Perhaps what is 
most remarkable about the assault taking place throughout 1777 was that the Indians 
succeeded in driving large numbers away from the frontier without resorting to large scale 
assaults or mass killings.  Such comparative restraint likely came about because, at this point, 
most of the tribes remained deeply divided over how continuing settler encroachments south 
of the Ohio River should be dealt with and, as such, the number of warriors willing to engage in 
hostilities remained limited.53  A large portion of the Cherokee and Shawnee were starting to 
engage in open warfare but the arrival of just one hundred and forty five armed settlers late in 
the summer appears to have provided sufficient reinforcements to balance the engagement.54  
Reports of Indian raids, and their associated casualties, were not uncommon throughout the 
late summer, but even relatively limited increases in the defensive capability of the settlers 
served to transform the effectiveness of the Indians.55  In all likelihood the settlers had blown 
the number of their enemies actually in the country far out of proportion, a direct result of 
Indian wartime practices.  When Patrick Henry considered how best to deal with the escalating 
frontier war, he reflected that ‘Savages must be managed by working on their Fears.’56  Few of 
the Indians currently besieging the frontier would likely have disagreed with such a sentiment. 
When Indians were suspected of entering a given region word quickly spread among 
the local population and, whether justified or not, the settlers had little choice but to assume 
that danger was imminent.  John Hanks, who grew up in the region around Wheeling, 
remembers ‘Old Ben Decker’ visiting the family farmstead one day to warn his mother that a 
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large body of Indians were heading towards the settlements, a situation that distressed the 
family not least because Hanks’ father was then absent.  Fear and precaution resulted in a 
hasty move to a neighbour’s property but even this act was ultimately unnecessary as Decker 
had ‘made it [sound] a great deal worse than it was.’  Indeed, neither the Hanks family nor any 
other settlers in this region were in any real danger and it appears that the great majority of 
the Indians Decker reported resided only in his imagination.57  Regardless, even these figments 
were enough to panic the family into forting with other, similarly worried settlers.  Although 
such moves often proved ultimately unnecessary, the recollections of Rachel Johnson 
underline why being over cautious was better than being underprepared.  When an 
acquaintance of Johnson’s, Daniel McLane, was ambushed near Wheeling, Johnson 
remembered hearing ‘the tomahawks as if the Indians were cutting up beef.’58  The Hanks 
family may not have been privy to the sounds of such butchery, but they would likely have 
been aware of what combat and, in particular, defeat at Indian hands might entail.   
Similarly, the settlers fleeing Kentucky in 1777 shared an oral culture that gave them at 
least some understanding of the potential dangers a frontier war would present to them, if not 
an expectation that they would have to face such a scenario firsthand.  Dunmore’s War was a 
fresh scar upon settler-Indian relations, whilst more distant confrontations, such as the Seven 
Years War, likewise provided a potent folk memory in which Indian relations could be 
framed.59  This raises an important question; if settlers entered Kentucky with some basic 
knowledge of what potentially awaited them, what actually made those same individuals turn 
their backs not only upon the frontier but upon the potential rewards they could gain by 
staying? By the time Logan’s Fort, Harrodsburg and Boonesborough were raided in 1777 the 
population had already reached its nadir.60  This strongly suggests that it was an acute fear of 
violence rather than actual contact with aggressive Indians that was the principal cause of the 
settler exodus which so marred the region.  Crucially, it also suggests that fear of violence was 
much stronger in regions where the Indians made their presence felt.  In the east oral 
traditions presented the Indians as an abstract danger.  In the west, however, the activities of 
the Indians turned that danger from an abstract concept into something far more tangible.  
Put simply, 1776 and 1777 saw the Indians leverage psychological warfare in such a way as to 
critically undermine the settlers’ confidence and, in the ever-developing world view of many 
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settlers, Indians came to exist in regions where, in reality, they simply did not.61  In this way, 
the Indians succeeded in fundamentally undermining any assumption of security.  Although 
levels of violence were yet to take a significant upward lunge, many settlers in 1777 perceived 
themselves as living in a world that was dominated by violence and Indians.62  The emptying of 
the Kentucky country thus occurred as a response to a developing culture of fear, a process 
which ensured that, for many, the threat of hostilities became more tangible than the actual 
situation they faced on a daily basis; bodies imagined became as vivid as those witnessed 
firsthand. 63   
As the fighting escalated through the spring of 1777 memories of past incidents, such 
as the kidnapping of the Boone and Calloway girls, became knitted ever more closely to the 
community’s world view.  Although Jemima would speak of kind treatment, the larger group 
would base their interpretation of this episode not upon her word, but upon their own 
experiences and perceptions.64  If the Indians’ use of indirect combat to drive settlers away 
from the frontier can be deemed a success then it must also be accepted that this victory was 
double edged indeed.  Although the Kentucky country saw its settler population collapse, 
those who remained, and many of those who later migrated to the region, did so with a new 
understanding of the world around them.  They understood not only that a war with the 
Indians was actively unfolding, but that they stood upon its frontline.65  This does not mean 
that all who inhabited the frontier were hardened stereotypes.66  On the contrary, the frontier 
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population remained as diverse as it ever had but those who now inhabited the region had to 
at least accept the distinct possibility that violence would affect their lives.  Accepting this 
possibility, however, did not serve to dissipate the power of terror, or of psychological warfare.  
For some, like Tom Berry, the mere threat of Indians in the region would continue to create 
tangible levels of fear that other contemporaries would later remark upon.  Berry may have 
been visibly shaken at the thought of an Indian attack, but his wife and children were positively 
horrified by the prospect and, upon hearing rumours of an Indian raiding party in the local 
neighbourhood, they reportedly ‘began to cry as if the Indians were [already] at the door.’67 
The Indians who raided and besieged Kentucky certainly scored a demographic victory 
in the first half of 1777, but – problematically – those settlers who did not leave very often 
resolved to stay regardless of the potential dangers they might have to face.  People like Tom 
Berry and his family were not the Indians’ main adversary.  Rather, it was those who chose to 
remain – in spite of the apparent dangers they faced – who posed the greatest threat.  In a 
very real sense, such individuals demonstrated that there were limits to the tactics currently 
being employed by the Indians; leveraging fear could only go so far towards emptying the 
west.  Even these individuals, however, were not impervious to the after effects of such a 
campaign and, having been exposed to the frontier war, many of those settlers who were not 
driven east were instead driven to fight.68  A dead body remembers no horrors; a living one not 
only remembers but often chooses to share those memories with the wider community.  Hugh 
McGary’s stepson felt no more pain after his death at Indian hands but McGary, like numerous 
others over the course of the coming years, would be driven by his past contact with the war 
to expand his role within it, sharing memories of past atrocities with the community as he did 
so.69  By remaining in Kentucky, in spite of the obvious dangers that had already shattered his 
family, McGary greatly increased the likelihood that violence would continue to play a major 
role in his life.  Even if he had not proactively sought out situations that would allow him to kill 
Indians, the decision to remain was a crucial one that would have tied him to the developing 
war.  When faced with the threat of further hostilities, most frontier settlers were faced with 
just two choices.  Retreat, removing one’s self and family from danger, or stay and attempt to 
defend their position.  The former choice, although popular throughout 1777, was hardly the 
obvious choice as a premature return east could lead to a potentially devastating financial loss.  
Additionally, the journey would have, once again, proven an arduous chore, something which 
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few settlers would have taken lightly.70  The only real alternative, however, was to remain on 
the frontier, but in so doing the settlers risked continued harassment. 
Accordingly, the decision to stay implied a decision to resist Indian assaults, and this 
led many to begin thinking in offensive terms.  At the very least it implied a willingness to 
defend one’s self; when a party of settlers were ambushed whilst out ‘shelling corn’ that 
September, the individuals who composed that group were left with little option but to 
understand – if they did not already – that one could not opt out of an Indian attack.  
Surrounded and set upon, this group had no choice but to experience incredibly close-quarter 
combat with all of its associated sensory highlights.  Squire Boone, for instance, found himself 
locked in hand-to-hand combat with an Indian who had already succeeded in battering his 
skull with a tomahawk.  Injured, but not mortally so, Squire had retaliated by withdrawing his 
rapier and ‘plung[ing] his sword into the front of [the Indian’s] abdomen.’71  As was often the 
case, death was not instant and Squire’s would-be assailant continued to battle, even as the 
frontiersman grabbed the Indian’s belt in order to slide his blade deeper into the man’s gut.  
Still, this did not end the struggle and Squire was forced to scramble for his knife, but the 
quantity of blood pouring from his own wound, not to mention the blood of a companion 
felled next to him, meant that unsheathing the blade became a ponderously difficult task.  
Falling together, the end of Squire’s rapier finally snapped off in the Indian’s body and after 
crawling a short distance, his opponent at last expired from his grievous wounds.72   
Although the origins of this incident lay beyond any given settler, the attack took the 
specific form that it did because each of its victims chose to remain in Kentucky, in spite of the 
Indians’ campaign to empty the country.  For Squire, at least, his continued presence in the 
region, even after such a vivid, close quarter and bloody struggle demonstrates a willingness – 
or resignation, perhaps – to engage in similar bouts in the future if the circumstances 
demanded it.  Garrison, the companion whose blood had coated Boone’s knife and clothing, 
would no longer have to face that very same choice.  Squire, however, did and he made sure 
that other settlers knew of the struggle he had endured.  His broken sword was soon mended 
and hanging once again by his side, a potent reminder to all who knew its history that the war 
with the Indians could involve any one of them at almost any time.  Put simply, none who 
remained in Kentucky after the summer of 1777 were ignorant of what that decision might 
potentially demand of them; the Indians’ psychological war had become self-sustaining.73  
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Accordingly, settlers all across the frontier began actively looking for ways in which they could 
regain control of their lives from the raids – real and imagined – they had suffered through; the 
arrival of a Shawnee peace delegate at Point Pleasant that winter provided them with that 
very opportunity.74  Cornstalk may have made the trip to Point Pleasant in an attempt to shore 
up the failing relations between his tribe and the United States but by the end of the year his 
dead body would stand as a monument to the settlers’ growing reaction against the Indians’ 
psychological war.  By the end of 1777 the war had certainly taken a toll, but the coming 
twelve months would see it explode – physically – across the west.75 
Even before Cornstalk had arrived at Point Pleasant, American officials demonstrated 
how successful the Indians’ guerrilla war had become when Captain Matthew Arbuckle 
arrested two of the chief’s emissaries.76  These arrests came near the end of a year that had 
seen the settler population terrorised almost out of existence in some areas, whilst reports 
from across the wider frontier informed settlers and American authorities alike that a general 
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state of dissidence had developed among the tribes of the Ohio valley.77  Arbuckle’s 
developing belief that ‘the Shawanese are all our enemy’ may have been grossly inaccurate, an 
unfortunate side effect of the Indians’ surreptitious campaign, but it also made his decision to 
arrest the peace delegates an easy one.78  Through the late summer and autumn, stories of 
atrocities and an Indian dominated wilderness combined with a relatively small number of 
actual raids, had continued to fuel tensions until they reached a crisis point around the time 
Cornstalk and his party arrived at Point Pleasant.79  The elderly chief may have visited the 
settlers in the hope of securing some semblance of peace but he instead found a town typical 
of many frontier settlements at that time; the inhabitants of Point Pleasant seemed more 
interested in retribution than in limiting the conflict.  Tensions had been bubbling under the 
surface at Point Pleasant for some time and even Cornstalk appears to have recognised that 
his death at settler hands was a very real possibility.  The day before his murder he sat in 
council with the officers of Fort Randolph, one of whom described his countenance as 
‘dejected,’ and talked, apparently at some length, about the possibility of his own murder.  
According to Captain John Stuart, Cornstalk ‘seemed impressed with an awful presentment of 
his approaching fate,’ and spoke on several occasions about his willingness to die if that was 
indeed to be the outcome of his visit.  According to Stuart, Cornstalk informed his listeners 
that ‘you may kill me if you please, I can die but once and it[’]s all one to me [whether] now or 
another time.’80  Cornstalk appears to have gauged the tone of the region’s settlers well as it 
took only a single death to ignite the tinderbox into which he had wandered.   
Shortly after Cornstalk’s arrest, a man named Robert Glimore was killed on the 
northern (Indian) bank of the Ohio River.  By the time the militia returned to Point Pleasant, 
Glimore’s scalped body in tow, events had already begun to escalate as word spread through 
the town of an attack upon the party.  Apparently without hesitation, Gilmore’s colleagues 
headed straight for the captive Shawnee.  Much to the horror of Captain Arbuckle, the party 
disregarded his orders to disperse and, when the issue was pressed, he and a subordinate 
were threatened at gun point.81  By the time the party had reached the prisoners, rumour 
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gripped the larger part of the town’s population; those responsible for Gilmore’s death had 
come with Elinipsico, Cornstalk’s son, who now sat corralled with his father, another man 
named Red Hawk, and a fourth – unnamed – Indian.  According to one report, Cornstalk 
offered to find Gilmore’s killer, going so far as to insist that the remaining hostages, including 
his son, stay in custody whilst he attempted to find those responsible.  Whether or not this 
actually occurred is unknown, but if Cornstalk attempted to negotiate the capture of Gilmore’s 
murderer his words went unheeded as the mob swiftly set about the task of killing the Indians; 
Cornstalk was shot by no less than half a dozen guns simultaneously.82  As the elderly chief 
drew his last breath, so too did the Shawnee peace initiative. 
For a number of reasons Cornstalk’s murder was an important turning point in the 
development of the frontier war.  Although Cornstalk was clearly not the Indian who had killed 
Gilmore, rumours linking the two nevertheless came into being.83  Put simply, the settlers were 
demonstrating an ability to link otherwise innocent Indians to unrelated wartime atrocities.  
There appears to have been nothing about Gilmore’s character to suggest that this response 
was a reaction to his specific passing; this response had less to do with the victim than it did 
the assumed perpetrators.84  Moreover, the settlers’ reaction was excessive.  In exchange for 
Gilmore’s life, they murdered four Indians and, to compound matters, each of those lost lives 
belonged to Indians who had a strong desire to maintain peace.  Like most of the trans-
Appalachian region, western Virginia had been subjected to a significant campaign of terror.  
By the start of winter, the tensions, suspicions, and paranoia of many settlers had been fed to 
the point where some kind of reaction was increasingly likely.  Put simply, the settlers who 
killed Cornstalk’s party were not just reacting to a single murder but a much wider context 
informed by extensive psychological warfare.  Prior to Gilmore’s death a number of other 
settlers had been attacked on the southern edge of the Ohio, actual casualties that fed the 
overall perception that the frontier was coming under a sustained and violent Indian assault.85  
As in Kentucky, those now being killed in western Virginia reflected incendiary cases such as 
the death of Elijah Matthews whose burned and scorched remains had captivated and 
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horrified the community’s collective imagination only a few months earlier.86  For the larger 
group, a perception of high casualty rates across the backcountry appears to have made the 
attack upon Cornstalk’s party not merely a justified enterprise, but a necessary one. 
Cornstalk’s murder represents the ultimate catastrophe that was inherently attached 
to the successes gained by the Indians throughout 1777.  The murder of Cornstalk and his 
party was not the culmination of a single death, but of a world view which the Indians had 
helped cultivate in order to drain the frontier of settlers.  Although their methods had proven 
partially successful, they had created in those who remained – and were determined to stay – 
a resolve to push back against those whom they identified as their aggressors.  By the summer 
of 1777 it was still difficult to identify individual tribes who were actively engaged in open 
hostilities; instead parts of one tribal group combined with the disillusioned members of 
others to form an ad hoc force that could be identified only with some doubt by its victims.  
The result of this multi-tribal sub-alliance was the refinement of the Indian (as an abstract, 
tribe-less body) into the principle enemy of the frontier settler.87  By the end of the year, the 
presence in Point Pleasant of Indian chiefs belonging to a tribe with known hostile elements 
proved to be enough to cause a radical breakdown of order.  This breakdown may have been 
catalysed by the death of Robert Gilmore but it had been primed by the shared ordeal the 
community had endured over the preceding twelve months.  The actual number of deaths had 
been relatively few but the perceived assault had been great indeed; the murder of Cornstalk 
did not occur in a vacuum but was instead the result of attitudes which the Indians’ 
themselves had inadvertently fostered through their own wartime practices.  It is important to 
understand that the settlers and Indians were locked together in a system in which the actions 
of each group fundamentally affected the future actions and reactions of the other.  Like the 
settlers, the Indians did not analyse en masse the root cause of Cornstalk’s incendiary murder, 
nor did they look to understand how the more guileful aspects of their raids may have laid the 
groundwork that ultimately led to his death.  Instead, the fall of this peace broker became a 
call to arms, evidence in Indian eyes not of their own complicity but of the settlers’ 
inhumanity.88   
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The settlers, likewise, ignored their role as an invading force whilst Gilmore’s presence 
on Indian lands north of the Ohio appears to have ruffled no conceptual feathers amongst his 
contemporaries.  The settlers, like their adversaries, saw themselves exclusively as victims in 
this scenario and, at least for a time, accepted Cornstalk’s murder as a reasonable act of 
retaliation even if their superiors never did.89  When the Shawnee almost immediately began 
retaliatory strikes against the frontier in response to this loss, the settlers saw only further 
evidence that the Indians were their natural enemy, not evidence that they had helped bring 
this situation about through their own actions.90  Neither group appears to have been capable 
of recognising that both sides of the frontier had become ensnared in a system which justified 
their own acts even as it condemned those of their opponents.  This situation was not entirely 
dissimilar to one which many backcountry inhabitants had already lived through in 1774 when 
Logan’s relatives were murdered, but in 1777 the ongoing War of Independence gave the 
Indians of the Ohio Valley an important ally from whom they could draw both supplies and 
support.91  The role of the British is often emphasised when the frontier war in the late 
eighteenth century is analysed but it is important that their role is understood within an 
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appropriate framework.92  The Indians who fought against the settlers did so not because they 
were allies of the British crown but because they had their own particular set of motivations.93  
With support from the British, particularly with regards to supplies, the Shawnee and their 
allies were able to quickly and confidently organise a number of retaliatory strikes against the 
frontier.  Unlike 1774, however, the Shawnee were not at war with their only viable trading 
partner and, as such, they could execute a war without undue concern for supplies of 
ammunition, particularly as, from 1777 onwards, the British increasingly hoped to utilize the 
Indians to a greater degree in their war against the Patriots.94  All across the southern side of 
the Ohio River numerous Indian raiding parties appeared to avenge the murder of a chief who 
had stood in his later life for peace and accommodation.95   
Perhaps nothing underlines the collective anger shared by the Shawnee more than 
their appearance south of the Ohio in the heart in winter.96  Ignoring the seasonal hiatus such 
months usually impressed upon both parties, Blackfish, one of Cornstalk’s primary adversaries 
within the tribe, had gathered a force of more than one hundred warriors in order to invade 
the Kentucky country in early 1778.97  Blackfish’s substantial band had little interest in 
harassing the area immediately south of the river but instead made the much more difficult 
journey to central Kentucky, no inconsequential expedition in the winter months.  Part of the 
allure of this area was the presence of Kentucky’s isolated frontier population who were 
concentrated around just three fortified settlements.98  Of these centralised targets the town 
of Harrodsburgh was the best manned and hence, best defended station in the country whilst 
Logan’s Fort, although defended by only a small force, offered the raiders little in the way of a 
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potential bounty in scalps or prisoners.  Boonesborough, on the other hand, offered the 
warriors their best opportunity to capture or kill significant numbers without encountering the 
problems posed by Harrodsburgh’s much greater defensive capability.  Before reaching the 
town, however, the party encountered a large number of men harvesting salt at the Lower 
Blue Licks whom they promptly, and bloodlessly, took into custody.99 
  With a major bounty in captives, the Shawnee no longer had to risk a winter time 
assault upon a fortified position and instead returned to the Ohio country with their new 
captives in tow.  Although they may have returned to their towns the warriors who had set out 
to strike Boonesborough maintained a close watch upon this settlement and, the following 
summer, Blackfish was able to gather an even larger force for a second expedition against the 
town.  When the Shawnee returned they continued a pattern which months of increased raids 
had already established; the fear and terror tactics of the previous year were married 
effortlessly with a very significant rise in the level of real conflict.100  This was no longer a war 
of ideas, but a war of actuality.  Ideas and their manipulation, however, would continue to 
provide the Indians with a significant arsenal of alternative weaponry; they may have lacked 
the artillery necessary to destroy the fort’s stockade, but that does not mean that the Indians 
lacked the means to breach the fort’s walls.101 
Although the Shawnee no doubt planned to surprise Boonesborough, the escape of 
several prisoners captured during the earlier winter campaign meant that the town had 
warning enough to bolster its defences, complete its stockade, and ready itself for the coming 
siege.102  By the time Blackfish and his army arrived at the town he found a reasonably well 
fortified position that could not be easily overrun.  Rather than pull back or break his force into 
smaller guerrilla parties, however, Blackfish instead laid siege to the settlement, employing 
ideas as much as he did the gun and tomahawk in an attempt to render his enemies into a 
position of surrender.  When Blackfish commenced mock negotiations with the fort’s 
commanders he combined threats with seemingly innocuous requests to underline the 
potential dangers the settlers were facing.  Probably one of the most cutting of these was the 
observation that should the inhabitants of the fort not surrender, the prisoners who would 
eventually be taken by the Shawnee would ‘all be put to death,’ whilst the town’s ‘young 
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squaws [would be reserved] for wives.’103  Blackfish even sent a messenger back to the fort, 
informing the defenders that ‘some of the warriors wanted to see Boone’s squaws.’  It was 
likely a chilling and effective reminder of the earlier threats made against the town’s 
population and the curt response that ‘Boonesborough’s squaws were very much afraid of the 
Indians’ probably contained very little hyperbole.104   
Indeed, it was not only the town’s women who feared for their lives but many of the 
men with one, in particular, expressing his fear physically when he hid ‘under Mrs. Stephen 
Hancock’s bed.’105  When negotiations, likely a ruse in the first place, finally broke down, the 
Indians opened fire upon the fort.  When rifles were fired, their balls struck persons without 
regard for age or gender but one did not need to be struck by a bullet to feels its effects.  
When David Brundin was shot in the head, his slow and excruciating death became an event 
which the entire community had to endure.  None were ignorant that, over the course of the 
next three days, as the fighting continued to rage outside the fort walls, ‘all [of] the brains ran 
out of the wound’ in Brundin’s head.  During the course of his death, Brundin apparently 
‘rocked his body,’ incessantly but lacked either the ability or will to speak.  He did, however, 
occasionally wipe ‘away the oozing out brains with his hand.’106  Brundin may not have spoken 
after sustaining his injury but his silence likely spoke volumes to those around him and word of 
his bad death spread quickly.  No one experienced Brundin’s death but the man himself, but 
the community as a whole were made very aware by his example just how horrific warfare 
could become.107 
Direct assaults and sieges such as that which Boonesborough suffered through in the 
summer of 1778 brought together the entire community through a shared ordeal.  Such 
attacks did not discriminate between martial and non-martial members of society – much to 
the detriment of the man who hid under Mrs. Hancock’s bed – but instead involved all of those 
within the immediate vicinity.  Certainly, all who lived at Boonesborough during the time of 
the siege were extremely vulnerable in a manner which had been largely alien to them 
beforehand.  To be sure, many settlers had conceived themselves as being vulnerable 
throughout the preceding year, but as 1778 drew on and the war escalated, that vulnerability 
was transformed from an abstract idea.108  The belief that the frontier was a dangerous place 
and that danger largely stemmed from the Indians was brought into much sharper focus for 
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many by the siege.  In short order, the fort’s women found it necessary to don male clothing as 
they ran bullets to the beleaguered defenders, ‘assuming the masculine tone of voice – as far 
as possible – to increase to the Indians, the apparent strength of the fort.’109  Even as they 
provided this essential role, some were forced to remove stray bullets which had struck their 
bodies in order to continue the ruse; evidently the Indians were not alone in employing 
psychological techniques to unbalance and confuse their enemy.110    
Even those settlers not living in Boonesborough found themselves in far more 
vulnerable position when rumour, idea, and fear was transformed into a tangible threat.  
William Pattin, a resident of the town, returned to Boonesborough from a hunting trip only to 
find it surrounded and besieged by Blackfish’s army.  Taking up a hidden vantage point, Pattin 
observed the unfolding siege.  On the final evening of the attack the Indians brought their 
assault to a crescendo as waves of warriors rushed the fort walls with lit torches and flaming 
arrows.  As the warriors did so, they ‘made the most Dreadfullest screams and howling that 
could be imagind [sic],’ a sonic and physical assault so great that ‘Pattin thought the Fort was 
taken.’111  Panicked by what he believed he had witnessed, this lone woodsman set out for 
Logan’s Fort where he informed the town’s inhabitants that ‘Boonesborough was taken’ and 
that ‘he actuly Did hear the Indians killing the people in the fort [sic].’ Nor were the 
descriptions he gave vague or uncertain; ‘he said...He heard the women and Children and men 
also screaming when the Indians was killing them.’112 
The effect of the final Shawnee attempt upon Boonesborough obviously affected 
Pattin, but it had a much wider impact when his account spread among the inhabitants of 
Logan’s Fort.  Now vague stories of individuals and small groups being killed, wounded, or 
captured paled in comparison to the very real threat which had come to bear upon the 
settlers.  Accordingly, those living in Logan’s Fort prepared for the worst: women, children, and 
men all rushed to gather supplies or hastily buttress the town’s defences.  Under instructions 
from Benjamin Logan the settlers readied themselves for an assault which everyone seemed to 
expect.  Problematically, most of the town’s livestock was scattered in the surrounding 
woodlands, a reality which prompted between six and eight men to volunteer for the 
dangerous task of leaving the stockade and entering the wilderness.  These volunteers, 
however, were dismissed by Logan who told the group ‘Stop! I am afraid for you to go.  I will 
                                                            
109 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Richard French, Son of Miss Calloway’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC203 
110 Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone,’ pp. 68-69 
111 Daniel Trabue ‘The Narrative of Daniel Trabue: Memorandum Made by me D Trabue in the Year 1827 
of a Jurnal of Events from Memory and Tradition [sic]’ in Chester Raymond Young (ed.) Westward into 
Kentucky: The Narrative of Daniel Trabue (1981; reprint, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 
p. 59 
112 Trabue ‘The Narrative of Daniel Trabue,’ pp. 59-60 
 
 
100 
go by myself...I will hunt the cattle and Indians alone.’113 If the panic that gripped the fort 
abated somewhat whilst Logan was out, his return, an hour later, no doubt reignited it.  
Bleeding profusely, Logan had sustained a broken arm and had been shot in at least two places 
by a party of Indians who had ambushed him in the wilderness.  If any had not believed 
Pattin’s account of the siege, or Logan’s warning that ‘their was but little Doubt but the 
indeans would come to our Fort [sic],’ then it is highly unlikely such doubts persisted following 
his return.114  Logan’s warning that ‘if the indeans takes the fort they will kill me and all the sick 
and wounded’ was likely meant to inspire the men within the stockade to make the most 
effective stand they could, but the appearance of a small number of Indians outside the town 
walls that night likely underlined the point in a way Logan never could.115  More effective still 
was the appearance, in the morning, of the very cattle which Logan had hunted when he was 
attacked and wounded.  Much of the stock that approached the town did so ‘with arrows in 
them,’ apparently looking back in the direction from which they had come.  It was a 
‘Meloncholy Morning [sic],’ indeed.116 
Whatever feeling of hopelessness may have gripped the community at dawn, faded 
into relative insignificance when the town’s inhabitants heard and saw what they believed to 
be the Indian army that had already defeated Boonesborough.  ‘Yes, yes the indins is a coming 
[sic],’ some of the town’s guard whispered whilst some of the women apparently cried out at 
the sight, ‘Lord, have mercy on us.  Yonder they come.’117  As the settlers’ readied themselves 
for the coming attack those armed and manning the stockade began shouting towards the 
approaching column, ‘Dam[n] you! Come on!’ before readying their rifles to make their stand.  
When, finally, it was noticed that the approaching column was composed entirely of men who 
had left to the town in order to aid Boonesborough, the reality of the past days finally began to 
present itself.118  All at once the defeat of Boonesborough was revealed as the fiction it was 
whilst the truth behind the siege of Logan’s Fort presented itself; it had been no more than a 
minor raid made significant by the community’s collective imagination.  To be sure, the people 
of Logan’s Fort – and the Kentucky country in general – would and did come into contact with 
significant levels of violence throughout 1778 but imagined conflict continued to be an 
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important factor even as the number of actual confrontations soared.  Blackfish may have set 
out to capture or kill the inhabitants of Boonesborough but the resulting siege became a 
country-wide, communal affair.  The tomahawk and gun were certainly major agents of 
frontier interaction that year, but the idea of them appears to have lost none of its potency as 
a result. 
Boonesborough did not fall as a result of Blackfish’s siege.  Following an assault that 
lasted almost two weeks, the Indian army finally broke up, leaving in its wake only two bodies 
within the town’s robust fortifications.119  Light casualties, however, did not equate to the 
community escaping the collective ordeal which such sieges necessarily imposed upon them.  
Whether the casualties were light or not is irrelevant; had the settlement’s stockade failed 
then potentially every one of the town’s inhabitants would have been killed, captured or 
wounded.120  All of the threats and dangers which the settlers believed they had faced over the 
past twelve months had stood before them, writ large in the massive number of Indians who 
had aligned against them.  To compound matters, those apprehensions would continue to 
define the culture of fear which the war had inspired; whereas imagined violence had 
dominated Kentucky prior to 1778, it now served to compliment extensive physical 
confrontations.  Every assault or attack was accompanied by residual components that 
reached out to affect many more people – witnesses, survivors, and concerned friends and 
family – than those directly involved in the incident.121 
 The psychological element of warfare was never absent from the trans-Appalachian 
west.  Often, such tactics were used deliberately, such as the day the ‘Indians came along and 
stole all of John Smith’s bed clothes,’ or the occasion when they ‘threw a couple of frogs’ into 
an unattended pan of boiling sugar water.122  Such exercises in ‘mischief,’ as such actions were 
often characterised by the settlers, offered those carrying them out no real tactical advantage 
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or tangible benefit.  They did, however, remind the settlers that they were never far from 
danger.  Such activities were carried out because they were detrimental to the morale of 
individuals and the larger group and morale is nothing if not a measure of a group’s attitude 
towards the obstacles they face.  By playing upon apprehensions and fears, the Indians who 
raided the frontier could help alter attitudes and, ultimately, force some settlers back across 
the Appalachian Mountains without having to engage them in combat first.  Throughout this 
period, many individuals, irrespective of age or gender, lost more than a night’s sleep owing to 
the apprehension which the Indians were able to foster among them.  Mrs. Gough, for 
instance, would relate to John Shane how her mother, hearing the cow bells jangling and 
seeing the cane shake, would lie awake all night in fear.  The fear that these noises were being 
generated by Indians, not cows, served to keep Gough’s mother firmly within the bounds of 
her home.123  On numerous other occasions the possibility of Indian raids saw men, women, 
and children alike scurrying for places of perceived safety.  Very often such persons hid 
themselves under beds, or gathering their children together, they simply ‘hid in the blankets’ 
whilst they awaited the danger, whether real or imagined, to pass.124 
Through subtle signs and markers, raiding parties were able to terrorise massive 
portions of the settler population, but subtlety was not always employed.  Outside of Louisville 
parties of Indians were known to have appeared ‘and danced freely to provoke [the 
inhabitants’] notice’ whilst leaving behind heavily mutilated bodies was probably one of the 
most overt and common methods the Indians employed to send a message to their foes.125  
When General Scott’s son was attacked and mortally wounded by the Indians he was displayed 
in such a manner as to provoke the maximum degree of torment in his would-be rescuers.  The 
fact that the young man was still alive – but beyond help – when he was discovered only 
served to increase the effectiveness of this ploy.  Having mortally wounded the young man as 
he travelled up a river bank, his attackers had gone to no small effort in order to move his 
dying body to the opposite shore, entangling one arm around a crooked tree root so that he 
could be left half submerged in the water.  In this awkward position Scott was both highly 
visible from the settlers’ shoreline and simultaneously beyond the easy reach of aid.  Indeed, 
so secure were the Indians in their new position that they ‘took their time,’ first cutting one 
scalp and then, upon finding Scott’s double crown, a second.126  When General Scott arrived 
with a body of men in search of his lost boy he was visibly distressed to find him scalped, 
restrained in the water, and still alive.  When the general inquired as to his son’s 
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circumstances, the younger Scott was careful to warn his father off from any rescue attempt.  
‘[T]he Indians,’ he informed his father, ‘were waiting for him.’  Regardless of the danger, 
General Scott, ‘a daring, as well as a feeling man’ attempted to swim over to his son, heedless 
of the threat.  His men, however, would not allow him to swim into a potential ambush and 
instead restrained him from any such attempt.  After an uncertain period of time, the younger 
Scott ‘finally fell back out in the water,’ dead from his numerous wounds.127  Even then the 
danger was too great to recover the body and instead the younger Scott sat as a morbid 
monument to his fate until the following morning.  Although the young man had warned his 
father of a potential ambush no evidence appears to have been discovered to suggest his 
appraisal of the situation had been correct.  Indeed, it is entirely possible that the Indians had 
not awaited Scott’s rescuers but had simply positioned him in a particularly striking manner for 
his eventual discovery.128   
Prior to being scalped, dead bodies were often mutilated with tomahawks; in addition 
to scalping, brains could be dashed out, additional slashes added to bodies, and body parts 
removed.  This practice is particularly noteworthy because it left clear and vivid images which 
stayed with many settlers throughout their lives.129  Time and again these images and 
memories were reproduced when former settlers were asked by men like John Shane to offer 
oral accounts of their time on the frontier decades later.  During both the frontier and the later 
antebellum periods the dead spoke to the living with the apparent voices of those who had 
taken their lives; they did this because their remains were treated in a particular manner 
designed to accomplish this end and few settlers exposed to such sights showed a propensity 
to forget them.130   
Memories of dead or nearly dead persons were enduring but they were only one 
thread in a complex tapestry that helped shape a world view that would, in some form, stay 
with the settlers throughout their lifetime.  Indeed, the Indians employed other, less dramatic, 
though no less potent methods of antagonising the settlers throughout the war.  When a 
group travelling through the wilderness in western Virginia found a series of letters on an 
Indian trail ominously inviting them to cross the Ohio River and, hence, enter Indian lands, the 
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settlers were so unnerved that ‘all the members of the party were mutually sworn not to 
divulge the secret of [the letters’] contents, for the next six months.’131  In other cases the 
psychological impact of the war was largely unplanned but was present nonetheless, the 
natural fallout of incessant harassment and guerrilla techniques.  One of the most common 
tactics employed by the Indians to antagonise and worry the settler population was horse 
theft, causing as it did a marked decline in essential resources whilst minimizing the risk faced 
by Indian raiders.  It was also a way of luring settlers out from the safety of their stockades and 
blockhouses and, as such, escalating horse theft came to reflect the escalation of the overall 
war.  This practice allowed very small numbers of Indians to materially benefit themselves – 
and their tribe – at the settlers’ expense, but it also had the advantage of reminding the 
settlers that their townships and homes were under a seemingly constant vigil and that the 
basic resources they required to survive and prosper were always vulnerable.  When Mrs 
Morrison awoke one night to the sound of Indians removing the bells from her family’s horse 
stock, she failed to wake her husband because, in spite of the hardship such thefts would 
impose upon her family, she feared ‘he would be too venturesome.’  Or to put it another way, 
she was scared that her husband would be killed if he tried to prevent the theft.  The Indians 
who stole the Morrisons’ horses did so for a number of reasons but it is unlikely that keeping 
Mrs Morrison up all night with worry was one of their foremost goals.  They did, however, 
manage to achieve this in addition to the successful theft of the family’s horses.132  
 
Closure 
Throughout the period of the frontier war physical combat was augmented by psychological 
warfare, a technique that allowed the Indians to have a significant impact upon their enemies 
when direct confrontations were either impossible or likely to result in excessive casualties.  
This type of warfare played upon the attitudes and, hence, the behaviour of their enemy; put 
simply, the Indians’ war was one designed to undermine the settlers’ collective and individual 
morale.  Indian raids throughout 1777 were never as large or as dangerous as most settlers 
imagined, yet throughout this year settler after settler left the country, bringing the Euro-
American population in the region to the point of collapse.  By carefully disguising their 
numbers and engaging in a type of harassment designed to create alarm and erode any sense 
of safety, the Indians who raided regions such as Kentucky and western Virginia were able to 
gain a disproportionate victory against their adversaries, emptying large areas of the frontier, 
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without having to engage the settler population in any large scale or significant battles.  This 
year was one dominated not by war but rather the idea, the fear, of conflict, something which 
the Indians utilized to their fullest advantage.  Whilst the use of such techniques proved 
remarkably effective in many ways, they had an unforeseen outcome that fundamentally 
affected how the settler population of the frontier came to view the Indians.  For the most 
part, the Indian became an abstract, the settlers’ natural, aggressive, and unrestricted enemy.  
Even as raiding parties used ideas to empty the frontier, they were inadvertently laying an 
enduring groundwork that would make it all but impossible for most settlers to view them with 
empathy in the future.  By deliberately harassing and terrorising the settlers, the Indians may 
have scored a huge demographic victory in 1777, but they created a detrimental image of 
themselves among the settlers that would be renewed, refreshed, and reinvigorated almost 
continuously until the signing of the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. More problematic still, by the 
end of the frontier war these tactics had been employed almost continuously for the best part 
of two decades – four, if one includes the Seven Years War – a process which left a potent folk 
legacy and memory that would haunt the Indians for decades. 
 By the end of 1777 the death of Cornstalk had led to a massive escalation in the war as 
the Shawnee, Mingo and significant numbers from other tribes – such as the Wyandot, Miami 
and Delaware – began dispatching much larger groups to fight on the frontier.  But even with 
the advent of large scale warfare, the management of fear and apprehension remained an 
important weapon in the Indians’ arsenal and throughout the remaining eighteen years of the 
war, the settlers of the frontier were subjected to a campaign of relentless terror.  For some, 
this resulted in a retreat from areas where the campaign was most effective whilst for others it 
resulted in hardening of resolve and an escalation in the fighting.  For most, however, this 
campaign hardened anti-Indian attitudes, reinforcing the idea that this group was inherently 
dangerous and antagonistic.  Whether or not a settler suffered a direct loss at Indian hands 
became almost irrelevant as such tactics and methods ensured that they suffered as a result of 
the culture of fear to which they belonged.  A given settler may not have lost friends or family 
to raids, but they nonetheless came to be affected by the war and those whom they identified 
as it primary agents; the Indians.  Whatever the response of a given individual, the sights and 
ideas which were cultivated in the wilderness often stayed with the settlers long after the war 
had come to an end and can be observed echoing through oral source material generated 
throughout the nineteenth century.  This type of warfare was no incidental matter and thus it 
helped to form the basis of one of the most significant pressure points which helped to shape 
society in early Kentucky and western Virginia.  Physical violence was certainly a potent force 
but when the psychological element is analysed the potential impact of war upon society 
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becomes much more evident.  Guns and tomahawks certainly led the way in this war, but 
those imagined were, in many ways, just as important as those which were actually used.   
It was not just that the level of violence was growing; it was the type of violence, the 
mode of fighting, that was important.  By creating and then exploiting fear in their enemies, 
the Indians came within a hairsbreadth of emptying the Kentucky country in 1777.  However, 
the realities of the psychological warfare which they employed ensured that those who 
remained – and many of those who would subsequently arrive – did so with a new 
understanding of the world they inhabited.  By dominating the wilderness, the Indians were 
able to shape the settlers’ relationship with their environment, a process with surprisingly far 
reaching consequences which will be analysed throughout the next chapter.  By creating the 
idea that certain zones within the Kentucky country were safe, such as settlements, or unsafe, 
such as the wilderness, the Indians altered the relationship between the settlers and the 
landscape which they aspired to master.  This changing relationship was one of the formative 
forces which helped to define settler society in the Kentucky country.  Between the continuing 
impact of psychological warfare and the changing relationships which the next chapter of this 
thesis will explore, the settlers could do little to escape the conflict.  Instead, they had to live 
with the war, a process which necessarily demanded change and adaptation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Invisible Empire 
 
August, 1778.  Josiah Collins and a small band of settlers set out for David Glenn and William 
Stuart’s cabin, a small structure some ‘50 or 40 miles’ from the group’s base in Harrodsburgh.  
The purpose of the trip had been simple; to bring the preserved bear meat located in the cabin 
back to the town.   However, a round trip of no less than eighty miles through a country almost 
completely dominated by the Indians had ensured that the execution of their plan had been 
anything but uncomplicated.  Indeed, the danger was so acute that, upon the return leg of 
their journey, the band had refused to stop, rest, or camp through the night.  They did, 
however, stop when they encountered an unconcealed camp fire on the last part of their 
journey but, rather than discovering the expected band of Indian raiders, the band had instead 
discovered something far more surprising; a careless German immigrant by name of John 
Shelp.  Curious, Collins’ band had pressed the newly arrived Shelp as to why he had so 
blatantly flaunted his presence, disregarding the most basic rules of wilderness survival.  
According to Collins, Shelp had replied that he ‘wasn’t afraid [and that he] Wo’dn’t die till his 
time came.’  Such an attitude did little to comfort Collins’ band.  Indeed, they found Shelp’s 
ignorance of the wilderness both vexing and reckless with Collins, in particular, moved to refer 
to this man thereafter as ‘a fool of the Dutch fort.’  That Shelp was later killed whilst out on a 
similar trip appears to have made perfect sense to the enraged settler.1  As Collins and his 
party knew well, the wilderness had to be treated differently from the settlements.  Here the 
rules were altered and the dangers heightened.  The settlers may have mastered the 
environment encapsulated by their palisades but beyond their limits it was the Indian who was 
king. 
For Josiah Collins, Shelp had demonstrated a failure to understand the new 
circumstances which he and his compatriots were beginning to identify as self evident.  Shelp 
may have been of Germanic origin but Collins’ negative attitude towards him was the product 
not of his ethnic heritage but of his failure to adapt to the realities of the frontier, a failure to 
accept that the wilderness was a place where even skilled, experienced woodsmen were in 
danger.  Not long before their encounter, one of Collins’ closer acquaintances, a man named 
James Kelly, had been found not only dead but disembowelled after a disastrous evening spent 
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in the woodlands, a morbid reminder of the dangers associated with the outside world.2  Even 
the rescue party dispatched to hunt for Kelly had abandoned the search as soon as night had 
begun to fall, too fearful that the de-illuminated world of the wilderness would place them all 
in immediate danger.3  Worse still, Kelly had been accompanied by his brother, William, who 
had been forced to listen to the sound of ‘the Indians singing & dancing round his brother,’ as 
they set about mutilating and distorting his remains.  Collins, then, clearly understood that the 
wilderness was not an environment to be taken lightly and when he encountered those 
ignorant of this it is hardly surprising to see frustrations drawn and dwelled upon.4  Indians 
were very quickly coming to be viewed as an abstract, aggressive whole, but so too was the 
wilderness coming to be identified as the host – or indeed the cause – of innumerable related 
dangers.5   
Since the initial settlement of Kentucky three years before and, particularly, since the 
death of Cornstalk the previous year, the war on the frontier had served to redefine how the 
majority of settlers had come to construct and understand the wilderness.  Far from an 
insignificant concept of geography, the wilderness dominated the landscape and was a key 
part of the settlers’ larger world view.  It surrounded every settlement, providing much needed 
game for hunters.6  The wilderness was also the area that bound one settlement to another 
whilst, simultaneously, obscuring paths and roads, inhibiting travel and slowing the exchange 
of people, goods and information.  Perhaps most importantly, the wilderness represented 
everything the settlers sought to change about the Kentucky country; canebrakes were to be 
removed, trees felled, land ploughed, and the environment transformed.  By the end of 1778, 
however, the Indians had succeeded in claiming this broad region as their own.  The wilderness 
played a central role in shaping frontier society but, as this chapter will demonstrate, the loss 
of that region to the Indians forced the settlers to adjust their world view to accommodate an 
all-encompassing landscape over which their enemy could claim mastery.  By dominating the 
                                                            
2 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Josiah Collins’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC102 
3 Peter Silver, in his study of Indian-settler relations throughout the eighteenth century, has identified a 
similar phenomenon occurring throughout the mid-Atlantic colonies, something he describes as ‘foot 
dragging.’  According to Silver it was a common occurrence for parties to abandon their pursuit of 
Indians at an early stage, or to deliberately delay their setting out in the first place in order to minimize 
the chances of actually engaging a hostile Indian party.  This, Silver argues, is largely a result of the 
‘terroristic’ nature he identified in Indian warfare.  Much of Silver’s argument is sound but some of the 
generalisations he makes are perhaps too broad as, at least in the trans-Appalachian region, there are 
many exceptions to this rule.  Whether these exceptions prove or disprove the concept is an issue that is 
open to debate.  See Silver Our Savage Neighbours, pp. 41-41, 54-55  
4 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Josiah Collins’ 12CC102 
5 ‘Letter from Arthur Campbell to George Brown, December 29th, 1787’ Arthur Campbell Papers 
A/C187/1,2,4, Filson Historical Society 
6 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Richard French’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC205, John D. Shane ‘Interview 
with Josiah Collins’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC102, and John D. Shane ‘Interview with Colonel James Lane’ 
Draper Manuscripts 12CC56  
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land, the Indians helped the settlers to create a particular perspective of the environment 
which served to bridge, negate, or soften a number of pre-existing social divisions ranging from 
gender to race, ethnicity and class.  By dominating the landscape outside of the stockades, the 
Indians effectively divided the environment into two broad zones, one which they controlled – 
the majority of the wilderness – and one which was controlled by the settlers.  This enforced 
division of the land, a product of psychological and growing levels of physical warfare, served 
to create some important bonds of commonality.  Settlers may have arrived upon the frontier 
with a clear sense of social division, but the universal threat and hardship posed by the 
wilderness created a shared sense of a common identity which negated or softened many such 
divisions.7  In short, the settlers’ construction of the wilderness helped them to build a sense of 
themselves as a group bound by shared interests, dangers, aspirations and experiences. 
For many, the Indians and the wilderness came to be closely related as the presence of 
the latter often appeared to suggest the presence of the former, a perception which was 
exacerbated by the Indians’ expert use of guerrilla warfare.  In the words of one settler 
reflecting upon Indian dominance of the environment following Cornstalk’s murder ‘The 
Western Country co’d never have been settled, had there been, so early, the interruption on 
the wilderness that there afterwards was.’8  Along with violence and the idea of violence, then, 
the wilderness was one of the three major pressure points which helped to forge the specific 
type of society which developed in the trans-Appalachian territories.  For the settlers of the 
frontier the wilderness was no romantic or idealised locale but one part of the multifaceted 
forces which appeared to be aligned against them.9  To most, the beauty that later generations 
would see in such environments was undermined by the hardships they naturally encountered 
within such regions and the perceived dangers that came to dwell within them.10  Henry David 
                                                            
7 For expressions of pre-existing social divisions see John D. Shane ‘Interview with Mrs. Morrison’ Draper 
Manuscripts 11CC152 
8 John D. Shane ‘Interview with John Gass’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC11 
9 Catherine L. Albanese ‘Savage, Sinner, and Saved: Davy Crockett, Camp Meetings, and the Wild 
Frontier’ America Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1981): 482-501, p.483 
10 Perceptions of the wilderness varied from case to case and there were certainly those on the frontier, 
particularly long hunters, who appear to have enjoyed their experiences in the wilderness.  The word, 
wilderness, however, is necessarily vague containing allusions as much to the backwoods of North 
Carolina in the years before the seven years war as it does towards the environment that settlers 
encountered in the trans-Appalachian region.  For many, the wilderness contained happy memories and 
there are certainly strong hints of the romantic in Filson and Boone’s narrative; ‘from the top of an 
eminence, [we] saw the beautiful level of Kentucke.’ But even within Filson and Boone’s work there are 
numerous details given to undermine the apparent beauty of the country.  Immediately following the 
above quote the narrative continues: ‘Here let me observe, that for some time we had experienced the 
most uncomfortable weather a prelibation of our future sufferings [sic].’  Indeed, throughout this 
narrative the potential beauty of the country is undermined by the hardships of war, a vivid contrast the 
romance later writers would impose upon the concept of a wilderness; Theodore Roosevelt somewhat 
echoed Filson and Boone’s caution, but never at the expense of the environment’s perceived beauty.  
Instead, he highlighted danger only as a device to emphasise the capable masculinity of those who 
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Thoreau may have believed that ‘in the Wildness is the preservation of the world,’ but the 
settlers of the trans-Appalachian west could rarely adhere to such a view for, from their 
perspective, in the wilderness lay danger, hardship and only the occasional moment of 
beauty.11  For them, the preservation of life lay not in the wild, but within structures which 
were ‘handsomely stockade[d].’12 
Indeed, the stockade came to define their environment; on either side of the defensive 
wall lay two broad zones which, in turn, helped to define the settlers’ understanding of the 
world and their place within it.  On the one hand the wilderness represented almost the entire 
country; a vast area over which settler control was marginal, a region in which ‘Danger became 
familiar.’13  On the other hand the settlements which they constructed came to offer a good 
level of refuge from these dangers, defining in the process the spaces in which most settler 
interaction would occur.  The wilderness and settlement zones thus became distinct entities, 
each requiring their own specific sets of knowledge and skills.  Men like John Shelp did not 
draw the ire of Collins through their arrogance, but rather their inability to recognise that the 
wilderness required its own specific attitude and set of abilities.  A fire may have been a 
common luxury in one’s homestead, but in the wilderness it could lead to a swift – or, for that 
matter, not so swift – and brutal end.  Differences such as these can appear trivial but to the 
settlers they became matters of life and death which helped to cultivate an important 
distinction within their society; those who operated largely within the confines of the settled 
world, and those who were able to operate in the wilderness.  These distinctions were not 
based upon existing notions of identity, nor should they be analysed strictly through the lenses 
provided by existing categories of analysis.  Although pre-existing ideas and prejudices 
remained, the lines which separated them were often blurred by this new distinction, itself a 
fluid concept dominated by the growth of a communal identity which was forged within the 
confines of the isolated frontier township.14 
                                                                                                                                                                              
engaged with such environment; ‘The man should have youth and strength who seeks adventure in the 
wild...He must long greatly for the lonely winds that blow across the wilderness, and for sunrise and 
sunset over the rim of the empty world.’ See Theodore Roosevelt and Paul Schullery (ed.) Wilderness 
Writings (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1986), p. 31 and Filson and Boone ‘The Adventures of 
Daniel Boon,’ pp. 50-51 
11 Henry David Thoreau and Eliot Porter In the Wildness is the Preservation of the World (New Jersey: 
BBS Publishing, 1996).  For an example of settlers identifying some beauty or facility within the 
wilderness see John D. Shane ‘Interview with David Crouch’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC226 
12 John D. Shane ‘Interview with Mrs. Stagg’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC236 
13 John D. Shane ‘Conversation with Chilton Allen’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC53 
14 Elizabeth Perkins argues that it is the ‘distinction and patricians’ which helped to define frontier 
society during this period, but it should be noted that Perkins does accept that ‘attitudes about others 
were contingent...[on] actual experience.’  However, Perkins consistently emphasises the differences 
between settlers rather than analysing how pre-existing divisions were challenged or altered by 
experience upon the frontier.  This argument stems, in part, as a response to ideas dating from Frederick 
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To the immigrants attempting to settle this region the idea of a wilderness – an area 
utterly outside of their control – was a highly problematic reality.  That the control of this 
region appeared to fall into Indian hands made it all the more frustrating for a settler 
population who were striving to bring this environment into their exclusive sphere of 
influence.  Both as a battleground and as an idea, the wilderness came to be the scene and 
cause of much conflict throughout the trans-Appalachian region.  The environment which 
dominated the frontier appeared to the settlers to serve no real long term purpose and, as 
such, they strove to transform it in order to facilitate both cultivation and meaningful 
individual ownership.  Moreover, they also sought to transform it to facilitate communal 
safety, turning this invisible empire of the Indians into a space which was ordered to meet 
their specific needs.  For the Indian tribes now fighting in this region, the environment had to 
remain largely unchanged.  Only in its pre-settlement form did it offer these communities a 
sustainable supply of game to hunt.  These competing goals and perspectives were mutually 
exclusive and as such the wilderness became as much a prize as it did a battleground; settlers 
sought to remake it anew whilst the Indians sought to restore it to its former, settler-less, 
glory.  This realisation was not lost upon those who fought in and against the environment and 
as both an idea and place the wilderness played a fundamental role in helping to forge a 
community from the disparate bands of immigrants who sought to settle the country. 
In describing the environment in which they came to dwell, the settlers of Kentucky 
commonly used the word ‘wilderness.’15  Although this description of the environment is 
certainly evocative it is also imprecise, describing an array of possible variations in the 
landscape.16  From heavily wooded areas to grassy plains, the wilderness concept was 
seemingly applied without qualification to any type of environment which lacked significant 
evidence of human intervention.17  When the settlers used this word, however, they did so 
because it was loaded with a very specific set of connotations which reflected their view of the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis and though Perkins’ study sheds some important light upon the sheer 
plurality in early Kentucky it fails to account for the dynamic nature of that society.  To be sure, settlers 
would continue to recognise differences among their neighbours but those differences were rarely 
defined; the idea that different groups converging upon a common geographic location would generate 
comments highlighting those differences is not particularly surprising.  What is, however, is the extent to 
which those differences failed to manifest themselves in a significantly divisive manner.  To be sure, 
many of Perkins’ observations and interpretations contain much value but, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, emphasising difference in this region has far less value than analysing the factors and 
forces that overcame these divisions.  See Perkins Borderlife, p. 81-86 
15 John D. Shane ‘Interview with John Gass’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC11 
16 For examples of how widely interpretations of the wilderness can vary – and how fundamentally they 
can be affected by contemporary agendas see J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson (eds.) The Great 
Wilderness Debate (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1998) 
17 Max Oelschlaeger The Idea of the Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 356 
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world they inhabited.18  Understanding how the settlers conceptualised the environment, 
then, is crucial to understanding the environment’s impact upon their society, something 
which John Demos reflected in his work Circles and Lines.  Not only did Demos emphasise the 
importance of natural cycles in daily routine – such as the often overlooked transition from day 
to night and summer to winter – he went so far as to emphasise the landscape as an obstacle 
to settlement, not merely its reward.19  Similarly, Rhys Isaac would emphasise the interaction 
between settlers, the land, and the larger environment in his study of Virginia in the 
eighteenth century.  Although the ability of the land to block, inhibit or otherwise limit 
settlement is not absent from Isaac’s work he does emphasise a relationship between people 
and place rather than Demos’ emphasis upon the land as an encumbrance.20  For James H. 
Merrell, the wilderness presented an ordeal shared by settlers and Indians, something which is 
emphasised by ceremonies designed to symbolically relieve wilderness travellers of the 
hardships suffered on their journey.  Rather than an environment in which the Indians 
flourished, Merrell’s interpretation of the wilderness instead emphasises the shared hardships 
which bridged, rather than divided, cultures.21   
In the case of the Kentucky frontier, it was not merely an absence of human habitation 
or the imposition of subjective ideas, many of which originated in medieval Europe, which 
gave the environment its apparent character.22  This was only one part of the issue and an 
equally important factor – possibly the most important factor – was the presence of hostile 
Indians from both the Ohio country and southern territories.  Their presence came to be 
accentuated by the apparent wildness of the land and the paradoxical mastery which they, 
nonetheless, exercised over it.  In particular, the Shawnee and Cherokee exploited trails and 
paths in Kentucky which allowed them to travel easily to each others’ lands.23  The Kentucky 
                                                            
18 Roderick Frazier Nash Wilderness and the American Mind: Fourth Edition (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2001), pp. xi-xiv.  For a general discussion concerning interpretations of the 
wilderness, see Anna Bramwell Ecology in the Twentieth Century: A History (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1989), Hans Peter Duerr Dreamtime: Concerning the Boundary Between 
Wilderness and Civilization (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1987) and Oelschlaeger The Idea of the 
Wilderness, pp. 1-30 
19 John Demos Circles and Lines: The Shape of Life in Early America (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 1-5, 58 
20 Rhys Isaac The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (1982; reprint, Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 11-19 
21 Merrell Into the American Woods, pp. 139-142 
22 Nash Wilderness and the American Mind, pp. 8-22.  For an example of a work specifically concerned 
with the Ohio Valley which argues that a wilderness is represented, at least in part, by an absence of 
European habitation see Perkins Borderlife, p. 45.  For a discussion on the significance of Nash’s work 
see Oelschlaeger The Idea of the Wilderness, pp. ix-x 
23 The Cherokee, living in what is now Tennessee, were separated by some considerable distance from 
the Shawnee who, by the late eighteenth century, had taken up residence in the Ohio country.  
Originally, the paths through Kentucky were utilized during the wars the Cherokee and Shawnee fought 
against one another.  By the time of Euro-American settlement in the Kentucky country, however, there 
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country may have lacked any form of permanent habitation but its use as a highway, in 
addition to serving as a hunting ground, meant that those groups who aligned against the 
settlers were able to draw upon a significant fund of accumulated knowledge to better execute 
their designs.24  The result was a settler population that initially floundered in a wilderness, 
struggling to come to terms with a local geography and environment which their adversaries 
utilized to their fullest advantage.  To compound this situation, the environment, at least 
initially, failed to reflect the values and aspirations of the settlers.  Here the environment 
existed for its own sake, or possibly the sake of the Indians, not for the benefit of individual 
advancement.  In this place animals knew no husbandry whilst lines and borders in this zone 
were not drawn by man but by the natural course of the landscape, a process of the Earth, not 
of its inhabitants.25  The wilderness was thus one of the most significant obstacles the settlers 
would have to overcome west of the Appalachians.  On the one hand its transformation into 
farmlands was one of the key driving forces behind migration to the Kentucky country, whilst 
on the other the difficulties presented by the landscape and the dangers posed by the Indians 
who exploited their knowledge of it made the process of accomplishing that goal decidedly 
difficult.26  
 Even without Indians, the wilderness had its own array of dangers and hardships which 
many settlers identified as being contrary to the experiences they associated with stable 
society.  In 1818 Elias Pym Fordham travelled through the Ohio Valley and Kentucky, a journey 
which led him to reflect upon his experiences in the less settled parts of the country: ‘you will 
never have a correct idea of what a wilderness is,’ he would later write, ‘Whatever limits it 
may have on the map, however quickly the eye may traverse the chart...the traveller and 
hunter [will] find impediments, which give to him notions of extension.’  When Fordham chose 
to dwell upon a subject he certainly had a sense for poetic prose but much of what he wrote 
appears to have rung very true for other wilderness travellers; ‘to have pathless forests of 
trees around...and then to lie at night in a blanket...listening to the howling wolves, and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
had been a seismic shift in Native American tribal politics that saw these two tribes set aside their long 
term enmity in order to fight with one another against the new settler population.  Stephen Aron’s 
argument that this alliance was possibly more revolutionary than the unification of the thirteen colonies 
is an overstatement, but it does highlight the significance of this shift in alliance.  Aron How the West 
was Lost, p. 38 
24 For Kentucky’s use as a highway between the Shawnee and Cherokee see Aron How the West was 
Lost, pp. 6-7 
25 Zeisberger ‘The Moravian Mission Diaries of David Zeisberger, 1772-1781’ in Wellenreuther and 
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26 ‘Letter from Reverend John Brown to Colonel William Preston, May 5th, 1775’ Draper Manuscripts 
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starting at the shriek of the terrible panther: This it is to be in a Wilderness alone.’27  Fordham 
may not have experienced the earlier wilderness of the frontier war but he did identify in the 
woodlands a series of hardships and dangers which were not contingent upon the presence of 
Indians.  In particular, predatory animals were certainly an issue.28  John McKinney was no 
stranger to such dangers.  Although his schoolhouse was not located deep within the 
wilderness, it was remote enough to encourage a wildcat to explore the structure and, finding 
the school master, attack him.29  Luckily for McKinney – there after known as ‘Wild-Cat John 
McKinney’ – he was able to overcome the animal.  The cat may have been killed ‘with little 
injury to himself’ but it had still taken two men to unclamp its dead jaws from McKinney’s 
chest.30  Wild animals were certainly a problem in the wilderness, but more problematic and 
common still was the Indian penchant for imitating the sounds or calls of those creatures in 
order to coordinate raids and ambushes.  ‘In the night,’ Major Black would later recall, ‘we 
heard owls all around’ a phenomenon which Black’s companions quickly identified as a 
harbinger of danger.   In response the party had hurriedly returned to their boats, pushing 
them out into the relative safety of the river.  Further downstream, however, the sight of meat 
which had been left on the side of the shore, apparently to lure them back, reminded the party 
of the very real danger the wilderness contained.31  Under normal circumstances the sound of 
an owl hooting would not cause any alarm.  Such, however, was not the case upon the 
frontier.  More specifically, such was not the case in the frontier wilderness.32   
To the individual traveller one of the greatest dangers the wilderness posed to their 
wellbeing was not necessarily the threats contained within the environment but the lack of 
assistance that could be obtained should one fall victim to them.  Numerous persons went 
missing on journeys through the landscape, victims of a number of possible catastrophes made 
significantly more deadly by their absolute isolation.33  This issue was particularly acute in the 
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1770s when there were few settlers in the region.  John Stewart, an early explorer, appeared 
to have simply evaporated into the wilderness during a hunting trip leaving, as he did, no clue 
as to his ultimate fate.  It would be six years before his remains would be discovered and the 
mystery of his disappearance finally laid to rest.34  Environmental conditions, too, could be felt 
much more keenly when no permanent or suitable form of shelter was available to wilderness 
travellers and throughout the history of the backcountry individuals unable to fortify 
themselves against the elements ‘perished’ as a result of the conditions they endured.35  Even 
in relatively ideal conditions travel through the wilderness could be physically demanding due 
to a lack of suitable roads.36  Within the Kentucky country a network of traces – paths formed 
by successive generations of buffalo travelling over limestone which was worn into 
comparatively smooth corridors – existed but these narrow tracks were often barely 
discernable from the rest of the environment.  In western Virginia and Tennessee, where there 
were fewer buffalo than in Kentucky, these traces were in worse condition still.37  When John 
May travelled to the frontier in 1780 he wrote to an acquaintance that he had undertaken a 
journey ‘through an uninhabited Country the most rugged and dismal I ever passed through.’  
As he travelled the wilderness, May encountered constant reminders of the difficulties that he 
and other travellers faced, ‘there being thousands of dead Horses & Cattle on the Road Side 
which occasioned a continual stench.’  To compound matters the area through which May had 
travelled contained no fresh water springs.  Instead he and his party had to ‘make use of the 
water from the Streams in w[hi]ch many of these dead animals lay.’38 
May’s experiences were not unique and many wilderness travellers suffered from the 
lack of habitations to which they had become accustomed.  Even the settlements, each an 
oasis of Euro-American culture, could suffer from dejected or particularly poor conditions.  
During the winter of 1779, the settlement at the Falls of the Ohio – later to be known as 
Louisville – suffered in just this manner.  Writing to his wife, William Fleming reported that the 
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inhabitants of that settlement ‘look[ed] like g’osts, daily dying, especially the young.’  
Apparently both the elderly and young were suffering a common ailment, ‘dangerous eating 
ulcers in the mouth & face,’ and all persons, regardless of age, appeared to Fleming to have 
been suffering ‘the affects of Bilious & intermitting disorders and Agues.’  Although possibly 
signs of a bacterial infection, scurvy, or malaria these symptoms were prescribed to both ‘the 
water they drink’ and the ‘malignant Air’ which they breathed.39  Infectious diseases were 
hardly unique to the frontier but the outbreak of such epidemics helped to blur the line 
between settled areas and the wilderness, particularly as the settlers tended to interpret the 
infiltration of corrupt air and water as one of the principle causes of such epidemics.  The 
response of many of Philadelphia’s inhabitants to the outbreak of Yellow Fever in 1793 aptly 
demonstrates how disease could be interpreted as an invasion by some kind of outside force.  
Naturally, the logic behind the evacuation of the city had little to do with how the disease 
actually spread but this movement away from the urban centre nonetheless illustrates how 
invisible outside forces were interpreted by contemporaries.40  In the specific case of the 
frontier the incursion of the hostile outside world into the comparatively controlled 
environment of the settlements was a problematic issue indeed, demonstrating as it did, that 
the wilderness would not merely retreat in the face of a Euro-American invasion, nor respect 
the boundaries the settlers attempted to enforce. 
Unlike in Philadelphia, the settlers of the frontier had nowhere they could readily 
escape to when the outside world infiltrated their homes.  When an invisible force afflicted a 
settlement the surrounding area was not a disease free haven but an area of equal or even 
greater danger.  The wilderness, then, was no static entity but one prone to both retreat and 
advance and on numerous occasions the settlers were reminded that their influence could be 
fleeting indeed.41  In 1784 a widow and her family attempted to gain access to a small fort built 
on the lower Blue Licks but the discovery that she and her children were afflicted with 
smallpox resulted in them being refused entry.  In a very real way the settlers of this fort 
intended to keep the dangers of the outside world relegated to the area beyond the limits of 
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their palisade.  Quite literally, this danger was to be kept in the wilderness in an attempt to 
preserve the relative integrity of the settlement.  Maintaining the purity of one’s environment 
by eliminating or exiling perceived threats was not, however, limited to the settlers alone.  
Upon discovering that the banished family were infected, the Indians did likewise, killing the 
widow and her family in order to prevent the spread of this much feared disease.42  The 
settlers did not wish to accommodate smallpox within the organized and relatively controlled 
world of their townships, just as the Indians did not wish to accommodate it within their 
sphere.  By destroying the infected family, the Indians demonstrated a degree of symmetry in 
how they and the settlers organised their environments, but in so doing they also underlined 
the cumulative dangers that existed just beyond the limit of habitation.  What exacerbated 
these conditions to the point of crises, however, was the ever present influence of the 
unfolding war with the Indians.  When John May wrote to Samuel Beall of his ordeal travelling 
through the woodlands, he made this point explicit: ‘what made the Journey still more 
disagreeable was, the continual apprehension we were under, of an Attack from the Indians, 
there not being one Day after we left Holtson, but News was brought to us of some Murders 
being committed by those Savages, and the vast Numbers we met, cautioning on that 
acc[oun]t, contributed not a Little to alarm us.’43 
Indeed, much of the settlers’ perspective of the wilderness was a direct result of Indian 
activities executed throughout the local environment.  Many settlers fostered different 
attitudes towards the land prior to coming into contact with the frontier war.  At least initially, 
many settlers did not conceive of the wilderness as a naturally dangerous place; instead it was 
seen as a space in which significant opportunity dwelled.44  In the words of one aspiring settler 
writing in 1775, ‘What a Buzzel is amongst the people about Kentuck? to hear people speak of 
it one Would think it was a new found Paradise [sic].’45  Obviously the environment they 
imagined differed greatly from the one they discovered.  There were certainly hardships and 
dangers associated with the landscape but the greatest were those which came as a result of 
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war.  Wildernesses can be many things but high levels of danger are not necessarily inherent to 
the concept.  On her journey through the wilderness in 1787 Mary Dewee was able to remark 
upon the beauty of particular scenes she had encountered without undue concern for the 
hardships she would later endure.46  When Daniel Trabue reflected upon his journey to 
Kentucky in 1778 he remembered that he and his party ‘entered the wilderness in high spirits’ 
largely buoyed by images of forthcoming adventure and the abundant supply of game upon 
which they could easily draw for provisions.47  Indeed, many settlers in later years would recall 
significant abundance within the wilderness which facilitated the easy acquisition of quality 
food, or at any rate, the easy acquisition of meat.48  Of course it appears that hindsight allowed 
many to exaggerate or overstate the sheer bounty the country apparently offered and William 
Calk’s journal from 1775 seems to suggest that buffalo and deer did not merely wander into a 
hunter’s sights to happily await a timely execution.  That said a hunter of only average skill 
appears to have been more than capable of supplying a significant amount of food.49   
What Calk’s journal and Trabue’s reflections both demonstrate is that the natural 
obstacles which stood in the way of hunting were nothing compared to the perceived threat 
posed by Indian raiding parties.50  This is an important point as the potential presence of 
Indians absolutely negated the ease with which settlers could engage in hunting.  The firing of 
a single shot, for instance, could draw attention to an isolated group and, as such, parties often 
had to suffer from a lack of foodstuffs when an Indian presence was likely or anticipated.  
Naturally, settlers did not need to see Indians to believe that they were present and as such 
Indians did not actually need to be within striking distance to affect the wilderness experience; 
even as the settlers were surrounded by potential foodstuffs, many still had no choice but to 
suffer through periods of significant want.51  This situation was aggravated by the relative lack 
of mastery many settlers yielded over the environment, something which the Indians and even 
the sub-culture of the Euro-American hunter brought into sharp focus.  When Samuel Treble, 
for instance, accompanied the expert woodsman Michael Stoner into the wilderness he was 
unable to resist shooting at a deer which had wandered into the vicinity.  Not being aware of 
his younger companion’s enthusiasm, Stoner had become very much ‘alarmed’ by the issue of 
the gun fire and accordingly ‘sprang down and treed in an instant and he called to me three 
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times to know if I was hurt.’52  If Treble had not understood the potential danger he was in by 
simply travelling through the wilderness, it seems that the reaction of the ever popular and 
ever reliable Stoner gave him some indication.   
For settler society as a whole it became largely impossible to separate the Indians from 
the wilderness, particularly as most Indian raiding parties utilized the environment extensively 
in their war against the settlers.  This was a particularly problematic issue in the years prior to 
1782 when the balance of environmental mastery leaned heavily towards the Indians.53  In 
particular, their use of guerrilla warfare depended almost entirely upon their use of the 
environment, allowing them to appear and disappear apparently at will.54  This type of combat 
was nothing new in the backcountry and its use by Indians had for some time undermined 
Anglo-American designs upon the Ohio Valley.55  That, however, did not reduce its 
effectiveness and because direct assaults or sieges upon settlements were relatively rare 
affairs this type of engagement became the modus operandi of the frontier.  It also ensured 
that the wilderness and the Indian became largely inseparable to contemporaries as a trip 
through the former could very often lead to an encounter with the latter.  Although the actual 
likelihood of encountering an Indian raiding party varied according to the ebb and flow of 
hostilities, or according to the seasons, the possibility was often enough to discourage travel 
except where it was deemed absolutely necessary.56   
One major impact this had upon the settlers, even within the confines of their 
townships, was a potential for starvation as hunting was often deemed too dangerous during 
times of heightened hostilities.  In early 1778, for instance, Boonesborough suffered as the 
wilderness came alive with Cornstalk’s avengers who, in addition to making farming almost 
impossible, also ensured that hunting was equally out of the question.  Josiah Collins 
remembered decades later how, upon his arrival, he had ‘found a poor, distressed, & naked, & 
starved people; daily surrounded by the savage.’  Under slightly different circumstances the 
arrival of some eighty armed men would have lifted the spirits of those in the town but this 
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new group were unable to affect the situation in the nearby woodlands in any tangible way.  
Worse still, their arrival had inadvertently caused an already precarious situation to worsen 
further.  In addition to the earlier difficulties which the settlers had faced in gathering 
sufficient foodstuffs they now faced the prospect of feeding an additional eighty mouths.  With 
little other choice, the new arrivals quickly began to impose upon the settlement’s remaining 
livestock without consent from their owners.  According to Collins such actions were taken 
only due to the ‘pressing necessity of our wants,’ a situation which the current state of the 
wilderness prevented them from satisfying in almost any other manner.57   
Upon occasion a hunting party would risk a trip outside the town in order to hunt 
buffalo for the town but, cut off from any easily accessible source of salt, the captured meat 
often spoiled and had to be barbequed or smoked if any hope was to be had of preserving it.  
Salt also served to negate the blandness of consuming only meat and, though it may seem like 
a small point, its absence meant that the settlers were constantly reminded, with every 
mouthful at every meal, how restricted their world had become.58  The settlers of 
Boonesborough lived in something of an enforced isolation throughout most of 1778, too 
‘afraid’ to draw upon the abundant resources which they all knew the wilderness contained.59  
Even when hunters were able to secure a supply of meat there was virtually no method of 
procuring bread or any other type of carbohydrate rich food, a deficiency which likely 
heightened physical exhaustion among the community.  Thus, when the new comers imposed 
upon what little stock remained within the town tempers quickly frayed and the situation 
teetered upon the edge of violence.  The butchering of one of Colonel Richard Calloway’s 
steers, for instance, ‘exasperated’ him to the point where he ‘swore that if any man killed 
another head of his stock, that he wo’d shoot him.’60  Less dramatic but no less potent was the 
general impact that malnutrition had upon morale and interpersonal relations within the 
confines of the towns.  According to Collins ‘the women co’dn’t get along’ throughout these 
periods of enforced scarcity.  Although he made no explicit mention of it, it appears that just as 
many men generated friction as they sat impotently inside the town.  Certainly, there was 
evident tension between Richard Calloway and the men hungrily eying the last of his cows.61  
This situation was not unique to Boonesborough and throughout the late 1770s settlers in 
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towns such as Lexington spent a significant amount of their time exiled from the surrounding 
wilderness.62 
In Boonesborough the hand to mouth existence which the eighty newcomers were 
experiencing only came to an end when they were ordered to proceed to the Falls of the Ohio 
in order to rendezvous with George R. Clark for his invasion of Illinois.63  For those who 
remained, however, the wilderness, and hence the vast majority of the country, remained an 
impassable proposition.  More than just the environment, the wilderness joined the array of 
forces which stood against the settlers’ desire to prosper within the territory.  More ominous 
still, it appeared that the wilderness now even stood against their desire to survive.  This 
apparent situation helped to solidify the idea that the frontier was divided into two broad 
zones; the environment which they manipulated to facilitate their survival, namely their 
settlements, and that which the Indians utilized to limit their prosperity, the wilderness.64  
Although a relative population explosion in the early 1780s helped throw control of large areas 
of the environment into the hands of settlers a wilderness continued to exist, albeit in a 
reduced capacity, until well after the conclusion of the war.65  As settlements spread and 
became more established the wilderness was quite literally forced into retreat, changing the 
shape of the frontier as it fluctuated across the region.  But even as it did so, newer 
settlements constructed in previously uninhabited areas continued to endure the pattern of 
wilderness and Indian dominance which defined the entire country throughout the 1770s.  In 
1786, for instance, the problems faced across all Kentucky in the previous decade were 
recreated in Jefferson County when the Indians again utilized the wilderness to limit settler 
control of the environment to the confines of a few fortified townships.  Restricted from 
manipulating the landscape, the settlers of this region ‘Collected in forts,’ a measure which 
afforded them protection but also defined a strict physical boundary between their sphere of 
influence and the outside world.   This lack of control was defined not just by an extreme lack 
of geographic mobility but also by the malnutrition and starvation which such forting tended 
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to necessitate.66  In a very real sense the limit of a fort’s stockade drew a line between the 
unruly wilderness and the settlers’ sphere of control.  Indeed, throughout the late eighteenth 
century the frontier tended to be dominated by a wilderness, rather than the wilderness being 
dominated by those who aspired to settle it. 
Settler attitudes towards the wilderness in the trans-Appalachian region grew from 
pre-existing backcountry and European heritages which had become infused with direct 
experience of the territory’s landscape.67  These attitudes, ideas, and experiences did not just 
influence how the settlers conceptualised the wilderness, but also how they came to 
conceptualise the wider world around them.  The wilderness may have been an idea, but it 
was a potent one which had significant implications for the community’s world view imposing, 
as it did, particular divisions within the larger group.  Although it is tempting to divide the 
settlers’ world along lines suggested by concepts such as ethnicity and gender, to do so would 
neglect the specific conditions which helped to shape early frontier society across the trans-
Appalachian region.  Instead, one of the principle lines of separation within the community 
was forged not by these existing divisions – although they continued to play a role – but by the 
separation of movement which the wilderness imposed upon the entire community.68   
Particularly in the years before 1782, the presence of a domineering wilderness 
divided the community into two broad groups which crossed or blurred traditional social 
divisions such as class, ethnicity and even gender.  The new divisions imposed by the 
environment instead concerned those who moved through the wilderness with some 
regularity or confidence, and those who were largely confined to the internalised world of 
artificial settlements.  In real terms the settlers of the frontier initially controlled very limited 
tracts of land in the western country and even those over which they could claim dominance 
were not immune to sudden Indian incursions.69  Abandoned settlements, farmsteads, and 
even townships attested to the ability of the Indians to reclaim once settled ground for the 
wilderness, particularly during the evacuation of Kentucky in 1777.70  This lack of 
environmental control had an important impact upon the developing culture of the region’s 
settlers who responded by dividing themselves into those who attempted to engage with the 
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wilderness and those who restricted themselves to the Euro-American micro environments 
they constructed.  Following the 1770s, however, the growth of the frontier population 
facilitated a massive expansion of settled territories but even as new lands were settled, vast 
portions of the country remained dominated by wilderness.  Kentucky may have been 
undergoing a process which would see it transformed from a frontier into a country with a 
frontier, but its less settled areas continued to face the same challenges the entire region had 
faced only a few years earlier.  As such, the frontier regions would continue to see the 
population divided by its interaction with the wilderness until, at least, the signing of the 
Treaty of Greenville in 1795.71 
The division of settlers between those who were able to operate in the wilderness and 
those who were restricted to the settlements affected frontier settler society to its core as it 
created vast differences in the level of freedom, at least with regards to movement, enjoyed 
by these groups.  For some, the larger environment represented a space of unqualified 
opportunity whilst it conversely limited much larger swathes of the overall population.  In 
particular, women and children living on the frontier often found themselves marooned within 
the confines of their family home or picketed township.  Mrs Arnold lamented to John Shane 
that there were ‘many rich places to see, and women couldn’t get out to see them.’  Such was 
their lack of exposure to the outside world that when a number of buffalo approached 
Arnold’s settlement they caused quite a stir among many of the town’s women who, 
accordingly, left the safety of the stockade in order investigate these curious creatures.  
Buffalo were not a particularly rare sight in the wilderness but to these women they were a 
rare treat, contact with a larger world to which they were normally denied.72   
Although it would be easy to focus only upon gender when considering such scenarios 
it should be recognised that many men also found themselves victims of limited geographic 
mobility and, though most were not made to stay within a fort by a spouse, they nonetheless 
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found themselves equally limited by the realities of the world outside of the stockade.  Ralph 
Matson ‘feared to venture out and was slow on foot,’ though his apparent short comings were 
somewhat made up for by his wife who was said to be ‘a better soldier than himself.’73  Billy 
Keaton probably regretted his decision to visit the frontier settlement of Baker’s Station in 
1790 when an Indian raid left a man named Dickinson scalped, but still alive, outside of the 
tiny township.  Unfortunately for Dickinson his fellow settlers were too afraid to venture 
outside of their fort to retrieve their stricken comrade.  Instead they sat awake, imprisoned by 
the same walls which offered them protection, listening to the wounded man ‘groaning’ his 
way towards an agonisingly slow death.  Those at Baker’s Station that night were restrained 
from helping Dickinson by neither gender nor age.  For his part, Billy Keaton spent most of that 
evening restricted to an even smaller geographic area, ‘under the bed.’  It should always be 
remembered that not every man carried a weapon or cared to use one.74   
Of course neither Keaton nor his fellows were permanently restricted to Baker’s 
Station but this episode does illustrate how restricted the movements of even those who did 
travel through the wilderness could become.  The division between those restricted to the 
settlements and those who engaged with the outside world on a regular or semi-regular basis 
was never set in stone and, upon occasion, it could become particularly fluid.  Even 
experienced woodsmen could find themselves restricted to a settlement if the circumstances 
demanded it, though such individuals tended to reserve the ability – or at least the 
determination – to re-enter the wilderness at a later date.  Those who were restricted to the 
settlement as a rule, however, tended to see very little flexibility in their daily existence unless 
a significant change occurred within the local environment.  For many settlers, then, the 
wilderness simply represented an area into which they could not normally venture and, as 
such, the full extent of their world came to be represented by the limits imposed upon them 
by a palisade or the edge of one’s farm.  John Graves would remember with appreciation the 
‘good lock’ which separated his family from the outside world as soon as darkness descended 
upon his home: ‘We shut our door early & in the morning it was sunup before we opened it.’75   
Beyond these self imposed bounds the vast territory which most settlers had come to 
inhabit remained unobtainable; moreover, it remained dangerous and even those with military 
experience could find the vast expanses difficult to deal with.  Captain Boyd led a militia 
company into the wilderness only to have his overreaction to a wolf call lead to much taunting 
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from his peers; ‘Had there been a hundred Indians I couldn’t have helped laughing,’ Benjamin 
Stites would later recall.  Not only had Boyd returned to the militia’s camp in an obvious panic, 
but he had run straight for the group’s fire ‘where [the Indians] would have been sure to see 
him best to shoot him.’  After a short time ‘things had gotten a little composed’ and a wolf ‘let 
out let out a piteous howl.’  Apparently the sound was so ‘piteous’ that Boyd was forced to 
offer ‘a full treat all round,’ if his companions agreed that they ‘would say nothing about it’ 
when they returned to the settlements.  Stites, who would later report this incident to Shane 
(apparently the ‘treat’ had not been large enough to warrant four decades of silence), certainly 
expressed mirth and humour at this incident but Boyd’s reaction is telling of something far 
more fundamental.76 
Neither gender nor age, nor sometimes even experience, necessarily fortified a person 
against the perceived hazards of the outside world.  Fear was a common sensation felt by 
many of those who found themselves out-with the protection of a township which sheer 
bravado or ignorance often obscured.  Daniel Trabue offered an unusual level of candour in his 
narrative when he admitted that during a journey through the wilderness in 1778 the presence 
of Indians had made him ‘feel chikinhearted [sic].’  Trabue’s account is telling as his continued 
pride required that his fear be thoroughly internalised to avoid the type of mocking which 
Captain Boyd was later subjected to.77  The expression of fear may have been somewhat 
restrained by admonitions of cowardice but that did not stop many from openly displaying the 
apprehensions they felt.  Caught in the wilderness, a member of a party whom Trabue and 
several fellows went to retrieve made the point explicit when he heard their approach and 
mistook them for Indians.  ‘O lord! O lord!’ the scared man was said to have cried; one can 
only speculate that Trabue had at least some sympathy for what the man was feeling.78   
Much has been made within the historiography regarding the role of cowardice in 
backcountry communities and there is certainly evidence within the sources to suggest that 
contemporaries levelled this charge at one another with some regularity.79   However, there is 
a remarkable level of inconsistency with which such charges were made that must be 
addressed.80  Why was Captain Boyd mocked for his show of fear, whilst Samuel Treble 
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continued to respect Michael Stoner for showing a similar emotion? Both men had, after all, 
over reacted to the thought of an Indian attack in the wilderness but their treatment by 
contemporaries was markedly different.  The dividing line, it appears, rested not with the 
emotion but the reaction.  Fear was likely a universal experience on the frontier even where it 
was not expressed in a particularly open manner.  It is highly unlikely that the entire 
population was scared all of the time, but most individuals probably experienced fear for at 
least some of the time.  To be sure, there is a certain level of assumption made in such a 
statement but an even greater degree of assumption would be made if one were to state or 
assume that the settlers were not affected by fear or other comparable emotions during the 
war.  The role played by emotion in history is a problematic subject indeed but assuming an 
absence or immunity to fear is just as biased as arguing for its presence.81  It should always be 
remembered that one did not need to break down into floods of tears to show evidence of 
fear in the historic record.  Indeed, throughout the region settlers demonstrated with their 
feet that they feared particular areas of the country when they abandoned those regions to 
which they had previously staked their future prosperity and happiness.  Isaac Hite would 
lament in a letter to his father that business on the frontier in 1783 was simply impossible; 
even if ‘[we] was not afraid of the Indians’ the surveyors had already fled the area.82  This, 
however, raises only another question.  If fear of particular areas or circumstances was 
acceptable, why did particular expressions of that emotion continue to warrant communal 
chastisement?  
In order to answer this question it is necessary to frame it within an appropriate 
context.  When the settlers arrived in the Kentucky country in the 1770s they found 
themselves in a contested environment, a wilderness which continued to push back against 
their attempts to measure, divide and control it.  The circumstances in which the settlers 
found themselves involved numerous shared experiences but cumulatively their frontier 
experience was a shared ordeal, a series of difficulties which the community had to face 
together.  Although they would prove ultimately successful in their struggle, the outcome of 
the war was never sure and, particularly in the 1770s, there were numerous occasions where a 
continued settler presence appeared to be a tenuous possibility.  As a whole the community 
reacted to the series of crises which it faced, evacuating areas en masse sometimes when the 
presence of Indians was only a possibility.  As settler control over the environment fluctuated 
so too did their resolve to occupy particular portions of the land and at both the communal 
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and individual level the culture of fear which their adversaries fostered began to take a 
significant toll.  As a group, the settlers reacted to fear and terror but as individuals those who 
reacted disproportionately compared to the larger community were made to suffer for their 
behaviour.83  It was not that the larger group did not recognise the validity of fear, only that 
they failed to recognise that a given person had the right to show excessive fear when the 
entire community was suffering through the same ordeal.  These were, after all, ‘very scary 
times.’84 
In the case of Samuel Treble, Michael Stoner’s fear was not misplaced as Treble’s own 
ignorance had not only caused the alarm but potentially alerted any nearby raiding parties to 
the pair’s presence.  Crucially, Stoner had not run from his companion but had instead taken 
up a position to fight whilst calling out the name of the younger man in order to establish 
whether he required assistance.85  In contrast, Captain Boyd had placed his entire party in 
danger by leading any potential pursuers directly to their location whilst dangerously exposing 
himself – and his lack of woodland knowledge – by placing his silhouette in front the group’s 
campfire.86  According to Nathaniel Hart ‘The women could read the character of a man with 
invariable certainty.  If he lacked courage they seemed to be able to discover it at a glance.  
And if a man was found to be a coward, he stood a poor chance to get his washing, mending or 
anything done.’87  This interesting assessment of cowardice is, again, not a statement relating 
to fear but rather the excessive expression of it.  All men on the frontier were expected to 
show a reasonable ability to take part in the group’s shared ordeal, not run from it.  This 
expectation did not demand a superfluous show of bravery but rather a willingness to defend 
the larger community and, quite literally, to hold the wilderness back from the settlement’s 
edge.  Again, it is important that gender lines are not drawn too distinctly as women, too, were 
expected to do their part to keep the outside world firmly out of the towns.  The adoption of 
male clothing during sieges, the running of bullets, and so on, all aided the community in 
overcoming the dangers which they shared.88  Some women reportedly took this role further 
than many men.  Just prior to the capture of her settlement in 1780, Mrs. Riddle, for instance, 
joined her fort’s male protectors at the palisade ‘with her gun,’ ready to fight whilst, on 
another occasion, two women ‘scalded an Indian to death’ during a siege upon their 
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settlement.89  They later reported to all who asked about this incident that their victim had 
‘made a dreadful howling,’ during his slow death.90 
Contrary to being an anathema, fear was a necessary component of settler society, 
particularly where the wilderness was concerned.  An absence of fear often led to disaster 
outside of the settlements with unprepared or cocksure parties and individuals, such as John 
Shelp, frequently falling victim to the dangers of the region.91  Like Michael Stoner, a core 
group of hunters and pioneers were able to draw upon a growing fund of cultural experience 
that allowed them to begin operating outside of the restrictions which the war was imposing 
upon the larger community.  Individuals such as Shelp may have, through sheer force of will, 
overcome these same barriers but a lack of prudence, experience, and knowledge was often 
their undoing.  Will power alone, it appears, was a poor substitute for caution and the relevant 
set of woodland skills.92  Practical ability was not a necessary prerequisite to survive in the 
wilderness but it did increase one’s chances by an immeasurable degree and those who lacked 
this ability generally compensated in one of two ways.  The first option was to simply ignore 
these dangers, as John Shelp did, with the hope that no ill fortune would follow.  In so doing 
such individuals refused to allow the wilderness to dictate the expanse of their daily world but, 
lacking woodland skills, their level of success tended to be limited by happenchance.  This was 
a comparatively rare approach as the disasters which befell a few tended to ward off larger 
numbers from trusting their lives to fate.93  The second solution was to avoid the wilderness 
wherever possible, typically by remaining within the bounds of one’s settlement whilst 
employing those with the desired skills in bush craft to carry out one’s business.  On the 
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occasions where wilderness travel was deemed absolutely necessary, such individuals tended 
to travel in large groups often drawing upon the skills of one or two experienced persons to 
facilitate their survival.94  This solution was probably the most common approach as it tended 
to encompass not only a significant proportion of the male population, but most women and 
children also.  In addition to these two principle options the settlers could, of course, attempt 
to learn the wilderness skill set which would allow them to engage directly with the outside 
world, but this approach was a long term solution only.  Samuel Treble had initiated this 
process and though he may have alarmed Stoner by recklessly firing his weapon he evidently 
learned from his mistake.95   
Beyond these approaches, a final technique was utilized by a small number of settlers 
in their attempt to overcome the barriers thrown up by the wilderness.  Quite aside from being 
completely impractical and likely to provide nothing but a false sense of security, the use of 
supernatural tactics, spells, omens, and charms underlines how desperate some settlers were 
to express their agency over the environment.  Rather than simply ignoring the danger, this 
attempt at environmental manipulation recognised the difficulties that the wilderness 
imposed upon the larger community by appearing to offer them some form of power over it.  
Perhaps most importantly, this new source of imagined power circumvented the necessity of 
having to undergo the lengthy and dangerous process of acclimating one’s self to the outside 
world.  Some settlers literally sought to harness the imagined power of the supernatural world 
in order to turn it upon the unruly wilderness.  More than a belief in an inexplicable 
powerbase, drawing upon the supernatural allowed some settlers the luxury of believing that 
they could fight fire with metaphysical fire.96  An undercurrent throughout the trans-Atlantic 
and Native American worlds, superstitions represent something of an attempt to manipulate 
conditions that were generally beyond the control of the individual.97  In the case of the trans-
Appalachian west, many members of the community turned to the supernatural in order to 
combat the realities of a world over which they had little practical influence.  
Of these phenomena the one most commonly given significance was the process of 
dreaming and its apparent connection to the workings of the world.  Awakening one morning 
from a particularly potent nightmare, David Hunter, for instance, quickly endeavoured to leave 
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the fort in which he had been lodged.  When he was asked why he made such haste to leave 
he replied that ‘he had a dream and he thought something bad was going to happen, either to 
him or to the station; and if there was, he would rather it be to him, than to so many people... 
inside an hour was killed.’98  Dreams could have a potent impact upon particular settlers, 
something which Mr. Williams would demonstrate when he heard that his friend, Mr. White, 
had had nightmare concerning him.  The dream certainly unsettled White who found its omens 
and clarity such that he was able to convince Williams not to work his fields that particular day.  
Unlike the case of David Hunter, the validity of White’s dream was never verified to the 
community as Williams never left the settlement to suffer his predicted misfortune.99  Instead 
Williams sat at home, a living testament to the power afforded to dreams.100  Reacting to 
dreams gave some settlers the illusion of control over both their circumstances and 
environment but drawing upon the supernatural was not limited to heeding the omens 
revealed in the non-waking world.  Indeed, a spectrum of proactive measures could also be 
undertaken by settlers in the hope of affecting their individual and group circumstances for the 
better.  ‘Charms and incantations were in use for the cure of many diseases,’ Joseph Doddridge 
would note, such as the use of ‘the blood of a black cat,’ to cure St. Anthony’s Fire, an infection 
which resulted in inflammations appearing upon the face and limbs.  According to Doddridge, 
‘there was scarcely a black cat to be seen whose ears and tail had not been frequently 
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cropped, for a contribution of blood.’101  Even the threat posed by the Indians in the 
wilderness could, some believed, be negated by powerful charms and spells.  When Daniel 
Trabue travelled through the wilderness with an ‘Old Dutchman’ named Mr. Lail he was 
exposed to a world of supernatural powers when his companion, who believed ‘he was 
endowed with such power, [that] he could spell their guns and Do many [other] things,’ used 
his magic in an attempt to make the woodlands safe for their passage.  When Mr. Lail panicked 
following the accidental discharge of his weapon, however, Trabue quickly concluded that the 
aged German’s power resided only in his mind.102 
Signs and omens, spells and prayer often allowed the settlers to metaphysically cross 
the line that separated them from the wilderness.  Lacking direct agency with their 
environment such individuals saw portents and indications in a number of unusual places that 
connected them to the vast spaces which existed outside of the settlements.103  A belief in the 
supernatural certainly appears to have given some settlers a belief in their own ability to 
interact with the world outside of the settlements, but this group was in the minority.  For the 
most part, the activities in which these individuals engaged or believed drew only inconsistent 
and sporadic support from the community who often vacillated between ‘faithless’ patronage 
and complete indifference.104  What they do demonstrate was the desire of some settlers to 
exercise a degree of agency in a world which largely denied them the opportunity.  For those 
possessing the necessary knowledge to survive and prosper in the wilderness such needs were 
largely absent, but a large portion of the settler population could certainly understand the 
desire to engage with the outside world if not the means through which some attempted to 
attain this end. 
For many, then, isolation and limited geographic mobility were merely facts of life.  
Even for those able to operate in the wilderness unfettered freedom remained a largely 
unobtainable goal with the vast majority of settlers forced to spend at least some time within 
the confines of a settlement during the late 1770s and early 1780s.  This shared experience 
crossed traditional barriers, uniting men and women, different ethnicities and age groups, and 
even different races.  When the inhabitants of Boonesborough found themselves completely 
cut off from the outside world in 1778, for instance, it was a slave named London who, along 
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with David Brundin, was killed whilst trying to defend his home from the Indians.  That London 
died clutching a Kentucky rifle is certainly symbolic.105  Although the shared experience of the 
frontier did little in real terms to challenge the institution of slavery, the experiences of war 
and the struggle against the wilderness nevertheless created a series of ordeals shared by 
master and servant.106  When ‘Mrs. Calloway’s old black woman’ returned to Boonesborough 
for a reunion and celebration some years following the conclusion of the frontier war, she was 
clearly as moved by the memories of that time as any white settler.  Upon her arrival ‘she 
cried...[because] It bro’t all the old Indian trouble, and the death of her master, so fresh to her 
mind.’107 
The impact of the wilderness, and the war which it supported, was indiscriminate.108  
Men and women, master and slave all experienced periods when the outside world was 
denied to them.  When settlements were attacked all within them faced the same danger and, 
for the most part, the community united in the face of a common set of obstacles.109  To be 
sure, traditional divisions remained but the shared experience of the frontier – the war and the 
wilderness – often served to bridge social divisions and blur hierarchal distinctions.  During the 
late 1770s and early 1780s, when the wilderness dominated the Kentucky country, the shared 
experience of the settlements came into being through the juxtaposition of two very different 
environments; the world the settlers found, and the world which they built.  In both of these 
zones existing ideas and world views had to be adjusted and modified in order to 
accommodate the specific conditions they met on the frontier.  Dividing the world into two 
broad zones was the first step in accomplishing this, whilst the easing of traditional 
boundaries, such as ethnic distinctions, followed thereafter.  That many of the changes which 
occurred were not deeper or more permanent does not reduce their significance.  Rather, it 
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was the ability of the settlers’ society to adapt to the specific conditions met upon the frontier 
that is important.110   
 
Closure 
Perhaps no other event underlines the pervasive nature of the environment on the frontier as 
well as the winter which enveloped the end of 1779 and the first months of 1780.  Although 
the lifestyle of the hunter appealed to many settlers, the vast majority were drawn to the 
backcountry not by the promise of game but the promise of land.  Upon their arrival, however, 
the land they sought was a largely inaccessible wilderness and the only source of food they 
could readily harness dwelled within that same environment, a region which lay, tantalisingly, 
within the sight of every settled locale.  It was an odd paradox to be so reliant on that which 
denied one their desired prosperity but it was the situation the settlers found.  As the war with 
the Indians worsened following Cornstalk’s murder, however, even the readily accessible 
source of food which lay just beyond the palisade became difficult to obtain; the hunter’s 
crown was stripped by circumstance.  Starvation and malnutrition plagued the backcountry 
throughout the late 1770s but in 1779 the arrival of a winter which, through sheer cold, killed 
much of the settlers’ remaining stock must have appeared to be a cruel joke to the more 
superstitious among the group.  ‘Go through the cane and see cattle laying,’ William 
Clinkenbeard would remember, ‘with their heads to their side, as if they were asleep; just 
literally froze to death.’111  Even in the wilderness the food supply began to disappear and even 
though the Indians failed to appear that winter in sufficient numbers to hold the settlers within 
their fortifications they nevertheless found only want and further hardship throughout the 
landscape; ‘A great country for turkeys, and they had like to have starved to death; a heap! a 
heap! of them died.’  What stock did not freeze the settlers were forced to consume and for 
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the first time since the Kentucky country had been settled the environment, without aid, was 
able to bring the new immigrant population to its knees.112 
 The wilderness was certainly a force to be reckoned with and, although it is tempting 
to look to Thoreau to describe the potential magnificence of such environments it is necessary 
to instead look to the experiences of those who dwelled within.  When, for instance, the 
winter of 1779 and 1780 reached its nadir, the lack of food was such that there was a marked 
depression in the number of births and pregnancies.  When, finally, food began to reappear in 
sufficient volumes it appears, to use the words of one settler, that ‘the women began to breed 
pretty fast,’ giving birth to a bevy of children ‘10 or 12 months after the corn of 1780 came 
in.’113  Still, the environment presented its challenges.  The number of pregnancies may have 
soared following the harvest, but this reality demanded the services of skilled midwives and, 
for the people of Lexington, this meant recruiting ‘the celebrated Mrs. Harper.’  Unfortunately, 
Harper did not live in Lexington and, as such, she was required to make the dangerous journey 
through the wilderness whenever her particular skills were required.  More than a simple 
journey through the woods, ‘about 30 armed men were frequently dispatched,’ to act as her 
personal body guard during such occasions, an excessive number which illustrates two 
things.114   First, it reflects the perceived danger of the wilderness and, secondly, it reflects the 
reduced mobility many settlers – even those with invaluable skill sets – faced upon the 
frontier.  Even men who were experienced in the wilderness preferred to travel in groups, 
micro communities forged by necessity and prudence.  As discussed in chapter two, 
psychological warfare was an important part of the battle for the trans-Appalachian region and 
one of its greatest net results was in physically and mentally separating the settlers from the 
wider world they inhabited.  Men, women and children all suffered reduced mobility and 
freedom throughout the period of the war and in many cases their experiences came to be 
defined not by their relationship with the land which they sought to plough, but their 
relationship to the land to which they were denied access. 
 This was a common experience to all; even male hunters proficient in wilderness 
survival experienced periods when the limit of their world was defined not by their ambition 
but the narrow walls of a communal fort.  Regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or race, such 
was the communal experience and such was the foundation upon which a common identity 
exerted itself.  Certainly, the settlers did not leave behind their pre-existing prejudices when 
they arrived in the west, but the common experience created by the wilderness and its 
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masterful exploitation by the Indians served to alter some of those expectations and ideas.  
Settlers may have readily identified different accents and ethnicities among themselves, but 
they did so within a broad context of cooperation against a common enemy – the Indians – 
and a common obstacle – the wilderness.  Otherness was occasionally defined by internal 
divisions but, for the most part, the Indians and the environment which they exploited created 
the meta-Other against which their larger identity was forged.  Daniel Trabue may have 
attempted to record Mr. Lail’s German accent in his own inimitable manner – ‘Some ting has 
gone rong.  We must not keep [to] De road’ – but the fact of the matter is that he and Lail 
were working together for a common purpose, camping in the wilderness for mutual safety 
and companionship.115  Similarly, Jospeh Doddridge, born of English descent on both his 
maternal and paternal sides learned incantations and spells in German.116  Such cases are 
hardly anomalous – the record is defined by common experience – and though difference is 
often accepted and sometimes commented upon, only seldom did it define relationships.   
Put simply, settlers could arrive on the frontier with whatever preconceived notions 
they happened to carry, but the necessities of direct experience required them to adapt those 
ideas to the specific circumstances which greeted them.  Women would often take on roles or 
carry out tasks normally reserved for men, whilst individuals of Germanic descent – such as 
Mr. Lail and Michael Stoner – travelled, hunted and fought alongside those of whose heritage 
was that of the French Huguenot – such as Daniel Trabue – or those whose heritage belonged 
to the Irish, Scots, English, Scots-Irish, Welsh and even the odd Spaniard or Métis.117  Slaves 
certainly continued to carry out the subservient role enforced upon them by their masters, but 
when circumstances demanded it, they struggled alongside their white companions not as 
servants but as comrades in arms, often earning their freedom and the – often begrudging – 
admiration of their former owners and fellow settlers in the process.118  The communal 
experience which the landscape helped to forge was no incidental matter, but something that 
would underline the experience of the settlers in the years ahead as they turned their eyes 
north of the Ohio River.  By the late 1770s the settlers had carried out only a very limited 
number of retaliatory campaigns in the Indians’ territory but as this decade drew to a close the 
community as a whole was ready to strike back against their adversaries.  As chapter four will 
demonstrate, individual vendettas against the Indians were now writ large across the 
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community and though retaliatory strikes would ultimately serve only to escalate the conflict, 
they represented a method through which the community could once again take control of its 
destiny.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Why the Settlers Fought 
 
Around the middle of June, 1778, Andrew Johnson led the first settler counteroffensive out of 
the Kentucky country against the Indians of Ohio.1  On the surface the actions of Johnson and 
his four companions require almost no analysis coming, as they did, after more than three 
years of escalating violence.  Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that neither Johnson 
nor his companions were soldiers or bounty hunters and, like most settlers, they aspired to 
farm not to fight, and to raise families rather than armies.  What, then, drove them to attack 
the Indians? Certainly, their vested interests required security but that does not necessarily 
translate into a need to undertake a long, dangerous journey through the wilderness in order 
to confront a numerically superior enemy in the heart of their territory.  Neither did a lack of 
support from the Revolutionary government nor a lack of any feasible material gain stop 
Johnson and his party from making the dangerous trip.2  Indeed, the risks attached to 
Johnson’s raid were massive, particularly as gathering in communal forts had proven to be a 
most effective method of countering Indian attacks.  Of course property and lives had been 
lost, but the community had endured and the Indians had suffered greatly, often 
disproportionately so, for their assaults south of the Ohio.3  In real terms, Johnson’s force was 
simply too small to affect any major victory or advancement for the settlers.  Moreover, their 
time in the wilderness promised only hardship and danger.  Yet, they carried out their 
campaign nonetheless.  The question this episode raises, then, is one that appears ostensibly 
simple but is in fact far more complex; why did the settlers fight? 
 This issue was touched upon in chapter one where it was demonstrated that the desire 
for revenge could stimulate small parties – like Johnson’s – to engage those whom they 
identified as their enemy.  By the late 1770s and early 1780s, however, the situation in 
Kentucky and across the trans-Appalachian west had developed a stage further.  For most of 
those who took part in the Battle of Point Pleasant it was the idea of conflict – imagined 
atrocities and potential dangers – rather than direct experience that drove them to fight.  Prior 
to this battle the war had been carried out by small bands of settlers and Indians motivated by 
revenge, but the numbers involved in this retribution-driven stage of the conflict were very 
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small indeed.  Logan had probably been able to draw upon no more than thirty Mingo warriors 
whilst the settlers who attacked the Indians, characterised by men such as Michael Cresap and 
Daniel Greathouse, likely amounted to, perhaps, two or three dozen.4  Logan’s vendetta was 
certainly a successful campaign but, even then, no more than thirty or forty settlers were killed 
by his band.5  When hundreds of settlers and hundreds of Indians gathered at Point Pleasant it 
was not direct experience or a need to satiate revenge which drove the vast majority of them; 
it was the imagined horrors already committed upon the frontier.  By the 1780s, however, the 
situation in the west had changed.  First, exposure to actual – as opposed to imagined – 
violence was exponentially greater than it had been during the period prior to the Battle of 
Point Pleasant.  Secondly, unlike 1774, the war for the frontier was, by the late 1770s and early 
1780s, demonstrating its long term potential.  Rather than measuring contact with violence in 
terms of weeks and months, the settlers were now measuring it in terms of years and, soon, 
would do so in decades.  The settlers were not just affected by violence, but rather its 
continuous presence.  Moreover, imagined violence was now far more vivid, supplemented as 
it was by deliberate psychological warfare and communal perceptions of the environment and 
wilderness.  All of these conditions combined and multiplied to create a powerful social force – 
communal revenge – which drove the settlers to actively engage the Indians, during and after 
the Revolutionary War.  Whereas a desire for revenge had driven only small parties directly in 
1774, by the end of this decade it was beginning motivate and drive the entire community.   
Whatever the political climate of the time, the settlers were being driven by a series of 
potent, localised forces generated by the community’s desire to extract retribution from their 
enemy.  The ways in which these forces acted and the underlying social realities which allowed 
them to exist are complex affairs and as such this broad issue will be tackled over the course of 
the following two chapters.  Chapter four will explore the how of the matter, analyzing how 
bottom-up retributive forces developed, how they created new opportunities for violence, 
how the war was able to continue when the American Revolution came to an end, and how, 
ultimately, the frontier war can only be understood within a context of reciprocal communal 
revenge.  Following contact with a combination of psychological warfare, an aggressive 
environment, and physical violence the settlers initiated campaigns of their own not merely to 
secure lands and prosperity, but to secure something far less tangible but no less important to 
them.  Although the drive for land would continue to provide a powerful motivation for the 
new western inhabitants, it was the desire of the community as whole – not, as was previously 
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the case, individuals within it – to secure revenge that drove the war forward.  Experiences of 
psychological and actual violence were multiplied by the ever growing timescale of the war 
and the increasing participation of the northern Indians, creating a level of perceived brutality 
which encouraged revenge for the sake of revenge or, more accurately, revenge for the sake of 
the community.   
Chapter five will analyze the social mechanisms which made these processes possible, 
the why of the matter; why was revenge so important to the settlers, why did they pursue it 
when other, more logical and safer alternatives were open to them? Communal revenge is not 
an arbitrary term; it speaks of the complex relationships which underpinned settler society, 
giving murders and deaths a potency which drove this impulse.  Together, then, chapters four 
and five will explore different ideas which create a much larger whole.  Where chapter four 
will analyze the social processes which fuelled the war, chapter five will examine how the 
settlers’ interpersonal world drove that larger system.  By 1778, men such as Andrew Johnson 
were a minority in the trans-Appalachian west, but within a few short years the goals, 
methods, and ideals of these few would become those of the larger community.   
More than a background detail, the issue of why settlers in early American fought has 
been an important concern for a number of studies and, in general terms, historians have 
looked to various forces ranging from race, to divergent ethnic origins, the pressures exerted 
by economic systems, and, of course, movements in the political sphere, in order to explain 
this phenomenon.6  As already discussed in this thesis, such ideas tend impose conditions 
upon large groups without necessarily taking into account the specific bottom-up forces of a 
given historical context.  Nor can it be assumed that the settlers killed simply, as Niall Ferguson 
has argued with respect to soldiers fighting in the trenches of World War One, because they 
grew to accept and then enjoy the process of taking lives.7  Even if such an assertion appears 
to offer a convenient or even plausible explanation for the actions of the ‘Indian haters’ of 
Kentucky and the wider American frontier, such interpretations  tend to be constructed upon 
highly problematic theoretical foundations and assumptions.8  In the case of Ferguson’s 
conclusion, Sigmund Freud’s highly controversial and largely discredited ideas cast a long 
shadow.9  Similarly, other highly theoretical explanations, such as Dianne Purkiss’s use of 
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Jacques Lacan’s theories to analyse violence during the English Civil War, draw heavily upon 
ideas that are highly controversial, problematic, or unsound.10  
More problematic still is the settlers’ refusal to act in manner consistent with the type 
of behaviours ascribed by such theoretical approaches.  The act of killing Indians was not an 
arbitrary one and, though often overlooked, the settlers often avoided opportunities to take 
aboriginal lives.  When the notorious Shawnee war chief, Blue Jacket, was captured by a band 
of settlers in 1789 it was quickly and, considering his role in the war, logically decided that he 
should be executed.  At this point, however, any fantasy of killing Indians in cold blood was 
exposed for the fallacy that it was when the numerous men who comprised this band each 
refused to commit the deed.  To be sure, the men wanted retribution in the form of Blue 
Jacket’s body, but the actual act of killing the chief – defenceless as he was – gave all present 
considerable pause.  James Baize, a former prisoner of the Indians, may have slammed the 
butt of his rifle into Blue Jacket’s face, but even he was reluctant to actually kill the Indian in 
spite of his fellows’ support; ‘all agreed that he should be killed.’11  Eventually, an Irishman by 
the name of Jim Wilson volunteered for the job, cursing as he did so.  ‘By Jasus,’ he griped, ‘I’ll 
kill him.’  But even then trepidation remained in the air with one member of the party, William 
Clinkenbeard, drifting away from the larger group in order to avoid having to witness the 
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spectacle.  He may have ‘wanted him killed, but [he] didn’t want to see it done.’12  In the end, 
however, it appears that he need not have bothered.  Whilst Clinkenbeard was away another 
member of the group, John Hanks, complained to his companion, John McIntyre, that their 
chosen course of action ‘looked like murder.’  McIntyre obviously agreed with the sentiment 
and finally the pair interrupted the procrastinating Irishman, and asked him not to shoot Blue 
Jacket.13  When Clinkenbeard returned to the group, he found that ‘the Irishman’s heart [had] 
failed him,’ and rather than standing over a dead body, he stood over a still living captive who 
had been granted a draught of whiskey.  In Blue Jacket’s own words, this was a ‘velly good turn 
[sic].’14  
When conceptualising the frontier, images such as Hugh McGary battering in the skull 
of a helpless, elderly captive are rarely far from view.  A study of the historiography of events 
such as the Gnadenhutten massacre and groups such as the Paxton Boys will attest to the 
importance such acts of brutality play in modern interpretations of this period.15  However, it 
should also be noted that the settlers were far from two-dimensional characters that killed 
merely for pleasure.  Indeed, they could demonstrate a marked reluctance to kill, particularly 
in cold blood.  Of course, men like Hugh McGary and countless others demonstrate that the 
settlers were certainly prepared to murder those whom they identified as their enemy, but the 
actions of Blue Jacket’s captors equally suggest that the desire to kill was not an unfettered, 
out of control, or pleasurable impulse.  McGary’s murder of Moluntha was tied closely to the 
defeat suffered by the settlers at the Blue Licks and his wider, troubled past with the Indians.16  
In contrast, the capture of Blue Jacket does not appear to have coincided with any particularly 
potent loss or defeat suffered by those who captured him.  That said James Baize, who had 
been a prisoner of the Indians in the relatively recent past, did smash the chief’s face with his 
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rifle butt.  His experiences, however, had not been so distressing as to inspire him to finish the 
job.17 
To put it another way, the communal revenge being discussed in this chapter required 
cause in order to come into effect.  Blue Jacket was fortunate in that his recent actions had not 
created a situation in which his death was highly likely, but many Indians did find themselves in 
precisely that situation.  When Andrew Johnson led his small band north of the Ohio River in 
1778, he did so because recent events, including his own captivity and a series of raids south of 
the Ohio River, had been potent enough to inspire him to make a concerted attempt to extract 
retribution from the Indians.  Johnson and his followers did not leave Kentucky because they 
enjoyed killing Indians.  Nor did they leave because the arrival of an aggressive Indian army or 
raiding party left them no choice.  On the contrary, these men took the initiative into their own 
hands by taking the fight to their enemy, an action that required at least some degree of 
reflection and forethought.  For better or for worse they had placed themselves in a position 
to engage in combat which would almost certainly fail to benefit them directly.  Such 
practicalities, however, did not stop this band from undertaking the journey to Ohio, nor did 
the inherent risks stop them from ambushing the first isolated group of Indians they 
encountered.  They did not succeed in killing any Indians and their careless return trip exposed 
them as the true culprits of this attack – the routed Shawnee had initially believed that they 
had been set upon by ‘some other tribe of Indians’ – but they had completed their objective, 
raiding the Indians as the settlers had been raided countless times over the past three years.18  
Evidently, Johnson’s raid was never designed to be a tactical coup de grâce. 
As a message, however, the raid probably was effective, particularly as it came during 
a time when the Indians had demonstrated a complete mastery over not only the wilderness, 
but psychological warfare also.  Johnson’s party may not have succeeded in securing any form 
of tactical victory but it did succeed in demonstrating to the Shawnee that the settlers were 
both willing and capable of striking back. What it did not illustrate was why these settlers went 
to such lengths in order to accomplish such a relatively minor end.19  Unlike Colonel John 
Armstrong’s attack upon the Indian settlement of Kittanning during the Seven Years War, 
Johnson’s raid was no rescue mission.20  This reality was borne out by both the tiny size of 
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Johnson’s party and the lack of any follow up activities on the part of either this group or any 
other settlers.  Had Johnson’s raid been a meaningful endeavour it is likely that the aggrieved 
settlers of Kentucky would have replicated it at some point throughout the remainder of 1778 
or early 1779.  That they did not is telling, whilst their failure to throw ready support behind 
George R. Clark’s expedition into Illinois a little over a month later similarly demonstrates a 
reluctance to assault the Indians, particularly during the busy summer agricultural season.21  
Rather than fighting in an offensive manner the settlers attempted to live their lives as best 
they could, acting defensively or engaging in combat when the need rather than the desire 
arose.     
Offensive action upon the frontier was never a given.  By its very nature such actions 
were difficult processes, requiring a number of factors to be fulfilled before they could be 
undertaken.  For one, such manoeuvres not only required a disparate group to be mobilized 
under a single banner, but motivated to proactively engage in combat.  It also required 
resources and commitment and, perhaps most importantly, it required those who took part in 
such operations to identify more value in the risks they would face than in simply perpetuating 
the status quo of their everyday lives.  These difficulties were compounded by a series of other 
options which were open to the settlers – retreat, fortification, accommodation, and surrender 
– all of which were utilized at different times throughout the frontier war.22  Offensive combat, 
then, was an extraordinary occurrence, not a natural residue of conflict.  When Johnson and 
his men crossed the Ohio they engaged in a manoeuvre which was thus out of the ordinary.  
Aside from bucking the defensive trend of the settlers, the members of this raiding party went 
to great lengths in order to place themselves in harm’s way for the sake of affecting a very 
minor victory over their foe.23  Although the actions of the raiders were largely insignificant in 
the broad context of the frontier war, they nonetheless represented a microcosm of the 
conditions that would lead the settler community to begin major offensives against the Indians 
in the coming years.  In order to understand the social movement that would grip the Kentucky 
country and trans-Appalachian world from 1779 to 1782 it is necessary to understand the 
forces that helped to lead Johnson’s raiders north of the Ohio. 
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For Johnson, the immediate motivation for his summer time raid probably dated back 
to February, 1778, when he, along with Daniel Boone and almost thirty other men, were 
captured by the Shawnee whilst harvesting salt at the Lower Blue Licks in Kentucky.  It appears 
that Johnson’s lack of height served him well on this occasion as his captors mistook him for a 
young adolescent rather than a full grown man and, as such, he was quickly adopted into an 
Indian family at the town of Chillicothe.  Although a captive, Johnson did not suffer among the 
Indians but instead enjoyed a family life with his adoptive father showing a particularly strong 
degree of affection for his new son.  When Johnson, known to his new family rather 
endearingly as Peguolly, or ‘Little Shut his Eyes,’ made his escape around the first of June his 
new father ‘grieved...very much’ believing that his son, who ‘co’dn’t shoot and didn’t know the 
way to Kentuck[y],’ would surely ‘die in the woods.’  After a trying three day search for the lost 
‘infant,’ Johnson’s despondent father began to seek solace in the still captive Boone, whom he 
would often ask ‘Boone! Think Peguolly found the way to Kentucky?’ Apparently this Shawnee 
wanted his son to find his way safely back to the settlements rather than dying, alone and 
hungry, in the wilderness.  Within two weeks of arriving at Harrodsburgh, however, the wily 
Johnson had set out upon the country’s first retaliatory raid against the Shawnee, in spite of 
what appears to have been months of decent, familial treatment at their hands.24 
 Johnson’s experiences, however, cannot be analysed at face value.  Although his and 
the other salt boilers capture had been a bloodless surrender, it was not, as Stephen Aron has 
argued, an attempt by the Shawnee to peacefully assimilate the whole frontier population, at 
least not entirely.25  To be sure, the Shawnee certainly promised amnesty to the salt boilers, 
and later to the inhabitants of Boonesborough when they famously besieged the town, but 
their process of assimilation was far from universal.26  For those not earmarked for adoption, 
sale to the British at Detroit was their ultimate fate and though Johnson may have enjoyed the 
protection offered by his new adolescent identity he was nevertheless forced to watch from an 
impotent position as his fellow settlers were marched to Detroit as prisoners of war or 
subjugated, sometimes violently, by the Indians.27  Johnson’s fate among the Shawnee may 
have been comfortable, but it was a comfort he could enjoy only in the context of the 
degradation suffered by the original captured band.28  To compound matters, raids against 
Kentucky and the wider frontier continued apace throughout Johnson’s five month captivity, 
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the sight of departing war bands and returning scalps likely speaking volumes.  To his captors 
Peguolly may have become a member of their family, but to Johnson he remained a prisoner 
of war, a helpless witness to the failure of Shawnee amnesty. 
By the time he was finally able to affect his escape around the first of June, Johnson 
had developed no particular bond with his captors.  Indeed, through their continued designs 
upon Boonesborough and the treatment of the salt boilers exiled to Detroit, Johnson’s 
resentment appears to have deepened.29  It is not impossible that Johnson, like many other 
former captives, developed some reciprocal bond with his adoptive family but if any such bond 
did indeed develop it certainly did not extend to the Shawnee as a whole.30  From the inside 
out he had witnessed events which he interpreted as the Shawnee’s attempt to violently 
dismantle settler society through continuous raiding and the sale of captives to the British and 
it was these apparent depredations that appear to have led Johnson to formulate his 
counteroffensive.  Although his own personal experience had not been particularly trying, the 
experience of the community – who had been subjected to continuous raids and starvation – 
had been.  With his small band of followers, Johnson could not hope to free any of those who 
remained in captivity or to stymie the flow of raiding parties operating in Kentucky, but he 
could endeavour to achieve something far more intangible; revenge, not for himself, but for 
his people.31 
Whatever the practical limitations and implications of Johnson’s raid, he was not alone 
in fostering a desire for retribution, particularly in the years following 1778.  Johnson’s 
particular experiences and perspective had led him to an extraordinary response but as the 
frontier war continued, and as a larger and larger proportion of the settler community came to 
be directly affected by the fighting, more of his contemporaries began to develop a 
comparable outlook.  As the 1770s drew to a close, conflict became more than a means to a 
tactical end; it became the primary means through which revenge and retribution could be 
attained.  Settlers no longer engaged solely in the practical patterns of defensive fighting which 
had defined the first years of settlement in Kentucky.  Certainly, retreating and forting would 
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continue to be options utilized by many, but a significant proportion of the community would 
respond to attacks with offensive actions of their own, combat not for the sake of achieving a 
tactical end or measurable victory, but combat for the sake of revenge.  As the 1780s dawned 
this new pattern began to take root in settler society, ultimately resulting in a further increase 
in the level of fighting which plagued the frontier.32  Rather than taking steps to control the 
war, the settlers now actively courted and initiated clashes with their aboriginal adversaries.  
Problematically, revenge was unquantifiable, something that was felt and measured by 
individual settlers as opposed to the community and, as such, it was rarely sated.  For their 
part, the settlers easily found the motivation required to continue or even to escalate the 
pattern of violence which would define the war.  For five years significant Indian raids had 
brought the settlers to a crisis point.  The response of the settlers, to begin assaults of their 
own, would do likewise for the Indian tribes of the Ohio Valley, a reciprocal system of violence 
that would drive both sides to a confrontational equilibrium that would carry the war on the 
frontier past the conclusion of the American Revolution. 
Indeed, that system created a type of anti-Indian radical on one side and a type of anti-
Settler radical on the other, relatively small sub-groups whose size would increase as the war 
progressed into the early 1780s.  From as early as the winter of 1777, George Rogers Clark had 
recognised the potential of Indian raids to create a far more proactive desire for violence 
among the settlers.  Although focused upon defeating the British when he planned his 1778 
campaign into Illinois, Clark hardly shied away from drawing upon general resentment of the 
Indians in order to draw support to his cause.33  By the early summer months of 1778 the 
power of anti-Indian sentiment – and his promise to act upon it – meant that he would later be 
able to write that ‘[I] Had my little army recruited in half the time I expected.  Elevated with 
the thoughts of the great service we should do our Country in some measure; putting an end 
to the Indian War on our Frontiers.’  In spite of this initial rush of enthusiasm, however, the 
reality of Indian raids across the backcountry meant that his army almost collapsed as soon as 
it had formed.  Gathering his forces at Redstone, western Virginia, an area ‘much distressed by 
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the Indians,’ had proven to be a near fatal mistake.  Clark’s followers may have fostered a 
desire to attack the Indians but what they saw and heard at Redstone made most reluctant to 
leave their farmsteads and families undefended.  The promise of attacking the Indians had 
been enough to rally the settlers to Clark’s banner, but the thought of leaving the frontier 
undefended, at this stage in the war, proved to be just as potent.34 
Thus facing the disintegration of his force, Clark was left with no option but to set out 
for Kentucky as quickly as possible.  Although he was struggling to maintain the integrity and 
viability of his little army, the ambitious major remained hopeful that he would be able to 
gather new recruits on the journey as well as rendezvousing with the remaining volunteers 
who had committed themselves from across the backcountry.  Upon his arrival in Kentucky, 
however, Clark’s hopes were to be dashed once again as entire squads either failed to appear 
or disintegrated en route to his location.  ‘[Y]ou may easily guess at my mortification,’ Clark 
would later write, when Captain Smith and his men failed to arrive at the designated meeting 
point prior to the launch of the Illinois campaign.  According to Clark, ‘all of his Men had been 
stopt by the insessant labours of the populace [sic].’35  This was a particularly precarious 
position for Clark as his entire ability to launch any planned invasion of Illinois rested upon the 
support he could gather upon the frontier, both in terms of man power and material 
resources.36  When a group of Kentuckians commanded by a Captain Delland finally did 
rendezvous with Clark any positive implications were likely undermined by the fact that even 
this group had been ‘threatened to be put into Prison if they did not return,’ to their 
settlements in order shore up defences against the Indians.37   
In spite of his ambitions, Clark was restrained by the attitude he discovered across the 
frontier.  On the one hand Clark had drawn upon a strong desire among many to strike back at 
the Indians but so too was there a strong reflex to shore up defences against that same group.  
To compound this, it was by now obvious, in spite of his expedition’s attempt at secrecy, that 
Clark was not targeting Ohio – the home of the most aggressive tribes – but the relatively 
peaceful Illinois country.38  True, there was certainly a British presence in the region but the 
population as a whole was largely comprised of neutral Indians or settlers formerly of New 
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France who posed, on balance, only a minimal threat to Kentucky and western Virginia.39  The 
settlers of the frontier demonstrated with their inaction their lack of confidence that any 
invasion of Illinois could materially impact their lives; they may have been willing to rally, in 
principle, against the Indians but they were not willing to rally against the British.  Indeed, 
rather than ease the frontier war it appears that Clark merely spread it further by providing 
new opportunities for conflict with the tribes of Illinois.40   
By the end of 1778, however, continuous Indian attacks south of the Ohio had served 
to sharpen anti-Indian sentiment in the region.  In addition to suffering raids, the country had 
been subjected to mass captive takings, sieges, and widespread starvation that had laid a solid 
groundwork upon which a desire for communal revenge could be built.  Even following the 
capture of Henry Hamilton in 1779, the Governor of Detroit upon whom many had laid the 
blame for widespread Indian scalping, there was no notable reduction in the level of violence 
which dominated the frontier.41  Hamilton’s role, like that of the British in general, may have 
been to facilitate and to supply the Indians but he had no real control over their activities and, 
following his capture, the earlier pattern of war which they had established continued without 
interruption.  Moreover, the settlers of the frontier did not necessarily connect Indian assaults 
to the British directly.  Instead they consciously connected the Indians directly to their 
atrocities, consequently focusing their need for retribution primarily onto this group.  The 
British were certainly not popular, but support for them vacillated along with individual 
political allegiances.  The Indians, however, became the recipients of near universal derision, a 
rare bridge connecting rebels, Tories and the politically ambiguous alike throughout the 
backcountry.  William Clinkenbeard, himself a diehard patriot, remembered being ordered to 
the defence of a ‘Tory’ Station during the spring of 1781; ‘They were afraid,’ he would later 
recall, ‘and we were as afraid as they.’42  Indian attacks, or the fear of Indian attacks, failed to 
respect divisions between rebel Americans, British sympathizers, or those with little interest in 
such matters.  West of the Appalachians, fear of the Indians was a great leveler. 
In order to understand why the settlers transformed their deepening animosity into a 
communal movement that demanded revenge it is necessary to analyze the implications 
Indian attacks had upon their society.  Like Andrew Johnson, many settlers began to escalate 
their response to raids owing to perceived violations of the community but, unlike Johnson’s 
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captivity, many in the settlements were exposed to a steady stream of particularly graphic 
examples of how brutal the frontier war had become.  George Fearis, for instance, would 
remember for the rest of his life the day he and two companions ‘saw the hog at something’ as 
they rode through their neighbourhood.  Investigating the odd sight, one of the Fearis’s 
companions discovered that the pigs had in fact been feasting upon the remains of one of his 
children.  According to Fearis, the child’s father ‘gathered what...he could’ of the body, ‘and 
took it along and buried it.’43  The discovery of a brutalized body was an occurrence which 
spoke to the settlers of the events which had surrounded the death of a victim, and the 
apparent attitude of their killer.  As chapter five will demonstrate, the discovery of a body, 
particularly that of a family member or close acquaintance, could be a disturbing episode in its 
own right but when enough evidence remained to draw conclusions as to the circumstances 
surrounding their death the impact could be felt all the more keenly.   
Betsy Moseby, for instance, heard ‘a very a curious, ugly sort of noise,’ which turned 
out to be the last sound made by one of her girlhood friends, Elizabeth Sanders, before she 
was tomahawked and scalped alive.  When the girl was discovered she had yet to expire from 
her wounds and continued to live until ‘the next day.’  William Niblick reported this incident to 
John Shane before mentioning the danger he had also apparently faced; ‘I had been out all 
that day hunting horses, had passed before this...same ground.’  Even without seeing an Indian 
Niblick had come to believe that, but for the passage of a few hours, his fate and that of the 
young Sanders girl could have been easily reversed.  To compound the impact this event had 
upon him, Niblick was closely acquainted with both the Moseby and Sanders families, relating 
later that ‘they were particular friends of my family.’44  Rebecca Grant, one of Daniel Boone’s 
nieces, would later dwell upon this very same incident when writing to Lyman Draper before 
relating to him the other atrocities which had been attributed to Sander’s killers; murder, 
kidnapping, and massacres.45  Such incidents did much to forge a communal settler identity 
against a common enemy, but by the 1780s each new episode was laid upon a potent legacy of 
prior bloodshed that led the community to the point where it would begin taking offensive and 
often atrocious measures of its own. 
Following the murder of John Wymore in 1781 a group of settlers were able to kill one 
of the Indians responsible for the popular hunter’s death; with ruthless efficiency, the dead 
Indian’s head was then removed from his body and hung from the branches of a tree whilst 
the rest of his remains, in a mirror of Hugh McGary’s earlier actions, were ‘cut up...for the 
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dogs.’46  Similarly, John Rupard would remember the appearance of a scouting party at his 
settlement, the head of another dead Indian hanging from a pole which they carried before 
them.47  In 1782 Bryan’s Station was assaulted by the Indians but it was in the aftermath of this 
engagement, when two Indian bodies were discovered, that many of the town’s inhabitants 
demonstrated just how desirous for revenge they had become.  With the first body sunk to the 
bottom of a pond and thus inaccessible, the group instead turned upon that of the second 
Indian, a young man around ‘17 or 18’ years of age whom they discovered in a thicket, 
wrapped carefully in a blanket.  This latter body appears to have elicited the sympathy of some 
within the town, particularly a number of women who commented upon the boy’s ‘fine [and] 
tender hands and feet.’  The apparent innocence some recognised in this corpse, however, was 
not universal and though ‘The women...begged that he might be buried,’ the men who 
discovered him promised only that ‘if they didn’t hush they would hang him up for [a] carrier.’  
Rather than suspending the body in the air, the men instead laid him ‘in a hollow’ where he 
‘made a greater smell than a hundred horses.’  Although he had not been suspended for the 
birds to consume he had been laid out in order for his remains to be destroyed in another, 
equally graphic and public manner.  The birds may not have been welcome but the animals of 
the town set about consuming the young Indian’s remains with aplomb.  Years later one of the 
town’s women would recall that ‘I saw my sow in his belly more than a dozen times.’48 
Through such acts of desecration the settlers were able to extract some limited degree 
of revenge from the Indians but, by 1779, the groundswell for such actions was beginning to 
be reflected in a more proactive, offensive approach to the war.  Gathering more than two 
hundred and fifty men to his banner that summer, John Bowman’s campaign against the 
Shawnee town of Chillicothe represented a significant change in settler attitudes as the 
belligerently defensive outlook Clark had encountered the previous year began to give way.  
Although expeditions north of the Ohio dangerously reduced the defensive capability of the 
settlements, they offered those who took part in them an opportunity to settle communal or 
personal vendettas.49  When Bowman’s force approached Chillicothe the decision to divide the 
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army into two so that the inhabitants of the town were completely surrounded likely appealed 
to the settlers not just on a tactical level, but a personal one.  The plan, however, was betrayed 
when the overzealous desire of one settler, Hugh Ross, to kill Indians overrode the greater 
tactical need of the group; as soon as Ross spotted an Indian, he opened fire.  Alerted to the 
looming danger, the inhabitants of Chillicothe were able to fortify themselves in a reversal of 
the previous year’s siege of Boonesborough.  Unlike in 1778, however, it was now the settlers 
who had undertaken a difficult journey through the wilderness in order to attack their 
enemies.  After a short siege the settlers withdrew from the town in order to return to 
Kentucky having, it appears, inflicted no more than seven casualties upon the Indians.  
Mirroring Andrew Johnson’s earlier raid, Bowman and his men appear to have been satisfied 
with having inflicted a minor defeat upon their foe rather than having achieved anything close 
a significant tactical victory.50  Although George Clark had proposed a plan that would 
ultimately see all of Illinois fall into American hands, it was to Bowman’s ineffective campaign 
that the settlers had flocked and it was this episode which they would later remember in their 
oral tradition.51   
Throughout the remainder of 1779, and into 1780, Indian raids south of the Ohio River 
not only continued apace but escalated in response to Bowman’s expedition.52  For the Indians 
of the Ohio Valley the attack upon Chillicothe became something of a rallying cry allowing the 
Shawnee to galvanise support.53  Not only had the settlers invaded their valuable hunting 
grounds south of the Ohio but they now appeared to be demonstrating designs upon the 
Indian’s northern territory.  Importantly, the last time a settler army had marched upon 
Chillicothe it had resulted in the divisive Treaty of Camp Charlotte which had seen 
representatives of the Shawnee agree to cede their claims south of the Ohio following the 
conclusion of Dunmore’s War.  Of course, Bowman’s attack had nothing to do with claiming 
land in Ohio but that does not mean that a significant settler presence in this territory was 
taken lightly.  For the past three years rumours had spread throughout the Ohio country 
suggesting that the Americans residing south of the river would not be content with control of 
this region alone.  Indeed, many rumours found their start in speeches made by former 
American agents, almost all of which suggested that the settlers sought not just title to land 
but a chance to annihilate the northern tribes.  For many Indians such statements bordered 
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upon the preposterous, at least initially, but the death of Cornstalk, the invasion of Illinois and, 
now, Bowman’s campaign into Ohio all began to suggest that the settler presence in the south 
could prove to be far more dangerous than many had initially anticipated.54   
To compound matters, Bowman’s campaign had resulted in the death of the popular 
war chief, Blackfish, who had been responsible for some of the most important attacks upon 
the settlers including the capture of Daniel Boone, Andrew Johnson and the salt boilers, not to 
mention the siege of Boonesborough.  Although Blackfish’s death should have been a great 
victory for the settlers they did not seem to have had any intelligence of it until sometime 
later, possibly not even until the end of the Revolutionary War when returning captives were 
able to share this information with the community.55  Blackfish’s death, however, would not 
have gone unnoticed by his followers.  Having died of wounds he had received whilst 
attempting to ambush the retreating Kentuckians, he could not have hoped for a better, more 
symbolic passing and, within a relatively short period of time, those who had looked to him for 
leadership began to look southward with renewed vigour.56  When, in 1780, an opportunity 
arose for the Indians to utilize their British allies to gain a major victory in the south they seized 
upon it.  Throughout the past year the Indians had continued to raid Kentucky but in the 
summer a multi-tribal force, possibly numbering as many as nine hundred, gathered for their 
largest single strike against the country.57  This mass raid may have been aided by the British 
but it did not represent a truly British invasion of Kentucky as the overwhelming majority who 
took part were Native Americans.  The British certainly helped to facilitate the gathering of 
such a significant force but the Indians who took part in this expedition did so for their own 
purposes.58  That so many took part in this campaign is telling of how all encompassing the 
frontier war had become; to put this force’s size into perspective the Shawnee – by 1780 – 
could probably field around three hundred warriors, the Delaware around seven hundred, the 
Miami around three hundred, the Wyandot around two hundred, whilst the Mingo could field 
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just sixty.  The hostile tribes of Ohio, it appears, were willing to commit more than half of their 
total warriors to a single campaign against the settlers.59 
The Indian invasion of 1780 was a markedly different affair from the vast majority of 
raids which had hitherto plagued the frontier.  First, the sheer number Indians involved 
dwarfed any prior invasion of the country.60  Secondly, when the invading army successfully 
defeated two fortified settlements, Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations, the Indians demonstrated 
their determination to roll back the settlements south of the Ohio River.  Although the siege of 
Boonesborough had been a trying experience, the Indians’ casualties had far exceeded those 
of the town’s defenders and, ultimately, the settlement had endured.61  Unlike in 1778, 
however, the Indians’ British allies had brought artillery.62  Rather than facing the prospect of 
dealing with an Indian army from within the relative safety of a fort, the residents of Martin’s 
and Ruddle’s Stations instead had to deal with the possibility that their primary means of 
defence would disintegrate in the face of cannon fire, turning their defensive structure into a 
slaughter house.  The fall, first of Ruddle’s and then of Martin’s Stations, thus represented one 
of the Indians’ greatest psychological victories of the war.  British artillery may have made 
these events possible, but it was the settlers’ fear of the Indians that had led them to 
surrender so readily, negotiating with British agents in order to hold the Indians, and their 
tomahawks, in check.63   
Fear of what the Indians might do was logically held; when the British agent Simon 
Girty negotiated the surrender of the towns’ inhabitants he reinforced the point, warning 
them that ‘if they did not surrender, they would all be killed, as the Indians was so angry.’  
More than meaningless hyperbole, Girty had to work almost constantly to ensure that the 
captives taken from these towns came to no harm on their journey north.  Although he may 
have had a reputation as a notorious turncoat, traitor and savage, Girty worked ‘hard 
afterwards to save them.’64  Though Blackfish had been dead for approximately a year the 
sacking of these settlements represented the fulfilment of his original ambition, his 
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vindication.65  For the settlers, the fall of these stations was a disaster and, as the Indians and 
their British allies spirited their prisoners away from the country, ‘terror’ began to grip many of 
those left behind.66  Indeed, with as many as three to four hundred persons taken into 
captivity the defeat of Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations could very well represent the single 
largest capture of civilians by Indians in the history of North America.67  
The fall of Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations helped to focus an acute sense of anger 
across the breadth of the population.  The British certainly did not gain any prestige from their 
role in this incident, particularly as the presence of their cannon had prompted the forts to 
surrender, but it was upon the Indians that the settlers turned their considerable wrath.68  
Although the settlers could have continued their defensive campaign against the Indians, or – 
individually – chosen to retreat from the frontier, as they did in 1777, they instead 
overwhelmingly chose to attack the northern tribes, a manoeuvre that guaranteed neither a 
meaningful victory nor future security.  It certainly would not have been unusual had the 
settlers chosen to retreat; during the Seven Years War, Pontiac’s Rebellion and even 
Dunmore’s War, the backcountry had, after all, been emptied by Indian attacks.69  In the case 
of defensive fighting, not only had this tactic proven broadly successful but the increasing 
settler population implied a degree of inherent security in some of the most well developed 
and densely populated areas.  It should be understood that by 1780 approximately one 
thousand to twelve hundred men capable of bearing arms lived in the region from a total 
population of approximately five thousand persons.70  This ever increasing population would 
prove hard to eradicate and, because of the sheer numbers involved, the Indians would have 
to fundamentally undermine settler society in order to undermine the viability of defensive 
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fighting.  Unlike 1777, the growing population was now large enough that its relative 
concentration in certain areas – and the associated destruction of the wilderness which 
accompanied this – was beginning to create areas of relative security.  The frontier was 
evidently a dangerous place, but the community, as a whole, recognised that it could be 
secured; reverse migration from the country was not a significant issue following the fall of 
Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations.   
In the face of a largely successful defensive campaign offensive action was certainly 
not the obvious choice, particularly as it was plagued by a number of practical limitations 
which had led the settlers to not only ignore this option in the recent past but to actively avoid 
it.71  In particular, such actions could significantly drain the defensive capability of the 
settlements leaving them vulnerable to raids and further disasters whilst the relative 
ineffectiveness of Bowman’s Campaign had demonstrated that the settlers could not expect an 
easy or significant victory.  Indeed, though Bowman’s army had not been annihilated most 
settlers considered it a success only because the casualties gained by the Indians had slightly 
outweighed those sustained by the settlers.72  These issues, however, did not stop the settlers 
from rallying around the idea of a counter offensive‘[i]n consequence of the depredations’ 
inflicted upon them throughout 1780.73  As John Filson and Daniel Boone would later reflect, 
the fall of Martin’s and Ruddle’s Stations had been ‘shocking to humanity, and too barbarous 
to relate.’74  ‘Thus harassed’ by the events of 1780, the settlers ‘immediately’ turned their eyes 
north, throwing themselves at the opportunity to ‘chastise the[ir] enemy’ with a level of 
enthusiasm they would never quite repeat.75 
Although it was George Clark, the captor of both Illinois and Henry Hamilton, who 
spearheaded the settlers’ counter strike against the Ohio Indians it was the masses of the 
frontier who not only made the campaign possible, but gave it its significance.  Following the 
defeat of Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations, eight hundred to a thousand men, around eighty 
percent of the country’s adult male population – an astonishing proportion – flocked to Clark’s 
banner in order to launch the largest per capita counteroffensive to come out of the Kentucky 
country.76  Even those who remained did so with an air of martial responsibility, to ‘protect the 
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settlements,’ whilst those unable to take part directly in the operation – namely women and 
children – also played a part as they ‘scraped up corn...and made bread’ and other essential 
supplies.77  Never before had the population of Kentucky acted so overwhelmingly as a single 
entity, marching not only under a common banner, but for a common purpose that was the 
product of their particular experiences with the Indians.  Underlining the explicit link between 
the events, one settler would later remark that ‘[t]he panic occasioned throughout Kentucky 
by the taking of Martin’s and Ruddle’s Stations, caused the people to look up to General Clarke 
as their only hope [sic].’78  Clark may have led the campaign but it had been his ‘promise’ for 
revenge against the Indians that had furnished his expedition with so many eager 
participants.79   
Most importantly, the movement against the Ohio tribes represented a reaction that 
was distinct for a community that had primarily carried out a defensive war.  General 
Brodhead may have warned Clark that the settlers ‘must depend [only] upon themselves,’ for 
this campaign, but he clearly failed to recognise just how fundamental communal support for 
such an expedition actually was.80  Brodhead’s warning may have been sound council in 
preceding years but the events of 1780 marked a turning point in settler attitudes towards the 
war with the Indians.  It had only been a year prior to this campaign that John Bowman had 
been able to draw only around two hundred and fifty men to his cause whilst the year before 
had seen Clark able to gather only one hundred and fifty.81   Now, however, the cumulative 
legacy of war had brought the frontier community to the point where the vast majority of its 
adult men were willing to engage in an invasion of the Ohio country.  Clark’s role in gathering 
and focusing this army was critical but it was the desire of the masses to fight offensively that 
allowed this force to come into existence.82  Moreover, they were prepared to do this even 
when it meant leaving the settlements, which they had fought so hard to establish, almost 
defenceless; in the words of John Bradford, both a participant in the campaign and the 
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founding editor of the Kentucky Gazette, ‘All appeared to be impressed with the belief, that if 
this army should be defeated, that few would be able to escape, and that the Indians would 
then fall on the defenceless women and children in Kentucky, and destroy the whole.’83   Even 
the best expectations for this campaign must have been tempered by past experience and 
knowledge of Bowman’s ineffective invasion the previous year.84  Still, the masses marched 
upon Ohio, a vivid contrast to their actions during the Seven Years War.85 
The defeat of Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations had helped to draw the community’s 
growing desire for revenge and retribution into a focus sharp enough to override the practical 
difficulties expected of such a massive campaign in the north.  Of course it can be argued that 
the settlers were acting in a pragmatic way with the destruction of these forts suggesting a 
failure in their hitherto successful pattern of defensive fighting but there was more to the 
hundreds of individual decisions made by the settlers to invade Ohio than pragmatism alone.86  
Even the most practical societies would struggle to field virtually their entire adult male 
population for a single assault, particularly when there was no real reason to suspect that such 
an offensive operation would produce a meaningful success.  As chapter six will show, the 
Kentuckians would consistently demonstrate significant restraint when it came to following 
agents of the government into battle.  That they did on this occasion – particularly in such 
astonishing numbers – serves to underline the sheer depth of the community’s growing 
animosity towards the northern tribes, not to mention the further radicalisation of anti-Indian 
sentiment among the larger group.  According to Simon Girty, the British agent who had 
negotiated the surrender of Ruddle’s and Martin’s Stations, the settlers were ‘madmen…for 
they rushed into the most extreme danger, with a seeming disregard for consequences.’87   
John Bradford probably offered the best insight into the forces which drove the 
settlers north, exploring their group mentality by reflecting upon the Indians’ consistent 
practice of disappearing into the wilderness ahead of Clark’s advancing forces.  According to 
Bradford, ‘It is an old maxim among the Indians, never to encounter a fool or a madman, (in 
which terms they include a desperate man) for they say, that with a man that has not sense 
enough to take prudent care of his own life, the life of his antagonist is in much greater 
danger.’88  The settlers who took part in Clark’s campaign were neither madmen nor fools but 
Bradford clearly identified his fellows as desperate.  To Bradford, the settler campaign of 1780 
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was not one founded upon a prudent or measured response but was instead a reactionary 
episode that spoke of how the ongoing war was affecting the community.  On this occasion, at 
least, prudence was abandoned in order for a symbolic madness to be expressed by the 
settlers as they marched upon the homes of their enemies in spite of the extreme vulnerability 
of the settlements they left behind.  True, a major military victory could have done much for 
the settlers but the destruction of their homes and families by Indian raiding parties as they 
accomplished this end would have negated any such advancement. 
The army which Clark led into Ohio may have been formidable in its size but the 
Shawnee demonstrated through their actions that prudence really was the better part of 
valour when they simply vanished into the wilderness ahead of its arrival.  Given a choice of 
engaging in extensive combat, surrendering, or fading into the environment the Indians chose 
the latter in order to best preserve the wellbeing of their communities.  Clark, however, was 
nevertheless able to turn this lack of confrontation into a tactical victory when he focused the 
general anti-Indian sentiment of his army into a scorched earth policy that saw the settlers 
ravage the abandoned Indian towns they encountered.  Their inhabitants may have slipped 
away to avoid a confrontation but they left behind cornfields which were promptly destroyed 
along with a large number of dwellings, tools and other items.  Though it was true that Clark’s 
army did not gain the victory it sought, its component parts nonetheless revelled in the 
destruction they wrought and the lack of casualties they suffered.89  The few skirmishes which 
did occur were celebrated as victories (although that interpretation played fast and loose with 
the nature of confrontation) and, once again, the settlers returned to Kentucky having affected 
no major military defeat upon their enemy.90  They had, however, succeeded in gaining a 
limited degree of retribution for the losses they had suffered in the preceding months through 
the destruction of Indian property and foodstuffs.  Moreover, Clark had finally succeeded in 
harnessing the disparate passions and motivations of the community in order to accomplish 
his personal military agenda.  But just as the settlers had been motivated to strike back against 
the Indians for the invasion of 1780 and the hostilities of the preceding years, so too were the 
Indians of Ohio – who were now facing the same starving conditions the settlers had faced in 
1778 – driven to strike back against their enemy, a process which started with the exhumation 
and desecration of all the settlers killed on the late campaign.91  In the coming two years, the 
seeds laid by the fighting of 1780 would grow into some of the most violent episodes in the 
history of the war.  
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In spite of the added pressure the destruction of foodstuffs placed upon the Shawnee, 
the tribe continued to raid Kentucky and the frontier throughout 1781 with the same 
determination, if not the resources, as it had previously committed.92  Though a lack of 
foodstuffs likely restrained the military efforts of this tribe, other Indian groups, such as the 
Wyandot and Miami, appear to have intensified their own activities against the frontier in 
response to the settlers’ invasion, effectively balancing any Shawnee deficit.93  Throughout 
1781 Indian raiding parties continued to appear, negating the victory Clark’s scorched earth 
policy had secured and, for many, this year appeared to be as violent as any which had 
preceded it.94  From Kentucky to western Virginia and western Pennsylvania, the northern 
tribes carried out a massive campaign of raids and expertly timed guerrilla attacks – retribution 
for the settlers’ invasion, and a groundwork upon which settlers from across the trans-
Appalachian region would seek future revenge.  These continuing incursions wreaked havoc 
among the settlers who responded by tightening their defences, desecrating bodies, and 
forming ad hoc militia groups to pursue the invading raiders.95  The level of violence in 
Kentucky may not have reached its 1780 level but the number of raids, deaths and captivities 
probably equalled those which occurred in 1779, a  more than sufficient level to keep the 
frontier on the point of crisis.  Indeed, settlers from across the western territories now turned 
their eyes upon the Indians with a growing ambition to extract retribution from the northern 
tribes.  The settlers may have scored a tactical victory under Clark but many now struggled to 
identify its worth as raiding party after raiding party fell upon the frontier.   
From 1781 onwards communal revenge would play an ever increasing role in shaping 
and driving the war for the frontier as renewed Indian raids plagued the trans-Appalachian 
country.  Problematically for the pacifist Moravian Delawares this would result in the massacre 
of over ninety men, women, and children at the town of Gnadenhutten in 1782.  Although a 
retaliatory campaign had been led against the Indians from western Pennsylvania in 1781 
under Daniel Brodhead, his insistence that the Moravians be left unharmed produced little 
enduring sympathy among the revenge-starved population of the frontier.  According to one 
disgruntled settler, Brodhead had proven through his actions that he was nothing more than a 
‘grovelling ignorant man’ more interested in land speculation than the ‘contemptible situation’ 
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of those who had suffered at Indian hands; western Pennsylvania had been afflicted by many 
of the same forces and issues which had inspired their southern counterparts to fight the 
tribes.96  It is perhaps unsurprising that historians often refer to the group who carried out this 
massacre, along with the settlers of the backcountry in general, as Indian-haters.97  Although 
the racism implied by this concept may help to explain why the Moravians were targeted, it 
does not explain why the settlers sought to use such extreme levels ofs violence.98  Even if 
racism against the Indians is taken as a given, it still does not follow that one of the worst – 
ever – settler atrocities would develop as a consequence.  To assume this is to apply broad 
concepts from other racial contexts without sufficient consideration of the specific experiences 
generated by the frontier war.  Slavery may have, as Philip D. Morgan has argued, demanded 
the use of physical coercion but it does not necessarily follow that racism, as a rule, demands 
the use of extreme violence.99 
Worse still, the use of Indian-hating as an explanation is one-dimensional, denying 
Native Americans their agency during this period.  It is important to remember that the 
experience of the war – the destructive influence of combat – affected both groups, creating 
cultural animosities on both sides of the frontier.  When Thomas Rideout was taken into 
captivity, for instance, he noted that ‘the Indian children would scream with terror and cry out 
“Shemanthe,” meaning Virginian or big knife,’ whenever they saw him.100  More than an 
example of prudent caution on the part of the tribe’s children, such scenes illustrate the type 
of lessons which Indian adults were teaching their offspring.  Rideout, though a captive and 
completely in their power, was an object of fear for the children of the tribe, not because of 
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who he was as an individual, but because of the actions of the society to which he belonged.  
The point being made here is that the violence produced by the war informed both settler and 
Indian societies, fostering conditions that encouraged both groups to engage in further hostile 
acts; this system was self sustaining with members of both communities informed by their 
violent pasts to engage in violent futures.  The events of 1782, in particular, would create a 
system that would promote the pursuit of communal revenge on both sides of the frontier.  
The Gnadenhutten Massacre would ultimately create a strong desire among many Indians – 
particularly the Delaware and Wyandot – to extract retribution from the settlers, something 
they would ultimately achieve with the capture, torture, and execution of Colonel William 
Crawford later that year.101  Far from bringing this episode to a close, however, Crawford’s 
notoriously bad death would, in turn, ignite further calls for retribution among the settlers.102 
From western Pennsylvania to Kentucky, Crawford’s death was a sensation that 
crystallised the frontier community’s need for revenge.  John Knight’s narrative of the event 
would be absorbed by Kentucky’s vibrant oral culture where it would be told and retold, a 
story of horror which would serve to underline and contextualise the community’s own 
experiences.103  Upon arriving in Kentucky, Knight was able to experience local interest in his 
work first hand; when Marcus Richardson met Knight in Frankfort he made a point of asking 
the former captive to ‘tell me the whole affair.’  Understanding how widespread his story 
already was, Knight simply replied ‘Oh...you have read it all – [and that] is all I can tell you.’104  
But however much Crawford’s death reviled the settlers, they were certainly not alone in 
looking to further the cause of revenge following his failed campaign.  Within two months of 
the Crawford’s defeat a multi-tribal army, not dissimilar to that sent against Martin’s and 
Ruddle’s Stations two years previously, had already come into existence and in short order a 
group of around three hundred Indians crossed the Ohio that August.105  The events which 
followed marked the culmination of one of the bloodiest years in the history of the war as the 
invading Indians first attacked Bryan’s Station before laying in ambush at the Blue Licks for the 
inevitable Kentuckian backlash.  Even as the body of an adolescent Indian was laid out in 
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Bryan’s Station as a retributive feast for the town’s animals a significant – ad hoc – force of 
enraged settlers had already gathered in order to pursue the invaders.   
Indeed, these settlers were so anxious to engage the invading Indians that they 
ignored almost every prudent option open to them by setting off in advance of the much 
larger militia band commanded by Benjamin Logan.  The settlers were simply unwilling to wait 
the full day it would take for Logan’s forces to reach their position.  The subsequent settler 
defeat was the largest near-simultaneous loss of life to occur in Kentucky throughout the 
entire course of the war.  Of a total force comprising around one hundred and eighty men, 
approximately fifteen to eighteen percent of the country’s total arms bearing population, the 
Kentuckians lost at least seventy men in less than an hour.  For the settlers of Kentucky 
Crawford’s death may have been an outrageous affront, but the defeat of the militia at the 
Blue Licks marked an even more potent disaster against which the community would rally.  
Within two months George R. Clark, ever ready to harness the community’s desire for 
retribution, would once again find himself at the head of a movement as approximately one 
thousand settlers gathered under his banner to strike back against the Indians.  By the time 
Clark and his men set off across the Ohio River the war between the British and the Americans 
had effectively been over for year.106  As the Kentuckians marched north, however, they 
carried with them the means through which the war on the frontier would continue rage as 
they, once again, revisited attack with attack, and atrocity with atrocity. 
 
Closure 
Tradition holds an interesting tale regarding Charles Bilderback, one of those who took part in 
the Gnadenhutten massacre.  Following the atrocity Bilderback took part in Crawford’s 
disastrous campaign against the Indians before resuming his life upon the frontier with his 
young wife, Rhuama.  Over the succeeding years the area in which Bilderback lived came to 
enjoy an ever increasing degree of security as the demographically weakened Indians 
withdrew further west.  Around 1789, however, that apparent security failed and both 
Bilderback and his wife were attacked before being spirited into separate captivities.  Upon his 
arrival at his captors’ town Bilderback apparently drew the suspicion of a number of Indians 
who enquired as to his name and past.  According to tradition Bilderback was the first of the 
militiamen to spill blood at Gnadenhutten.  Upon telling the Indians who he was his captors 
apparently exclaimed ‘you kill Indians – you big captain – you kill Moravians’ before setting 
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about the task of his execution; Bilderback was either burned alive or heavily mutilated as a 
measure of atonement for his role in the massacre.  Even as the 1790s were waiting to dawn, 
the Indians, it was said, were still spilling blood for the massacre they had endured seven years 
previously.  Though her husband may have been guilty of taking part in one of the most 
ferocious massacres of the war Rhuama probably took little comfort in what, retrospectively, 
can be seen as a not unreasonable act of retributive justice.107   
The story of Bilderback’s death may very well be apocryphal but it nonetheless 
highlights a microcosm of the system that dominated the trans-Appalachian frontier during the 
war with the Indians.  Seven years after the Gnadenhutten affair the Indians, it was said, still 
sought to take revenge upon those whom they could identify as its perpetrators.  The cultural 
memory of Gnadenhutten did not merely evaporate following the death of Crawford and even 
those who marched against Kentucky in the late summer of 1782 could not have been ignorant 
of the event.  Even as Gnadenhutten faded from immediate attention it left behind its own 
form of scar tissue that would continue to underwrite Native American life throughout the 
Ohio Valley for years to come.  Similarly, the execution of William Crawford and the defeat of 
the Kentuckians at the Blue Licks both served a similar purpose south of the river.  These 
affronts and defeats gave both sides an easily identifiable atrocity around which they could 
begin to refine a sense of both their own identity and an understanding of their enemy.108   
Crucially, Gnadenhutten, Crawford, and the Blue Licks affairs occurred within a much broader 
context of violence and strife which helped to give these incidents their larger social meaning.  
It was not merely Gnadenhutten or Crawford’s campaign that brought the Indians down upon 
Kentucky in August, 1782, but such events did help to focus the already lengthening legacy of 
atrocities, invasion, and displacement that was already having an adverse effect upon Ohio’s 
aboriginal communities.  Likewise, the death of William Crawford and the ambush of the 
Kentuckians meant little in isolation, but within the broader context of seemingly unjustified 
aggressions, murders, and kidnappings they became far more significant.  However justified 
the Indians’ aggressions, the settlers never came to accept the actions taken by them in the 
name of their cause. 
From 1779 until 1782 the frontier underwent one of its most formative processes as 
both sides, en masse, began to turn to violence not as a means to achieving a tactical end, but 
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as a response to past acts of violence.  As the 1770s drew to a close and the 1780s dawned, 
this situation developed into a self sustaining mechanism as each act of retribution, far from 
bringing any closure to the situation, instead laid the groundwork for the opposing side to seek 
a similar solution.  The ultimate result of this escalating spiral of confrontation was the 
trapping of both the settlers and the Indians into a symbiotically destructive cycle that led each 
side to commit further and greater atrocities against the other.  By the end of 1782 both the 
settlers and the Indians had established, through their actions, the cultural and social 
groundwork necessary to carry the war far beyond the end of the American Revolution.  By 
1783 the two opposing forces upon the frontier required little motivation to perpetuate their 
struggle against the other; the frontier war was a personal experience expressed by the 
community and it had now reached a level of confrontational critical mass that would all but 
ensure its perpetuation for the next decade.  In the coming years attacks upon individuals, 
their families, and the community would continue almost without interruption.  The continued 
destruction of family, kin and social ties would help to maintain the perceived personal nature 
of this war and ensure its continued ferocity.  Because these interpersonal ties lay at the heart 
of settler society, it was their destruction that provided one of the most potent driving forces 
behind the community’s need for revenge.  Accordingly, the nature and significance of 
interpersonal relationships, and how they created a communal desire for retribution, will be 
analysed extensively in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Ties That Bind 
 
It did not take long for the Indians to gain the upper hand at the Battle of the Blue Licks.  
Within minutes the settlers had found themselves caught in an expertly planned ambush, a 
tactical tour de force which decimated their ranks and sparked a disorganised rout.  In spite of 
the destruction which surrounded the Kentuckians – one survivor would describe them as 
‘sweltering in blood’ – Daniel Boone lingered on the field in order to ensure that his son, Israel, 
was mounted and able to make his escape.1  Unwilling to leave his father Israel had instead 
lingered, an easy target for the sniper who ultimately gunned him down.  Faced with the sight 
of his dead – or nearly dead – son, Daniel was thus confronted by one of the most potent 
forces on the frontier: the body of an individual to whom he shared an important emotional 
bond.  Such sights could be incredibly affective and, like others settlers in similar situations, 
Boone reacted accordingly.  For a time he tried to carry his son’s body upon his shoulders, 
away from the battlefield but – exhausted by the effort – he was ultimately forced to abandon 
Israel.  Before fleeing from the field, however, the usually restrained Boone had waited for an 
Indian to approach Israel and, before any attempt could be made to scalp the body, he 
shouted ‘You be there,’ fired his rifle, and killed his target.2   
Scenes such as these were not unusual on the frontier and, at the Blue Licks, settlers 
watched and reacted as companions and relatives had their brains blown out, were scalped, or 
were gutted by stray bullets.3  For every death suffered at the Blue Licks, ties of blood, kin, and 
friendship ensured that families and other close relationships all across the region were made 
suffer as a result.  Many lives were lost at the battle, true, but many more were affected by 
those losses, a process which ensured that the impact of this defeat was not felt by its 
veterans alone.  In the words John Filson would later attribute to Daniel Boone, ‘The reader 
may guess what sorrow filled the hearts of the inhabitants [of Kentucky], exceeding anything I 
am able to describe.’4  Like many confrontations in the trans-Appalachian west, the Battle of 
the Blue Licks would serve to inspire future conflicts in the region, particularly another 
                                                            
1 Houston ‘A Sketch of the Life of Daniel Boone,’ p. 25 
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Boone,’ p. 78 
3 Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone,’ pp. 76-77 
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campaign led by George R. Clark against the Indians of Ohio, but that desire to extract 
retribution found its roots not strictly on the battlefield but in the relationships forged by the 
region’s inhabitants.  
 The bonds that connected parents to children, husbands to wives, and companions to 
companions were a powerful and often overlooked force of social action on the frontier.  It 
was just such a bond – parental affection – that had led Daniel to place the life of his son, 
Israel, above his own during the calamitous Blue Licks affair, just as it was that same bond that 
had framed Boone’s ambush of the Indian who attempted to scalp his son’s body.5  More than 
an incidental detail, the interpersonal relationships fostered by the settlers helped to define 
how they perceived the wider-world and how they interacted with the frontier war.  It was 
that same system that would cause Samuel Brannon to go out of his way to rescue a wounded 
settler during the retreat at the Blue Licks, just as that same impulse gave meaning to 
Benjamin Netherland’s actions when he rallied those around him to provide covering fire for 
those caught in the most vulnerable position by the collapse of the settlers’ lines.6   
Driven by a recognised commonality and an encompassing interpersonal network, the 
settlers undertook actions they may not have otherwise considered.  As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, communal retribution was a significant driving force behind the continuing 
war, but the existence of that system raises an implicit question in its wake.  Why did violent 
acts by the Indians against one’s family or companions inspire members of the community to 
respond? In order to understand why communal retribution became such an important force 
in the trans-Appalachian west it is necessary to understand how the settlers’ interpersonal 
world – the relationships they shared with their peers and their families – provided the context 
for the revenge they would ultimately seek.  By fostering potent relationships with their peers, 
the settlers infused the losses of the frontier war with meaning.  Those who were killed were 
not merely settlers; they were individuals characterised by the type of relationship they shared 
with the conflict’s survivors.  Thus connected by meaningful bonds and, often, genuine mutual 
affection, the settlers gave meaning to their losses and in so doing gave meaning to the deaths 
they caused in return.  Or, to put it another way, the settlers did not kill because they were 
‘Indian haters,’ but because they sought to preserve or avenge those in whom they were 
personally, even emotionally, invested.  In this way it was the settlers’ social, family, and kin 
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Boone,’ p. 26 
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Jacob Stevens’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC135 
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networks which defined their approach to the war, an interpersonal world which turned the 
often indiscriminate fighting in the region into a highly personal assault.7  In particular three 
core relationships sat at the heart of the community and, thus, were fundamentally connected 
to the ongoing conflict between the settlers and Indians; the relationship between parents and 
children, the relationship between husbands and wives, and the relationship between platonic 
companions. 
In general terms, the family was the core building block upon which settler society was 
constructed.  Migration in family groups was common, and though a large number of single 
men did indeed migrate to Kentucky they often did so with an eye towards starting a family of 
their own.  In other cases it was not uncommon for the head of a family to act as a figurative 
and literal trailblazer, moving out ahead of their family in order to claim lands, build a cabin, 
and secure some basis upon which their family could be expected to prosper.8  Indeed, the 
success of the family unit was a core concern for many men who invested significant energy, 
resources, and even emotion into this institution.  William Fleming, for instance, would write 
often to his wife, Nancy, reflecting the value he placed in the family whose future he was 
trying to secure.  Reflecting upon a Christmas spent alone in Kentucky, Fleming would write 
that ‘I was here on Christmas day, a dismal contrast to that felicity I enjoyed at home.  My 
family & Home rush’d on my mind with double force.  I recalled the innocent, diverting prattle 
and amusements of my Children.  I lamented your absence.  The tender human feelings were 
all afloat – but I live in hope, my D[ea]r. Girl that we will yet enjoy that calm domestic 
happiness I regret being deprived of at present, and that we will not be separated again for 
such a time and to such a distance, till our setting Suns usher us to regions where we will part 
no more.’9   
By investing themselves in their families, settlers defined the context in which they 
measured their experiences, but so too did this institution come to contextualise the dangers 
faced upon the frontier.  Through the creation of meaningful bonds within the family, 
                                                            
7 This was a particular issue in locations such as Kentucky where the war was, per capita, seven times 
more deadly than the Revolution in the thirteen colonies.  This resulted in a significant number of 
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comparative deadliness of Kentucky see Faragher Daniel Boone, p. 144 
8 John D. Shane ‘Interview with John McKinney’s Family’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC25, John D. Shane 
‘Interview with Leptha Kemper’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC127, John D. Shane ‘Interview with Jonas 
Hedge’ Draper Manuscripts 12CC213, Filson and Boone ‘The Adventures of Daniel Boon,’ pp. 59-60, 
Trabue ‘The Narrative of Daniel Trabue,’ pp. 44-52 
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Fleming-Edmunds Papers A/F 597,  Filson Historical Society, ‘Letter from William Fleming to Nancy 
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individual settlers became vulnerable through their destruction.  In particular, the bond 
between parent and child was a highly formative one and, regardless of age, parents often 
demonstrated vulnerability when their offspring were endangered, injured, or killed.  Although 
the sheer distance which separated Fleming from his own father – who lived in Dumfries, 
Scotland – posed a significant barrier to their relationship, Leonard Fleming nevertheless 
expressed his ‘most dismall apprehensions’ when he read that his son had been among the 
wounded at the Battle of Point Pleasant.10  Similarly, when Israel Boone was killed at the Battle 
of the Blue Licks his father reflected the nature of their relationship in the manner in which he 
acted following his son’s death; ‘Father used to be deeply affected, even to tears, when he 
spoke of the Blue Licks defeat and the death of his son,’ Nathan Boone would later recall.11  
Such an emotional reaction did more than reflect the type of connection felt by this father 
towards his progeny.  It reflected the failure of the frontier war to promote familial fatalism.  
Evidently Boone’s exposure to continuous conflict had not dampened his ability to feel, 
particularly towards his children.12  Although this group was especially vulnerable, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the experience of war caused parents on the frontier to blunt the 
level of affection which bound them to their offspring.  Indeed, the death or kidnapping of 
child was an event that could be fundamental in its impact upon the both the parent and the 
larger family group.13  When Jonathan Alder finally returned to his family decades after being 
taken into captivity, the reaction of his siblings and mother spoke volumes: ‘My mother arose 
from her seat and threw her arms around my neck and kissed me.  She...was unable to speak 
for a short time, but the first words she said were “Jonathan, how you have grown,” whilst 
tears freely rolled down her cheeks.’ At this same meeting Alder was reunited with his brother 
                                                            
10 ‘Letter from Leonard Fleming, January 17th, 1775’ Fleming-Edmunds Papers A/F 597, Filson Historical 
Society 
11 Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone,’ p. 78 
12 Daniel Boone revelled in the joy he gained from playing with and, sometimes, teasing his descendents.  
During his twilight days, he made a point of comforting his six and four year grandchildren who visited, 
promising to pick hazelnuts with them when he was well enough to do so.  Somewhat more devious was 
the construction of his coffin which he stored in Nathan Boone’s home ‘greatly to the fear of all the little 
folks in the house.’  Boone appears to have revelled in the mock terror he inspired among ‘the little 
folks.’  See Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone,’ pp. 137-138.  See also the compassionate 
reaction of Henry Jolly’s mother to the Indian child recovered from the Yellow Creek massacre, Jolly 
‘Account of Henry Jolly’ Draper Manuscripts 6NN22-24 
13 For the importance of sibling and wider family relationships see ‘Letter from Margret Fleming to 
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Society, John D. Shane ‘Interview with Isaac Clinkenbeard’ Draper Manuscripts 11CC1, and Mary Kinnan 
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who, ‘After giving me a hearty shake by both hands...left the room to give vent to his 
feelings.’14   
More than a highly emotive ordeal, the loss of a child could prove to be incredibly 
destructive.  When Thomas Baldwin’s family was decimated by an Indian raiding party in 1783 
it triggered a series of events which would ultimately culminate in Baldwin’s withdrawal from 
society.15  Like many others in Kentucky, Baldwin was already tied to the larger system of 
communal retribution that was coming to define the country by the end of the American 
Revolution.  Present at the Battle of the Blue Licks, and a member of the party which buried 
the dead following the battle, Baldwin had readily volunteered to take part in Clark’s 
subsequent campaign against the Shawnee.  Recognising that this expedition had likely made 
the Indians ‘still more enraged against the whites,’ Baldwin would later come to regret the 
action, believing that the settlers’ invasion had brought the Indians to seek ‘new opportunities 
to revenge themselves.’  Having taken part in Clark’s campaign because of the disastrous affair 
at the Blue Licks, Baldwin came to recognise that the settlers’ subsequent actions north of the 
Ohio had laid the groundwork upon which further retribution would be sought.  Indeed, it was 
a chance meeting with an Indian ‘by whom [he] was recognised as a member of Colonel Clark’s 
party,’ which ultimately led to the raid which destroyed his family.16  Reflecting upon their 
deaths in 1835, Baldwin would relate that ‘[I] had a clear and melancholy view of the fate of 
each unfortunate member of my family,’ as they ran from their burning home and into the 
ambush that had been laid for them.  According to Baldwin, the sight of his wife and children 
running into an Indian trap, whilst he was engaged in the lengthy process of reloading his rifle, 
‘presented a spectacle, heart-rending in the extreme to a husband and a parent, who could 
afford them no assistance!’ Unable to render them any aid, Baldwin could only watch as one of 
his sons was scalped alive.  Following this initial attack Baldwin and his surviving children were 
taken to an Indian town, whereupon his eldest son was burned alive.  ‘What at that moment 
were my feelings,’ he would later ask rhetorically, ‘I shall not attempt to describe.’  Tellingly, 
he added that ‘parents alone can judge!’17 
Following the destruction of his family, Baldwin withdrew to a secluded part of the 
country and, effectively, cut himself off from the rest of settler society.  In some ways 
Baldwin’s actions were not unusual; at least in so much as they reflect how the violent 
                                                            
14 Alder and Nelson (ed.) A History of Jonathan Alder, pp. 137-138 
15 Thomas Baldwin and Anonymous (ed.) Narrative of the Massacre, by the Savages, of the Wife and 
Children of Thomas Baldwin, Who, Since the Melancholy Period of the Destruction of his Unfortunate 
Family, has Dwelt entirely Alone, in a Hut of his own Construction, Secluded from Human Society, in the 
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destruction of one’s family, particularly children, could lead to a radical reaction.18  That said, 
Baldwin’s specific response was relatively distinct but extreme mental distress brought about 
by the destruction of one’s children was hardly uncommon.  When one Mrs. Martin was taken 
into captivity she suffered an intense psychological ordeal on her journey to the Indian towns.  
En route her weak child was carried off by one of their captors who returned shortly 
afterwards with its scalp hanging from his belt.  According to one of Mrs. Martin’s fellow 
captives, ‘She commenced screaming and hallooing and crying “My child! My child! My 
child!”...the Indian stepped up to her and bade her hush, but she paid no attention to him 
whatever, but still screamed and hallooed.  He then drew his butcher knife from its scabbard 
and caught her by the hair and slapped the edge of his knife against her forehead and 
hallooed, “Sculp! Sculp!” She paid no attention to him, but held perfectly still as though she 
was willing that the man might scalp or kill her and kept screaming and crying.’  Far from 
indifferent, Martin appears to have acted in a suicidal manner following the murder of her 
offspring.19 
In a similar incident, Mary Kinnan, whose family was attacked by a raiding party in 
1791, would later recall the impact the sight of her dead child had upon her.  ‘What a scene 
presented itself to me! My child; scalped and slaughtered, smiled even then.’  According to 
Kinnan, this episode ‘precipitated me to the verge of madness,’ a process which led her to 
entertain thoughts of suicide: ‘I became indifferent to my existence; I was willing to bid adieu 
to that world, whence all the lovely relatives of life were borne before me...I[’d] ha[ve] 
terminated my existence by my own hand.’20  The death of infant children, then, was certainly 
no incidental matter for many parents, a vivid contrast to the image presented by Philippe 
Ariès in his monumental study of early modern family life, Centuries of Childhood.21  Rather 
than emphasising the importance of emotional bonds between parents and children, Ariès and 
his academic successors have instead argued that the links between family members in the 
early modern period were very weak indeed.22  This idea has been developed by a number of 
subsequent historians, giving Ariès’ thesis its enduring significance.23  In particular, the works 
of Ivy Pinchbeck, Margaret Hewitt, and Edward Shorter have built upon many of Ariès vaguer 
ideas, refining both his concept and evidence methodology.  Pinchbeck and Hewitt, for 
instance, argued that particular conditions, such as high infant mortality rates, necessitated 
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19 Alder and Nelson (ed.) A History of Jonathan Alder, p. 34 
20 Kinnan True Narrative of Mary Kinnan, p. 6 
21 For the enduring significance of Ariès work see Vann ‘The Youth of Centuries of Childhood,’ pp. 279-
297 
22 Philippe Ariès Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York: Vintage 
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limited levels of bonding between children and adults whereas Shorter develops the discussion 
even further by arguing that the family unit as a whole was often, at least until the end of the 
nineteenth century, an ‘affectionless’ institution.24  The idea that family members were 
emotionally distant is exemplified by Elizabeth Badinter who came to argue that ‘at best the 
child was unimportant.  At worst, he aroused fear.’25   
In the context of American history, the ideas and concepts put forward by this group of 
largely European historians have certainly had a significant impact.  John Demos, for instance, 
reiterates Ariès basic thesis regarding the non-existence of childhood almost wholesale in his 
book, A Little Commonwealth.26  In his book, Huck’s Raft, Steven Mintz again looks to the 
concept of Ariès’ familial discontinuity in order to demonstrate the changing nature of 
childhood, but at the very least Mintz also goes so far as to argue that parents did indeed 
mourn for their dead children.27  This latter issue is one of the most important debates 
surrounding the nature of the family as a failure to mourn, or to feel, for one’s lost progeny 
would remove a massive part of the emotional drive that could, in turn, lead to significant 
personal reactions on the frontier.28  This debate, like the wider issues which surround it, has 
never been satisfactorily resolved not least because of the apparently contradictory evidence 
used by both sides to support their arguments.  It is one thing, for example, to show a source 
that appears to depict a mourning parent, but it is equally possible to demonstrate that many 
parents, particularly in colonial America, sought to raise their children first by ‘breaking [their] 
wills’ through harsh, physical punishment, an act which appears to underline parental 
distance.29   It is certainly no easy task to demonstrate consistent emotional attachments 
between parents and children but, in spite of the arguments put for forward by Ariès and 
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those who have followed in his theoretical wake, the concept of the relatively affectionless 
society has come under some significant criticism and cannot be taken as a given.30 
Indeed, accounts such as those concerning Baldwin, Kinnan and Martin immediately 
suggest that these ideas are problematic when applied in the context of the trans-Appalachian 
west.31  Of course, these examples also demonstrate that further violence was not necessarily 
a product of infanticide, but they provide reminders that the death of a child could be a 
fundamental experience in the west.32  It should also be remembered that in societies with 
strong oral traditions, stories of deeply felt losses did not exist in a vacuum and the 
experiences of even a single ordeal survivor could create strong impressions among the larger 
community.33  Perhaps adults did, as Ariès and his successors have argued, share an indifferent 
relationship with children, but as an abstract body.  Even then, however, it does not follow 
that parents viewed children individually – particularly their own – in the same manner.  Even 
Puritan parents, known for meting out harsh physical punishments, did so as a means to guide 
their children towards heaven.34  Indifference towards children may have existed in some 
instances west of the Appalachians, but the available evidence suggests it was hardly the state 
de facto.  Indeed, the fate of the country’s children was a core concern for many and was even 
used as a rallying call by the inhabitants of Jefferson County when that region became the 
focus of intensified Indian raids throughout 1786: ‘we apply to you for aid to revenge the 
injuries we have already suffered and to prevent those with which we are everyday 
threatened.  We lament the horrid occasion which subjects us to the dire necessity of applying 
to our friends to leave their peaceful abodes and enter on scenes at which humanity wou’d 
shudder, were it not in defence of the lives of ourselves, our wives and helpless infants.’35   
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In broad terms, intense investment in the wellbeing of children, primarily one’s own, 
not only distressed parents who survived their children, but also created new opportunities for 
confrontations.  When Jemima Boone along with Betsy and Fanny Calloway were kidnapped in 
1776, for instance, the investment of the girls’ parents in their wellbeing was demonstrated by 
the rescue attempt that followed.  The risks involved in their recovery – death, captivity, 
mutilation, or even being burned alive – are simply too difficult to explain away unless the girls 
were invested with a degree of genuine value.  It should be remembered that the success 
which accompanied this rescue was remarkable and it is no coincidence that these events 
would form the basis of a similar episode in James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the 
Mohicans several decades later.36  Put simply, the settlers who embarked upon this rescue had 
everything to lose by doing so and, as such, their actions reflect the true value invested in 
these captives.  Indeed, Daniel Boone was so desperate to have his daughter returned to him 
that he did not stop long enough to put on moccasins before setting off to recover her whilst 
Richard Calloway’s very public concern for his daughters’ wellbeing likewise reflected the 
importance of the parent-child bond as a driving force behind their recovery.37  
Attempts to recover captive family members were not unusual and though such 
episodes often ended in tragedy they nevertheless highlight the importance of the family 
bond.38  For most settlers the capture of a family member by the Indians was probably one of 
the most distressing outcomes of the war.  Rather than being presented with a body, survivors 
could potentially expect to spend years not knowing whether their family had survived, or 
whether or not they had been converted into white Indians.39  This was the situation in which 
Israel Hartgrove found himself after his family was decimated by an Indian raid.  Having failed 
in his attempt to rescue his children, Israel thus spent years attempting to uncover their fate, 
the type of action one would not expect from someone indifferent to their offspring.  Indeed, 
Hartgrove would not be reunited with one of his children, a son, until he attended a treaty 
negotiation two decades later to see if the boy, who was now fully grown, was ‘yet living.’  
Even when the younger Hartgrove was returned to Israel, the family did not remain together 
long as the young man, by now far more attached to his Indian acquaintances than his long-
lost father, returned to the tribes.  Even this, however, did not prevent Israel from continuing 
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to seek out news of his estranged son’s wellbeing.  Eventually he was able to discover that his 
boy resided safely among the Potawatomie.40 
During the two decades Israel spent hunting for his son, he must have faced the 
possibility that his boy had been killed by his captors.  Like many others in a similar situation, 
what compounded this possibility was the settlers’ cultural knowledge of their adversary; had 
he been killed by the Indians it was entirely possible that the younger Hartgrove’s end would 
have been a protracted, living horror.  One can only speculate whether or not Israel was 
haunted by the thought of William Crawford and his bad death in 1782, for instance.  Had the 
thought of his son’s fate among the Indians given Hartgrove sleepless nights, Mary 
Rowlandson would probably have been able to identify with such post-raid hardships.41  But 
even if Crawford’s ghost never bothered Israel’s thoughts, the settlers had a wide cultural 
knowledge of Indian wartime practices which almost certainly underpinned Hartgrove’s 
perspective of his son’s fate.  For more than a century and a half, captivity narratives had 
helped to lay a cultural foundation upon which Indian wartime atrocities could be understood 
but, more importantly, the fundamentally oral nature of backcountry culture meant that tales 
from across the frontier were able to spread far, becoming a fundamental part of how the 
settlers understood their enemies.  Tom McQueen, for instance, was taken captive on William 
Crawford’s ill fated campaign and made to run the gauntlet, an experience he freely shared 
with others.  According to his brother, ‘There was not a sound place in his head when he got 
through.’42  The idea that captured settlers were burned alive, mistreated, or murdered was 
not an uncommon one.43 
The bond between parent and child, then, was one worth fighting for, particularly as 
the settlers fostered a strong impression as to what might occur to their children if captured; 
less abstract than a fear of captivity was the knowledge that the a child’s age would not 
necessarily offer them protection from a raiding party.  Indeed, numerous accounts of 
murdered children were delivered to oral historians, though there is no real way to tell how 
many children ultimately became victims of Indian attacks.  In some ways, however, that 
number is not important.  What was important was the settlers’ practice of integrating tales of 
infanticide into their oral tradition, allowing accounts of even a few such incidents to become 
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core components of their larger world view.44  The murder of Captain Guess’ young daughter 
in 1782, for instance, may or may not be indicative of a wave of child murders on the frontier, 
but it was, nevertheless, a story repeated time and again by the settlers, evidence in their eyes 
that the only way to ensure the security of one’s offspring was through the defeat of those 
who might threaten them.45   
In a similar way, the threat posed by the Indians to marital partners was equally 
important to the development of society across the trans-Appalachian west.  Like parents and 
children, spouses were often connected by bonds of affection which could, when threatened 
or broken, form the basis of future attitudes towards the Indians.  The relationship between 
husband and wife did not necessarily evolve from a close personal connection, nor did it 
necessarily result in the development of one.46  There is, however, a significant amount of 
evidence which suggests that, in Kentucky and other western regions, there was, first, a bond 
of affection between many marital partners and that, secondly, the breaking or endangerment 
of that bond could have a fundamental impact upon the surviving spouse.  When an injured 
Alexander McConnell returned after having gone missing in the wilderness for several days, 
such a bond was demonstrated when ‘His wife ran out to meet him, but they had to carry her 
in, [as] she fainted away, overjoyed.’47  Sally Wilcox had something of an even more distressing 
experience when she watched her new husband, Daniel, being chased by a party of Indians.  
Apparently terrified that she might lose him, she had cried out to him ‘Run, Daniel, Run!’ 
Hoping to will her husband to safety, Wilcox had ‘hallooed to him as hard as she could.’  
According to one witness of this event, Sally ‘hadn’t been long married and she didn’t want to 
lose him.’48  Similarly, when John Hayden went missing on a hunting trip one of his wife’s 
companions noted that she ‘looked like she would go distracted,’ from worry.49 
Although not the focus of most documents, the reflexive responses shown by many 
settlers to the news that their partner had been killed are a source unto themselves which 
helps to shed much light upon the type of relationships that existed between married partners 
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in this region.  When Mrs. Brown was brought the body of her dead husband she ‘examined 
him over very carefully, fondly, at first without a tear.  Then suddenly [she] gave way to her 
grief.’50  Brown’s sorrow at the death of her husband was not merely the expression of a 
woman who had lost a provider, but the outward expression of a woman who had lost 
something far more important.  The wife of John Smith acted in a similar manner when she 
was delivered the news that her husband had been killed.  According to Doctor Louis Marshall, 
who was present with Smith when she received the news, ‘she gave the most piercing shriek 
that I ever heard.’51  When Michael Mitchell was shot and killed by the Indians, his wife 
appears to have dealt with the loss in stages by first letting it be known that ‘she was very 
thankful [the Indians] had not shot him in the eye,’ and later that ‘she would rather they killed 
her cow, “Pretty.”’  Although the comparison to the cow may appear crude at first glance, Mrs. 
Mitchell was in actuality demonstrating to her contemporaries that Michael had been the 
most important thing in her life.  Her neighbour, Joseph Ficklin, understood this well as he 
witnessed her express her anguish physically by ‘lamenting and wringing her hands’ 
afterwards.52  Such emotional turmoil was not necessarily a short term of fleeting concern; 
following William Christian’s death in 1786, his newly widowed wife retired from the frontier 
with their children but future happiness was elusive.  Mrs. Christian’s health deteriorated 
rapidly in the east leading one contemporary, Judge Campbell, to remark that ‘he had never 
known weakness in her before.’ In order to explain her ever worsening condition, Campbell 
went on to note that ‘her grieving for her husband,’ was so intense that it was beginning to 
‘injure her health.’  Whether a reasonable medical explanation or not, Campbell essentially 
attributed her death shortly afterwards to a broken heart.53  
Fear for one’s spouse was thus an important component of many frontier marriages.  
Fear of separation through death or captivity were realities that had to be dealt with and 
assimilated into world views but, significantly, these interpersonal realties were shared with 
the Indians.  Although it is easy to emphasise the difference between them during this period, 
the interpersonal worlds of the settlers and Indians demonstrate a considerable degree of 
overlap.  Race, the political landscape, economic factors, cultural hatred, and contention over 
landownership have been used by historians such as Woody Holton, John Mack Faragher, Eric 
Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall to frame the war on the trans-Appalachian frontier.54  This 
conflict was not, however, one driven purely by difference.  Indeed, it was the similarities 
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between the Indians’ and the settlers’ interpersonal worlds that formed the background for 
much of the everyday fighting that defined the war.  As with sources which deal primarily with 
the settlers, some of the most vivid evidence for the existence of emotional family connections 
appears where those bonds were threatened or broken.  In his account of Henry Bouquet’s 
1764 expedition into Ohio, William Smith described in vivid detail an emotional prisoner 
exchange following the conclusion of Pontiac’s Rebellion.  According to Smith, the Indians ‘as if 
wholly forgetting their usual savageness, bore a capital part in heightening this most affecting 
scene.’55   
Prisoners of war they may have been, but the relationship between captor and captive 
was never straight forward in the aboriginal world.  As the lives of Mary Jemison and John 
Tanner demonstrate, it was entirely possible for white captives to fully participate in the Indian 
sphere, not as captives, but as equals.56  Accordingly, Smith recognised not just the joyful 
reunification of settler families – ‘father and mothers [were to be seen] recognising and 
clasping their once-lost babies; husbands hanging around the necks of their newly recovered 
wives; sisters and brothers unexpectedly meeting together after a long separation’ – but the 
decimation of equally potent relationships between the Indians and their onetime captives.  
‘They delivered up their beloved captives with the utmost reluctance,’ Smith would write 
shortly after this incident, ‘shed[ing] torrents of tears over them, recommending them to the 
care and protection of the commanding officer.’  In short, the former captives were 
‘accompanied with...all the marks of the most sincere and tender affection.’57  Indeed, many of 
the Indians followed the army after it departed, supplying their adoptive family members with 
game which they hunted on their behalf.  In one particularly potent instance, a Mingo warrior, 
who ‘would make a figure even in romance,’ refused to abandon the army – and his now 
redeemed Virginian wife – even as they neared the settlements.  ‘Against all remonstrances of 
the imminent danger,’ Smith would later write, this Indian strove to fulfil his ‘instance of love,’ 
in spite of the ‘risk of being killed by the surviving relations of many unfortunate persons, who 
had been captived or scalped by those in his nation.’58   
All at once Smith made one of the most astute observations of the late colonial period, 
recognising the link between familial bonds and the desire to attain physical revenge.  
Moreover, Smith’s vantage point at the prisoner exchange had given him a much sharper 
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understanding of the tragedy of the larger situation; unlike most of those who had lost or 
suffered at Indian hands, Smith had been granted an opportunity to recognise in the Indians 
the same level of familial affection which he recognised among his own people.  Reflecting 
upon the sheer level of devotion he had witnessed during the prisoner exchange, Smith would 
write that ‘Those qualities in savages challenge our just esteem.  They should make us 
charitably consider their barbarities as the effects of wrong education, and false notions of 
bravery and heroism...Cruel and unmerciful as they are, by habit and long example, in war, yet 
whenever they come to give way to the native dictates of humanity, they exercise virtues 
which Christians need not blush to imitate.’59   
Or, to put it another way, Smith recognised that the settlers and Indians shared a 
common method of building, maintaining and engaging with their families.  Moreover, this 
recognition demonstrated to Smith a common ground of humanity even as he recognised the 
power of broken emotional bonds to spark demands for retribution.  For Smith, the affection 
between husband and wife, or between parent and child, was self evident.  Among the 
Shawnee, he noted that some prisoners – particularly women – had to be bound and forced to 
return to the settlers.  It appears, however, that the affection which some of them maintained 
for their Indian husbands won out the day; ‘some women, who had been delivered up, 
afterwards found means to escape and run back to the Indian towns.  Some, who could not 
make their escape, clung to their savage acquaintances at parting, and continued for many 
days in bitter lamentations, even refusing sustenance.’60  Indian or settler, familial bonds 
mattered.  It drove individuals to cross cultural divides, to estrange themselves from the 
society into which they were born, whilst inspiring others still to seek physical revenge.   
In a similar vein, Indians demonstrated attitudes towards their children that were not 
dissimilar to those demonstrated by the settlers.61  The tribes of the Ohio country may have 
lacked their own Shane or Draper, but they were observed, measured, and judged by the 
federal government during the early nineteenth century and even these later – often highly 
racist – observations serve to reinforce the idea that strong bonds tied Indian parents to their 
offspring.62  Although confirmed in his racial view of the world, and hence the Indians, Henry R. 
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Schoolcraft, in his governmental study of the Algonquin peoples in the mid-nineteenth 
century, went so far as to argue that the presence of strong family ties among the Indians was 
such that it was ‘proof...that the obligations of the [family] tie...are inherent in the nature of 
human society, and were implanted in the breast of man to uphold the laws of purity and 
virtue.’  Making this point even more bluntly, Schoolcraft argued that ‘It is this trait, indeed, 
that disarms barbarism of half its repulsiveness, and gives to this erratic and benighted branch 
of the species, their best claims to our sympathies and benevolence.’63  Schoolcraft 
emphasised the relationship between parent and child among the Indians, relaying in his work 
a tradition which underlined the sheer depth of emotion that bound the Indian family 
together.  According to the tradition passed on to Schoolcraft, the seventeenth century war 
between the Fox and Chippewas resulted in the capture of a young man named Bi-ans-wah, 
the son of an ‘aged chief of the Chippewas.’  Upon discovering his son’s fate, Bi-ans-wah’s 
father set off for the Fox town where he arrived in time to witness the construction of the fire 
which was intended to ‘roast [his son] alive.’  According to tradition, Bi-ans-wah’s father 
‘stepped boldly’ into the village of his enemies where he delivered a speech which convinced 
the town’s inhabitants to place him, not his son, upon the fire; Bi-ans-wah was thus saved from 
the flame by the sacrifice of his father.  According to Schoolcraft ‘Such are the severities of 
savage warfare, amidst which the family tie is maintained with a heroism which has no parallel 
in civilized life.’64 
For the settlers acts of paternal devotion, even among their enemies, could become 
the stuff of legend or, at least, oral tradition.  The sacrifice of an Indian father during Josiah 
Harmar’s campaign against the northern tribes in 1790, for instance, would be described by 
one witness as ‘heroism and devotion not more than equalled, I think, by any thing of the kind 
to be met with in Greek or Roman story.’65  For the most part such recognition was possible 
because acts of parental or communal devotion reflected many of the settlers own values, a 
series of ideas and interpersonal connections which bound not only the family, but non-related 
members of the community as well.  Platonic companionship may have lacked the ties of blood 
and kinship which underlined connections within the family but the close quarter contact 
demanded by life within the country’s fortified towns – or between those fighting to survive in 
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the wilderness – helped to negate any such deficit.66  Indeed, the relationships forged between 
non-related settlers could be intensely close, rivalling and possibly even surpassing some of 
those between family members.67  When Neely McGuire was shot and killed in the wilderness 
‘T’was said,’ his friend, John Cocky Owings, ‘cried powerfully about it.’  Emotional ties may be 
easily cultivated within the family but they could also be cultivated among other social groups 
and, on the frontier, those bonds often served to define companionship.  When John Owings 
cried for the loss of McGuire, he was demonstrating the depth of the bonds which could bind 
non-related individuals.  Blood may be thicker than water, but it was not necessarily thicker 
than the connections which the settlers forged amongst themselves.68 
Whether the groups were comprised of men, women, or even mixed gender bands, 
the realities of frontier life demanded that non-related settlers spend extended periods of 
time together, very often in close contact with one another.69  For many men, time spent in ad 
hoc militia bands pursuing Indians was often the theatre in which their bonds were forged, 
whilst for most women it was the close contact afforded by fortified settlements, particularly 
when the men of a given town were away hunting Indians, which helped to facilitate their non-
familial connections.70  Even these rules, however, were not hard and fast.  Thrust closer 
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together by circumstance and a limited geographic space, men and women were able to forge 
meaningful platonic friendships within the confines of the frontier town.  There was, for 
example, nothing sexual in the relationship between Billy Rayburn and the wife of William 
Clinkenbeard, but that did not stop Mrs. Clinkenbeard from spending several hours picking ‘a 
great many thorns out of him’ after an angry buffalo had chased Rayburn through a patch of 
honey locust.71  Similarly, when Simon Kenton appeared on the doorstep of the Boone 
household in 1809, years after their shared experiences in Kentucky, Daniel’s wife, overjoyed 
at the sight of him, kissed their old compatriot without reservation.  Rumor of an alleged affair 
with one of Daniel’s brothers notwithstanding, there is no reason to suspect that this gesture 
was anything but evidence of a long, enduring, and important friendship.72  When Mrs. 
Shankin’s father first arrived in Kentucky in 1775 he was aware of only four women in the 
entire country and, through necessity and close contact, became closely acquainted with them 
during the time he spent at Harrodsburgh.  As it turned out, four women was the minimum 
number of female participants required to carry out a four handed reel.  Whilst the excess 
number of men at the fort watched for Indians, ‘the rest alternatively danced,’ with the town’s 
women ignoring, for a time, the escalating threat posed by the growing war.   
Of course, such close contact very often led to opportunities for courtship and 
marriage, allowing one social structure to develop from another.  When John McIntyre led a 
company to defend Strode’s Station one of the town’s women made a point of thanking him 
for the security he and his men had been able to offer; ‘Oh, said he, you have no need to thank 
me.’  Turning to one of his companions, he confessed, ‘she may be my wife yet.’  The pair did 
indeed marry some short time later.73  The possibility of a romantic entanglement or marriage 
was certainly present when men and women spent any amount of time together in the close 
quarters of a frontier fort but relationships which spanned genders did not need to have a 
sexual component.  Just as William Clinkenbeard’s wife did what she could to relieve Billy 
Rayburn of the thorns he had accumulated in his person following a chase by a buffalo, so too 
did other settlers, regardless of gender, attempt to offer one another relief from the outside 
world without sexual expectation.  It was in this communal spirit that Daniel Boone once gave 
a tract of land to a girl who had recently been orphaned and, presumably, left with little or 
nothing else to her name.74   
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The community, then, was informed by the existence of a significant interpersonal 
network, a reality which meant that the death of a given settler could affect very larger 
numbers, even entire townships.  When John Wymore was shot and scalped outside of 
McConnell’s Station all those within the fort shared similar feelings when his fate became 
known to them.  When the town’s women began to cry they did so because they were all 
enduring the same ordeal, and when Wymore’s body was retrieved they, along with the 
town’s men, gathered around his remains in a spontaneous show of communal upset and 
solidarity.  Wymore was always a popular man, but his death demonstrated just how deeply 
the community could be affected when one of their own met their end at Indian hands.  Those 
who shed tears for Wymore did not need ties of blood, or connections through past sexual 
relationships to mourn his passing.  There may be no mention of the town’s men crying, but 
one did, with ruthless efficiency, succeed in killing one of Wymore’s Indian assailants.  One can 
only speculate whether there was a similar outpouring of loss or emotion when this Indian’s 
social networks learned that the invading settlers had taken his life.75   
In a very real sense platonic bonds shared a close, self-sustaining relationship with the 
frontier war.  On the one hand they created new opportunities for violence whilst, on the 
other, they were reinforced or expanded by the existence of such confrontations.  Even long 
running feuds, a phenomenon that would later become an important feature of life not only in 
Kentucky but across the far west, could be challenged, ended, or reversed by the impact of the 
war with the Indians.76  Though ‘bitter enemies,’ Michael Warnock and a man named Warner 
saw their prior relationship turned upon its head during the calamitous Blue Licks affair when 
Warner risked his life to save the exhausted and overcome Warnock from the Indians.  
Unwilling to leave his onetime adversary defenceless and virtually unable to move upon the 
field, Warner first ‘told him to get on his horse behind him,’ but when sheer exhaustion 
prevented Warnock from even accomplishing this, Walker – in spite of the danger he was 
placing himself in – ‘then got down and pulled him up,’ onto his horse, an action which allowed 
both men to make their escape from the field.  After the battle had come to its disastrous end 
the two men became ‘good friends.’77   
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Although not enemies to start with, an ‘old soldier’ and one Captain Madison became 
friends following a similar episode during St. Clair’s defeat in 1791.  Wounded in the arm, 
Captain Madison was attempting to make his escape on foot from a band of pursuing Indians 
when the soldier ‘said to him, “Capt. You must get on and ride this horse.”’  Madison, 
however, was suffering from ‘the loss of blood’ he had incurred from a wound he had 
sustained and was thus unable to haul himself onto the animal’s back.  The old soldier 
accordingly dismounted in order to help the captain onto his horse before retaking his place on 
the animal and spurring it away from the field.  The pair’s escape was so desperate that the 
soldier’s switches quickly ‘gave out,’ forcing him to instead use his hat to spur the animal to its 
fullest speed.  In the years that followed this rescue, Captain Madison would attempt to repay 
this act by continually bailing the ‘old soldier’ out jail and even paying off a number of his 
debts when they threatened to overwhelm him; ‘If he could not go and help him out when he 
was in distress, he would send down one that could.’78   
The development of such fraternal bonds in combat situations was nothing new and 
has been identified throughout the colonial period by Stephen Brumwell in his study of British 
redcoats.  Although Brumwell does not argue that interpersonal relationships directly inspired 
violence – the redcoats were, after all, subject to the whims of a strict hierarchy in way that 
the settlers of Kentucky were not – he does demonstrate that the bonds shared by soldiers did 
much to inspire a sense of communal purpose; the soldiers fought not because they were 
coerced, but for the sake of their companions.79  This fraternal system was not unique to the 
army but developed in other contexts, particularly on the frontier where common enemies 
and common problems mirrored the issues faced by those on His Majesty’s payroll.  In a 
broader sense, such fraternal obligation had already been established as a feature of early 
modern thought and, though it may be unlikely that Captain Madison, his rescuer, Michael 
Warnock, and Mr. Walker were all well versed in the works of William Shakespeare, it appears 
that all would have been able to identify with the words placed by the bard into the mouth of 
Henry V; ‘We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; For he to-day that sheds his blood with 
me Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile, This day shall gentle his condition.’80  
Companionship was a system that was capable of spanning significant divisions and, 
though uncommon, this same system did – on a few occasions – result in the development of 
real and meaningful relationships between some settlers and some Indians.81  When Moses 
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McIlvaine was attacked and kidnapped by the Shawnee in 1779 his initial experiences were so 
bad that it hardly seems possible that he would have been able to develop any kind of 
meaningful relationship with any Indian in the future.  Between being forced to run the 
gauntlet and suffering through a series of other physical hardships there is every reason to 
suspect that his attitude towards the Indians would have followed a similar trajectory to that 
of most other settlers.  Indeed, throughout his time with the Shawnee it appears that this was 
very much the case, but upon being sold to the British at Detroit McIlvaine made an 
acquaintance with an Indian to whom he appealed on an emotional level.  McIlvaine informed 
the Indian that ‘he was very much troubled in his mind,’ having, as he did, a wife and child who 
‘he never expected to see any more.’82 
Sympathetic to McIlvaine’s plight, but canny enough to understand his position of 
power, the Indian inquired of the captive how much he would be paid if he aided his escape.  
Promised £100, the Indian made preparations to smuggle the settler out of Detroit, promising 
that he would escort him back to Kentucky.  During their journey, the pair grew closer and on 
several occasions McIlvaine’s Indian companion hid the settler from several very large parties 
of Shawnee Indians who were, at that time, en route to sack Martin’s and Ruddle’s Stations.  
Upon their arrival at Fort Pitt the Indian was paid by the ‘commissary...£20...for his troubles’ 
but McIlvaine assured his companion that if he helped him to complete the final leg of his 
journey to Kentucky ‘he wo’d still give him the £100, and if he wo’d stay with him, he wo’d 
maintain him, a gentleman, his lifetime.’  Although it may have been money that inspired the 
Indian to aid McIlvaine in the first place, he showed little interest in it once the pair had arrived 
Fort Pitt.  Indeed, when McIlvaine set off alone on the final leg of his journey, they ‘shook 
hands...[and] the Indian shed tears & cried.’  Perhaps if the Indian’s belief that ‘the white man 
wo’d kill him,’ was not so well founded, he may have taken McIlvaine up on his offer.83   
The relationship that developed between McIlvaine and his Indian companion was 
exceptional.  Few settlers from Kentucky ever developed a significant bond with any of the 
northern Indians, at least during the war.  Instead their experiences as adversaries tended to 
drive the two cultures deeper into their own company.  The bonds that existed between the 
settlers were powerful and, when broken through combat, often led them to seek revenge 
from any Indian or Indian collaborator they could find.  When a group of settlers chased a party 
of raiders who had stolen some horses from Strode’s Station, for instance, they were shocked 
to discover a German among the Indians.  Probably a converted captive, the Kentuckians 
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treated him as they would any other captured Indian and though he cried out ‘O, don’t kill me,’ 
the recent deaths of two of Michael Cassidy’s closest friends led this man to shout at his 
compatriots ,‘Damn it rain it into him.’84  
 Although Cassidy’s demand that an unarmed prisoner, begging for mercy be run 
through with a sword appears to be an action filled with hate (which it probably was), it was 
must also be recognised that at its most fundamental level it was one fuelled by the recent loss 
of his companions.  Parties such as that to which Cassidy belonged shared a close physical and 
– often – emotional space; when James Lane led a similar band in pursuit of an Indian raiding 
party, he had been laying ‘spoon fashion,’ huddled for warmth, with William Clifton when he 
was shot.  Far from being able to forget this incident, however, Lane was reminded of the loss 
whenever he encountered Clifton’s widow: ‘she always burst out crying, whenever she saw 
me.’85  Although it is often convenient to conceptualise and describe the settlers of the frontier 
as ‘Indian haters,’ this should not be done without a considerable degree of qualification.  
Setting aside the loaded racial connotations of this phrase for a moment, this description fails 
to hint at the complexity of the emotions that governed settler-Indian interactions.  In reality, 
many on the frontier probably did hate the Indians, but that hate was the product of the 
affection they held for one another.   
 For all of the blood spilled on the frontier, for all of the relationships that were broken, 
it is vital that historians remember that what gave these deaths meaning was the closeness 
people shared in life.  Clifton was connected not only to his wife through a strong emotional 
tie, but to his companions and, likely, any other relatives who lived in the vicinity.86  It can be 
easy to forget when one studies the impact of violence upon the frontier that the settlers 
revelled in one another’s company, enhancing their lives and bringing joy to each another.  
Through the comfort offered by two men huddled together against the elements, or the 
pleasure taken from dancing a four handed reel, the settlers formed for themselves a myriad of 
connections which the unfolding frontier war constantly threatened.  The presence of violence, 
however, never reduced the capacity of the settlers to feel joy and comfort in one another’s 
company but instead served to underline and inform their need to seek revenge or to carry out 
vendettas.   
The last years of the Revolution had been particularly brutal and, by the time peace had 
been declared, neither those south of the Ohio River, nor their adversaries to the north, wished 
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to perpetuate the sentiments written on a scrap of paper in Paris.  They simply did not apply in 
the west.  Both the settlers and the Indians continued to fight one another and, of course, 
landownership was an ever divisive issue but, at the individual level the emotional fallout of 
prior fighting played a major role in motivating many to fight in the future.  Like the Indians, the 
settlers chose individually when and where to apply themselves militarily.87   It is thus vitally 
important to understand the everyday forces that motivated them to fight.  Some did indeed 
fight for land but, at best, this was an abstraction.  On an everyday basis the settlers instead 
fought to defend, or avenge, the connections and relationships which meant so much to them.  
Within the family, bonds could be intensely close but so too were those between many non-
related members of the community.  In his study of the Whiskey Rebellion, Thomas Slaughter 
argued that westerners ‘prided themselves on their inhumanity,’ but such statements, in 
addition to being chronically loaded, are fundamentally misleading.88  In the telling words of 
one child who reported the capture of its siblings to its mother, ‘Mamma, the Indians have 
been here and stolen all your sugar.’89 
 
Closure 
With the end of the American Revolution in 1783, the situation in the west was thrown into 
sharp relief.  On the one hand the Treaty of Paris brought the conflict between the United 
States and Great Britain to an end but, on the other, fighting in areas such as Kentucky 
continued with little slowdown.90  This situation raises one of the most important questions 
concerning the trans-Appalachian region: if the American Revolution came to an end in 1783 – 
or, 1781 in the east – why did the settlers continue to fight? In many ways historians have 
sidestepped this question by dividing the war in this theatre into smaller, more manageable 
conflicts; Dunmore’s War, the American Revolution, and the Northwest War.91  Chronological 
gaps, 1775 and 1783-1785, have been identified by historians which, when coupled peace 
treaties, ostensibly justify these divisions but, when studied from the bottom-up, these gaps in 
the fighting reveal themselves to be nothing of the sort.  To be sure, the American Revolution 
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came to an end in 1783, but the war fought in the west, always more than a colonial rebellion, 
did not.  There were certainly Tories, Patriots, disaffected, and disinterested settlers 
throughout the region but the war against the Indians was not necessarily a product of this 
larger struggle.  Without any doubt, the American Revolution certainly took place in the west 
but so too did a concurrent war with the Indians which would continue long past the 
transformation of the colonies into states.  It is crucial, then, to understand why the settlers – 
and Indians – continued to fight.  Clearly their goals were not limited to those of Revolutionary 
politics alone.  As was demonstrated in chapter four of this thesis, the drive for revenge and 
retribution by both communities was a key factor in the continuing momentum of the war.  
Understanding the drive for revenge, however, can only be framed appropriately when the 
sheer significance of the family and other social networks is analysed.  Interpersonal bonds on 
the frontier were incredibly powerful and the threat or destruction of them set in motion a 
series of opportunities for further conflict. 
It can be easy for historians to fall back upon the Indian-hater label to explain the 
perpetuation of the war but, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, that concept fails to 
accurately reflect the settlers as a social group.  Among both the settlers and Indians there 
existed a common type of dedication to families, communities, and compatriots which 
provided the fuel for countless vendettas and confrontations.  Rather than framing the settlers 
and Indians as different cultures, able to engage peaceably only when a common or middle 
ground of shared motivation existed between them, it is important to recognise that these two 
groups shared some key cultural similarities.  Indeed, it is crucial that the significance of these 
shared world views be understood.  Put simply, the settlers and Indians fought not because of 
the ideas and perceptions which divided them, but because of the cultural and social overlap 
which united them.  Both of the societies who met in Kentucky placed significant value upon 
their individual members, emphasising links of kin and friendship.  The breaking of these bonds 
– or the perceived threat that this might come about – was a potent driving force behind much 
of the fighting, providing a plethora of individuals on both sides with ample motivation to carry 
the war forward.  Kentucky may be celebrated for its vicious nineteenth century feuds – such as 
that which occurred between the Hatfields and McCoys in the 1880s and 1890s – but in many 
ways the war with the Indians in the late eighteenth century was by far the most expansive 
example of this type of western intercourse.92  To put it another way, the war for the trans-
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Appalachian west was probably the largest, most expansive blood feud in North American 
history.   
As already stated, conflict over land ownership and larger trans-national struggles – 
such as the American Revolution – certainly played a role in shaping this war but, at its most 
fundamental level, the continuing conflict in the west was a product primarily of the settlers’ 
and Indians’ making, a reaction based upon the value each society placed upon its individual 
members.  The engine which drove the frontier war was neither political nor economic.  It was 
instead something far more human; the drive to protect, to avenge, and to cherish.  To be sure, 
cultural differences certainly played a role.  Few settlers ever came to recognise that the 
Indians’ practice of ritualised torture provided a retributive safety valve for the tribes.  
Fundamentally, however, the need for such a safety valve was no different from the process 
which drove the settlers to seek their, unlimited, version of the same.  Whatever the political 
forces acting at the time, the settlers and Indians were driven to fight by a common set of 
ground-up social forces which inspired violence, demanded conflict, and encouraged 
retribution.  These forces also shared an active relationship with society creating combat 
fraternities,  long term cross-gender friendships, and underlining the need of family and kin 
networks to stand together in order to fight, defend and, at times, rescue one another.  To be 
sure, the greatest impact social structures such as the family had upon the frontier war came 
when they were broken; it should be remembered that the relationship between violence and 
society was a dynamic one, each informing the other.  Rather than creating a state of social 
fatalism, however, the violence of the frontier war instead created conditions which promoted 
close interpersonal contact, just as a significant interpersonal network formed the basis upon 
which many future acts of violence would occur.  Such a force, however, was not left untapped 
or free from manipulation.  Although the United States government would struggle to impose 
peace upon its western frontier throughout much of the 1780s, the sheer potency of the forces 
acting in this region meant that the subjugation of the masses to the will of the few was never 
a practical or easily attainable goal.  By the mid-1780s, however, the desire of the government 
to exert control over the western lands ceded to it by Britain at the end of the Revolution came 
into alignment with the drive of the settlers already in the region.  How those forces were 
manipulated to suit the government’s ultimate ends will be the subject of the following 
chapter.
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Chapter Six 
 
Making the Most of War 
 
The sound of musket balls flying back and forth across the frontier echoed through the halls of 
Congress.  Throughout the 1780s the United States had attempted, through a series of peace 
initiatives and treaties, to bring the war on the frontier to a close whilst simultaneously 
securing vast tracts of the Ohio country for sale and settlement.  For all their efforts, however, 
the government found that the situation in the west was simply beyond their control.  Peace 
may have been obtained with the British, but the true contest for the trans-Appalachian region 
had never been settled.  In spite of any and all hopes to the contrary, the frontier war had 
continued unabated since the end of the American Revolution, a situation which highlighted 
the very real dichotomy between political perspective and intercultural reality.  On the one 
hand the United States was ostensibly at peace.  No declarations of war had been issued since 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris and it was to matters of internal politics and nation building, 
rather than the ongoing struggles with the Indians, that the majority of the political élite 
turned their attention.1  On the other hand, the people of the frontier lived in a very different 
                                                            
1 The period between the end of the Revolution and the adoption of the constitution was something of a 
grey area for the western territories who received attention from the east not because of their ongoing 
war with the Indians, but because of the contentious issue of which state (or indeed, Congress) could 
claim supremacy in the region.  Virginia, with its claims to not only Kentucky but to lands north of the 
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and the northern tribes.  At the very least the true extent of the continuing hostilities was obscured by 
the idea of peace and western expansion.  Even historians tend to describe the period between 1775 
and 1794 as being afflicted by two very separate conflicts; the War of Independence (1775-1783) and 
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These six years, however, were far from a violence free vacuum. Nor is it particularly appropriate to 
describe the conflicts which bookend these years as distinct entities.  True, from a political perspective 
there is some justification for this, but from a bottom up analysis the apparent gap which these two 
wars bookend becomes far more problematic.  In short, the west was dominated by a continuous war 
lasting until the middle of the 1790s, something which many eastern contemporaries (and historians) 
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reality to those same eastern politicians and policy makers.  Since the disastrous events of 
1782, the war upon the frontier had shown, at best, only a momentary lapse in intensity 
before returning to its prior potency.2  Politicians may have arranged for the sovereignty of 
Ohio to be transferred from Virginia to congress in 1784, but the Indians who lived in the 
region had fought to ensure that this domain of paper remained just that.  This division 
between eastern political fantasy and western reality highlights a divide between those who 
claimed political power, and those who lived upon the periphery of the nation.  Whatever the 
actions or plans fostered by the political élite during the early years of the republic, the settlers 
and Indians of the trans-Appalachian west marched to the beat of their own particular drum.3  
A potentially alarming development, the divide between west and east – something which 
would ultimately culminate with the Whiskey Rebellion of 1795 – also presented a distinct 
opportunity for the government.  Although they hoped to open the Ohio country to settlement 
via peaceful means, the sheer voracity of the settlers’ desire to fight Indians was a potent and 
powerful tool which could be employed to achieve that same end following the failure of the 
peace process in the 1780s.  The ongoing conflict in the west may have placed western settlers 
and eastern power brokers at odds, but it could and would be manipulated to serve 
government’s larger agenda in the Ohio Valley. 
Over the course of this chapter it will be demonstrated that the anti-Indian sentiment 
generated by the war with the Indians was a valuable commodity which was used and 
manipulated by those in positions of power as a means to achieve their particular ends – the 
acquisition of Ohio and the exertion of authority in the west – throughout the late 1780s and 
1790s.  A common feature throughout the 1770s and into the 1780s, fear and resentment of 
the Indians allowed settlers with strong reputations as Indian fighters or expert woodsmen to 
gather increasing levels of power and influence.4  Following the end of the American 
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Revolution those same forces retained much of their potency.  Indeed, as the war continued so 
too did anti-Indian sentiment among the settlers continue to build but, rather than take 
advantage of this force, the United States’ government had instead struggled against it in an 
attempt to secure lands north of the Ohio River through peaceable means.  By the end of that 
decade, however, the failure of the government’s non-violent attempt to usurp the Indians 
forced a change of approach to the Ohio question; with no way of gaining the region peaceably 
the United States needed an army capable of fighting the Indians.  Rather than attempting to 
hold back anti-Indian sentiment in the region the government instead started to take 
advantage of it, drawing upon communal animosity, frustration, and fear in order to furnish 
armies for a number of major expeditions against the Indians.  Having forced a continuation of 
the fighting, the settlers were, in turn, used to ensure that the government’s larger agenda in 
the Ohio Valley was secured by the ongoing violence.  In this way the government was able to 
use the attitudes and world views created and shaped by the war in order to advance two of 
its key interests; the acquisition of Ohio from the Indians and the expression of meaningful 
authority in the west. 
Although the United States spent most of the 1780s attempting to avoid a renewed 
war with the Indians, their desire for tribal lands ultimately trumped their desire for peace.5  
Fear and resentment, two inseparable forces, were the devices which the government and it 
supporters would use in order to steer an otherwise hostile and non-conformist settler 
population down their chosen path in the 1790s.  The government may have aspired to impose 
peace upon the west but their motivation for doing so was hardly altruistic.  Following the end 
of the American Revolution, Ohio had come to represent one of the new nation’s best hopes 
of recouping the massive costs of the Revolutionary War.  Avoiding an Indian war in the region 
would thus serve two purposes; first it would avoid the significant cost of yet another conflict 
whilst, simultaneously, it was hoped, the signing of peace treaties would open up lands in Ohio 
for sale and settlement, or as James Madison put it, such a plan would effectively serve to 
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transform the ‘Western territory [into] a mine of vast wealth.’6  Unfortunately for the 
government, the situation on the ground was such that it simply could not fulfil this aspiration 
through non-violent means.  Too many settlers and Indians were simply unwilling to cease 
their hostilities.7  As demonstrated in chapters four and five, a potent system of highly 
personalised vendettas was continuing to drive conflict in this region forward.  The 
government – along with tribal leaders – certainly attempted to impose peace upon the 
frontier but many settlers and Indians were being driven by forces far more powerful than the 
wishes of their political masters; the forces unleashed by the war had effectively served to 
radicalise significant numbers on both sides of the frontier.  As the 1780s progressed it became 
increasingly obvious that the government could not hope to restrain western settlers in their 
war against the Indians, just as Indian chiefs who aspired to re-establish peace in the region 
could not hope to restrain those members of their community dedicated to the fight.  Indeed, 
by promoting peace with the Indians in the 1780s, the government appeared to mirror the 
perceived attitude of the British in the 1760s, promoting the interests of the tribes ahead of 
those of their own people.8   
To transform this situation, fear, animosity, and anti-Indian sentiment proved to be 
powerful tools.  Even before the outbreak of the Revolution, earlier political élites such as Lord 
Dunmore had demonstrated that such attitudes could be capitalised upon in order to advance 
particular interests.9  Dunmore’s War may have been a conflict sparked by an outbreak of 
vendetta feuding but that does not mean that Dunmore failed to take advantage of the conflict 
in order to satisfy his own agenda, specifically the opening of western lands for speculation 
and settlement.10  Dunmore was nothing if not an opportunist and though the outbreak of war 
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in 1774 had little to do with him, it delivered to the governor the opportunity for which he had 
been waiting.  In a way simply not possible before, Dunmore now had a chance to force the 
Indians to recognise the surveys he had commissioned by forcing upon them a significant 
change to the problematic Proclamation Line of 1763.  Dunmore may not have started this war 
but he did draw upon the ‘emigrating spirit of the Americans’ in order to see that his will was 
carried out in the western territories.11   
Even after the war had concluded, Dunmore continued to leverage the conflict and his 
publically professed motivations for joining it as a means of shoring up his relationship with 
the soon-to-be rebelling colonists of Virginia.12  Writing in a special supplement of the Virginia 
Gazette, Dunmore went to great lengths to portray himself as the guardian of the frontier; 
‘The Fatigue and Danger of the service which I undertook,’ he reminded his colonial 
underlings, was carried out ‘in particular...for the back Inhabitants.’13  Not one to pass up an 
opportunity to extract the maximum political capital from a situation, Dunmore had continued 
to leverage the settlers’ fear of the ‘human carnage’ caused by the Indians as a means to 
further shore up his position and public image.14  According to Dunmore, ‘the motives which 
induced me to exert my efforts to relieve the back country from the calamity which it lately 
laboured would have been disappointed of one its principle ends if it had not met your 
approbation.’15  With a stroke of his pen, Dunmore expertly identified himself as the true 
champion of the frontier population.  Not satisfied with this alone, Dunmore pushed the 
matter further by reminding his readers that his role in the war made ‘manifest my Solicitude 
for the Safety of the Country in general, which his Majesty committed to my care.’16  In other 
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conspiracy theory the following year in the Virginia Gazette as the colony hurtled towards revolution.  
According to the anonymous writer of this piece, ‘I cannot omit taking notice of the suspicion that has 
gone forth, that lord Dunmore encouraged that war, and sent the Shawnanese to attack.’  This 
remarkable claim, that the royal governor was in league with the Shawnee, contains significant 
undertones that speak volumes as to how potent settler fears of the Indians actually were.  This letter 
also demonstrated that apprehension and fear of the Indians was a valuable commodity which differing 
factions sought to exploit in order to pull the settlers into their respective spheres of influence.  Just as 
Dunmore sought to gain support by painting himself as a guardian of the frontier against the Indians, so 
too did this letter writer attempt to undermine that support by describing the governor not as a 
protector, but as an instigator of Indian wars against his own population.  By describing Dunmore not 
only as an Indian sympathiser but as a man willing to use the Indians against his own people, this letter 
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words, if the settlers wished to live in safety – free from the fear of Indian raids – Dunmore 
was their natural leader.  Similarly, Revolutionary authorities would employ a comparable 
approach from an early point in the frontier war.  In late 1776, for instance, Colonel Dorsey 
Pentecost wrote to Captain William Harrod of his fear that ‘a Numbers of people has 
Combined to Cross the Ohio and kill some of the Indians,’ a course which he believed would 
‘forever Distroy the faith the Indians harbour of us [sic].’17  Although Pentecost was concerned 
that the settlers’ desire for retribution would further alienate the northern tribes, it quickly 
became evident that there was much value in directing rather than restraining such 
impulses.18  A planned expedition against Pluggy’s Town in 1777 did not materialise but the 
transformation in intent is striking nonetheless.19 
In the aboriginal world, too, certain chiefs were willing to exploit pre-existing ideas, 
prejudices, and apprehensions in order to see their personal wills executed throughout the 
frontier war; the manipulation of the population by a relatively small élite was a system not 
particular to the settlers alone.  Indeed, Indian war chiefs lacked any coercive authority over 
their followers and could hope to draw support only by appealing to the sensibilities and 
attitudes of those whom they sought to lead into conflict, a situation which made the 
exploitation of pre-existing ideas or prejudices all the more visible.  In many ways, the Mingo 
chief Logan was Lord Dunmore’s opposite number among the northern tribes.  His motivation 
for going to war – the murder of his family as opposed to opening up new lands for settlement 
– may have been very different from Dunmore’s but his desire for revenge was, nevertheless, a 
highly personal agenda.  More importantly, it was one that Logan was willing to place above 
his long held belief that peace with the settlers was the best possible option for his tribe.20  
Rather than attempting to hold back the tide of war, Logan instead took advantage of it in 
order to ensure that his revenge was secured.  Nor were such situations unique to Dunmore’s 
War; the Shawnee chief Blackfish, for example, was able to expertly capitalize upon the death 
of his political adversary, Cornstalk, in 1777, by drawing upon widespread anger over the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
writer sought to very deliberately undo all of the good press which the governor had thus far managed 
to generate surrounding his role in the war.  See ‘Letter from an Unknown Author,’ Virginia Gazette 
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19 ‘Letter from Governor Patrick Henry to Colonel David Shepherd, April 12th, 1777’ Draper Manuscripts 
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Louise Pelps Kellogg (eds.) The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, pp. 25-126 
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peace broker’s murder in order to shore up support for the pro-war faction within the tribe.  
Indeed, anti-settler sentiment following Cornstalk’s murder was so strong that Blackfish was 
able to manifest it in the most unusual of forms; a large-scale wintertime assault upon the 
settlements.21  Far from being particular to the 1770s, such systems would reappear with 
varying degrees of consistency and effectiveness throughout the period of the war.22 
Throughout the 1780s, Revolutionary authorities drew upon anti-Indian western 
sentiments in a haphazard and inconsistent manner.  With the notable exception of George R. 
Clark’s and a small number of other campaigns, the United States had a remarkably poor 
leadership record in the west until their breakthrough at Fallen Timbers in 1794.  Although 
focused upon opening up Ohio for speculation, sale and, ultimately, settlement, the new 
government’s drive to avoid an expensive Indian war placed them at odds with the region’s 
settler population.  Rather than taking a leadership role in the continuing western struggle, the 
government’s strict policy of attempting to acquire Ohio via peaceful means served to drive a 
wedge between them and many settlers.  The battle for independence had been a costly 
endeavour which the government did not wish to repeat.  Indeed, the purpose of opening the 
northern Ohio valley to settlement was an attempt to recoup some of those Revolutionary 
expenditures, rather than adding to them.23  In almost every way, then, a war with the 
northern tribes was contrary to the new government’s vision of the region, a reality which 
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Bradford ‘Notes on Kentucky,’ pp. 49-50, ‘Official council report, Henry Hamilton, June 17th, 1777’ 
Draper Manuscripts 49J13, Hoffman Simon Girty, Ebenezer Denny Military Journal of Major Ebenezer 
Denny, An Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars with an Introductory Memoir (Philadelphia: J. B. 
Lippincott & Co. For the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1859), p. 105, Calloway The Shawnee and the 
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Colonel George Mason, July 7th, 1777’ Draper Manuscripts 3NN11-13 
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placed them at odds with the actual situation in the west.24  Thus was the paradox faced by the 
United States throughout most of the 1780s; on the one hand the government sought to 
exploit Ohio in order to generate significant levels of income, a goal which should have, 
theoretically, appealed to the land hungry settlers of the west.  On the other hand, the method 
through which the United States pursued this goal stood in stark contrast to the everyday 
aspirations of not only their own settler population, but a significant portion of the Indians 
also.  As Gordon S. Wood has argued, the settlers ‘compelled the federal government’ to 
fight.25  Put simply, the government found itself between a rock and a hard place or, to put it 
another way, between a tomahawk and a Kentucky rifle.   
Rather than exploiting anti-Indian attitudes or Indian-related fears in the region, the 
United States had instead spent much of the 1780s struggling against them.  Indeed, the 
United States would spend most of that decade attempting to negotiate peaceable control of 
the Ohio country in an attempt to avoid a full scale Indian war.26  However, the processes set 
in motion by the preceding fifteen years of warfare among the settler and Indian populations 
would continually hamstring those efforts, forcing the government to take advantage of that 
same system in order furnish its armies with hundreds of frontier veterans in order to take 
Ohio through military means.  The character of the western population was thus something of 
a double edged sword, simultaneously forcing the United States down a particular – and 
unwanted – path whilst providing the government with a ready body of support for its 
eventual military actions in the region.  In a very real way it was the actions of the settlers and 
Indians in the region which perpetuated the war in the trans-Appalachian west and, finding 
itself with no viable alternative to an armed confrontation, the government took advantage of 
that system in order to realise its goal of controlling Ohio.  If the settlers wanted to fight 
Indians, the government intended to make that desire serve a purpose, their purpose.  The 
United States would certainly strive for the cheaper option of peace throughout the last years 
of the frontier war but, at almost every juncture, it would find itself restrained by the attitudes 
and actions of those who resided in the western country.  In his study of British-Indian 
relations in the late eighteenth century, Timothy Willig emphasised the agency of the British in 
order to explain the antagonistic attitude of the Indians but it should be remembered that the 
Indians, like the settlers, fought for their own ends.27  Neither group passively acceded to the 
whims of a larger empire and neither group, whether their relationship was with the British or 
the American government, could be commanded or led without a clear understanding of the 
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advantages they could expect from such an arrangement.  Thus unable to influence the 
western war through negotiation, the government would ultimately attempt to exploit the 
settlers’ anti-Indian voracity in order to accomplish its primary goal of taking, settling and 
selling Ohio.   
By the time the United States entered the frontier war in late 1789 the Northwest 
Territory had been in existence for two years.  More than a paper empire, the creation of this 
new territory had been accompanied and preceded by the establishment of permanent – and 
mostly illegal – settlements north of the Ohio River, a move which expanded the settler 
domain out of the Indians’ hunting grounds and into their residential territories.28  Such 
ruthless demographic expansion occurred in spite of the continuing hostilities that marred the 
earlier settlement of Kentucky, but it also occurred during a time of increasing federal strength 
in the west.  Since the establishment of the United States, the condition of the western 
frontier had steadily become one of the new nation’s top priorities and, over the coming years, 
the newly formed government would spend the vast majority of the nation’s available capital 
attempting to bring the war in that territory to a favourable conclusion.29  The end sought by 
the government was not limited to a cessation of hostilities, but was tied fundamentally to 
their desire to control the Ohio country.  Problematically, this brought the power of the federal 
government directly into the lives of the settlers who had, up until this point, spent the past 
fifteen years fighting this very same war largely on their own terms.  Moreover, the United 
States’ entry into the war was, almost until the final battle in 1794, a disastrous, haphazard 
series of missed opportunities, misjudged circumstances, and failed enterprises.  Even as the 
interests of the settlers and their government aligned, the latter’s blundering efforts, 
combined with their prior attempts to negotiate peace with the Indians, served to drive a 
wedge between the two, something which made the manipulation of settler fears and 
paranoia all the more important if any hope was to be had of rallying them to the 
government’s banner. 
Essentially the entry of the United States into the frontier war introduced yet another 
player to an already crowded battlefield.  In addition to the various Indian tribes, the settlers, 
and the British, the United States represented a fourth interest which sought not just security 
but vast swathes of uninhabited and uncontested land.  With only a limited army and, by the 
late 1780s at least, little hope of gaining the Ohio country through peaceful means, the US 
government could not hope to achieve such ambitious ends without utilizing the existing and 
aggrieved frontier population.  In theory the entry of the United States into the war should 
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have been a boon to the settlers, representing as it did a significant increase in the resources 
that could be committed to the western sphere.  By 1789, however, the frontier had changed 
significantly since the start of the decade.  For one, Kentucky had been gradually stabilizing 
throughout much of the 1780s and although the frontier regions within this country were still 
extremely volatile and prone to attack, the more settled parts of this region no longer 
laboured under the daily apprehensions which the Indians had previously wrought.  Kentucky 
had been transformed from a frontier into a country with a frontier (see figures one-six) and 
though anti-Indian sentiment remained an important force, for many the lack of everyday 
danger removed the need to engage in highly proactive acts of violence.  In Ohio perspectives 
of the Indians were also divided; in many parts of the county Kentuckians had carried their 
southern, anti-Indian world views with them but in the eastern part of the region immigrants 
from New England – who brought with them a more accommodating approach to the Indians – 
had a significant impact.30   
As intense as the frontier war had been for those living south of the Ohio River it 
should be remembered that the settlers of this region were farmers and aspiring landowners 
first; they were Indian haters and fighters second.  As the central areas of Kentucky began to 
stabilize so too did settler attitudes towards the Indians in those regions.  Of course, old 
prejudices and ideas died hard and slowly but without the ever present threat of war imposing 
itself into one’s daily life – away from the country’s frontier regions, at least – animosities were 
able to simmer rather than boil over.  The settlers of the more stable regions within Kentucky 
may not have felt any particular degree of affection for the northern tribes, but the chance to 
live without the daily threat of being killed was no trifling matter.  The entry of the United 
States into the frontier war may have been a welcome occurrence, in principle, but the 
reliance of the government upon the western population demanded that many of those who 
were now able to live in relative tranquillity place themselves once again in the firing line.  In 
order to accomplish the task of mobilizing and motivating this group, the government set out 
from an early stage to remind the inhabitants of Kentucky – not just the inhabitants of its 
frontier – of all that they had lost, stirring up dormant grievances and reopening old wounds.  
As early as 1788, Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, informed the readers of 
the Kentucky Gazette that ‘we have been in the daily expectation of seeing the Indians,’ in the 
vicinity of Fort Harmar but having not yet spied the anticipated raiders he recalled the  
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     Figure 6 - This map illustrates zones of conflict as they affected Kentucky and the southern 
Ohio country between the years 1787 and 1794 in detail 
 
 
apprehensions of the early days of the frontier war; ‘we are in a state of utter uncertainty.’  
Although lacking any real evidence, St. Clair pushed the matter further by suggesting that the 
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disappearance of two runners was a precursor to a renewed Indian assault north and south of 
the Ohio River.  ‘[T]here is in my opinion,’ St. Clair wrote, ‘too much reason to fear they have 
hostile design, and that the first intimation of it will be a stroke upon some of the 
settlements.’31  In other words, so long as the northern tribes remained active and hostile, 
security was little more than an illusion. 
If the Indians were not as boisterous as St. Clair had expected then this may very well 
have been the result of the divisions which the war had caused among many of the tribes.  For 
some, the continued distance of the settlers facilitated mild or restrained attempts at 
repulsing them whilst, for others, the sheer duration of the war had acted to split the tribes 
internally.  The Shawnee, one of the most consistent adversaries to settler expansion, had 
already lost large numbers through combat but the tribe itself was also beginning to fracture 
as some members looked to settler-free lands further west or accommodation in order to 
avoid continued hostilities.32  A year before St. Clair wrote his incendiary letter to the Kentucky 
Gazette, the Kentuckians were made aware – through a published speech from the Shawnee 
chief Captain Johnny – that at least some members of the tribe sought peace rather than 
continued war.  According to the published account, Captain Johnny pleaded with the settlers 
to ‘take pity on our women and children,’ before informing them that his village wished to 
make ‘a decree [of] peace...which our brother the big knife have always said was in our 
power.’  Although many Kentuckians probably dismissed Captain Johnny’s words as relatively 
hollow, the idea that members of such an aggressive tribe wished to ‘live like brothers’ was 
likely an appealing one.33  Indeed, sentiments such as this were precisely the type of rhetoric 
the government hoped to hear more often from the northern tribes.  Words, however, did not 
equate to peace and Captain Johnny’s hopes were not shared by a significant number of other 
Indians.34  This situation created a profound problem and a profound opportunity for the 
United States; obviously, continued Indian aggression severely undermined any hope for a 
peaceful transition of power and authority within Ohio but so too did such actions serve to 
agitate the western population.  Those who had been lucky enough to establish farms in the 
now settled parts of the country may not have fostered a strong desire to interrupt their lives 
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in order march to war, but they nevertheless continued to sympathise and support their 
stricken frontier contemporaries.35  
It was not that the settlers had mellowed since the conclusion of the American 
Revolution, only that the changing shape of the frontier and their slow but steady 
demographic victory had acted to remove many from the most immediate danger.  For those 
who remained in the firing line, patterns of individual and small group violence continued to 
predominate and, to all intents and purposes, the frontier war continued as it had before.  
Writing at the end 1787, Harry Innes attempted to measure the cost which the war had 
exacted from his local district in the years since the end of the revolution.  According to Innes’ 
estimation, over three hundred settlers had been killed between 1783 and 1787 in his locality, 
with a further fifty taken into captivity and an astounding – and probably exaggerated – 
twenty thousand horses stolen during this same period.36  Such estimations, though 
doubtlessly based upon broad impressions rather than a systematic measurement of the 
ongoing war, reflect the high level of post-revolutionary devastation that the Indians were 
continuing to wreak among the settlers.  This ongoing decimation continued to promote a 
pattern of individualistic conflict and retribution on the frontier, providing the settlers with all 
of the drive they required to continue fighting the Indians.  Problematically, this pattern of 
individual and small group combat did not promise a speedy, efficient, or even achievable 
removal of the Indians from the lands which the government now coveted.  The settlers may 
have developed a method of fighting this war which afforded them some degree of security, 
but their approach to the conflict lacked the specific focus the United States would ultimately 
seek.  Although frontier leaders such as George R. Clark and Benjamin Logan had been able to 
field large groups of settlers against the Indians such campaigns were infrequent and rarely 
decisive.  Following the government’s failure to gain Ohio through negotiation and peace 
treaties it would turn to the settlers but, before it could employ them in any extensive manner, 
it first had to focus their long running resentments, fears, and animosities before setting itself 
up as a figurehead for this group to follow. 
The United States may have signed treaties with numerous tribes in 1789, even going 
so far as to demand that ‘All the Citizens and Subjects of the United States are hereby required 
to...abstain from every act of hostility, injury, or injustice to the said nations,’ but continued 
reports of inter-cultural violence almost immediately undid any hope for a peaceful resolution 
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to the conflict.37  If anything, the appearance of such proclamations followed in short order by 
numerous reports of Indian attacks likely served to undermine the idea that peace with the 
northern tribes could ever be accomplished.38  When another speech delivered by an Indian 
chief was printed in the Kentucky Gazette later in 1789, the expressed sentiment of peace was 
almost immediately undermined by follow up reports of continued Indian raids against frontier 
settlers.39  Indeed, one of those reports appeared on the very same page as this latest call to 
bury the hatchet.40  The chief delivering this speech may have asked the settlers to overlook 
any further ‘bad action[s]’ committed by the tribe’s young men but such was a tall order for a 
people who had been fighting the same war since 1774.41  Such realities fatally undermined 
the government’s attempts to secure Ohio through non-violent means.  However much they 
exerted themselves to this end, the situation on the ground consistently served to undermine 
their efforts.  The government may have ordered a cessation of hostilities but such demands 
ultimately served only to underline their lack of coercive authority beyond the Appalachians.  
By attempting to will an end to these hostilities, the government demonstrated a failure to 
understand western sensibilities.  A song published in the paper six weeks after the 
appearance of this latest speech summed up the underlying sentiments of the Kentuckians 
which the government had thus far failed to harness but would, in short order, come to 
exploit: 
To the tune of “The dusky night.” 
COME all you brave Kentuckians, 
Who dangers dare to meet: 
Come, let us haste, in wars dead guise, 
The Savage foe we’ll beat 
For a fighting we must go, &c.42 
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The attitude represented by songs of this nature was hardly indicative of a strong 
desire for peace among the settlers.  Indeed, such sentiments reflected the subtext of anti-
Indian resentment that had developed and come to fruition over the course of the preceding 
years of conflict.  To complicate matters further, the government had to deal with more than 
just an aggrieved settler population; the United States also had to attempt to secure peace 
with the many tribes and native factions north of the Ohio River, however their insistence that 
the Indians surrender vast tracts of their territory placed them at loggerheads with the very 
groups they needed to pacify the most.43  Treaties may have been signed and reconciliatory 
speeches given, particularly in 1789, but so long as the government demanded territory north 
of the Ohio those Indians most opposed to settler expansion remained unwilling to cease their 
hostilities.44  It is true that the government made numerous efforts to end the war through 
peaceful means, at least until 1792, but by making demands which the hardliners could not 
accept, they all but ensured a continuation of hostilities.  That does not mean that the 
government did not continue their attempts to end the war and acquire lands in Ohio 
peaceably – if only to avoid the potentially crippling cost of another war – but whatever efforts 
the United States made were undermined by their own focus upon obtaining control of Indian 
lands.  The government also faced the increasing problem of exerting continued sovereignty 
over the already settled portions of trans-Appalachian region.  Throughout the mid-to-late 
1780s, a growing division between east and west was threatening to undermine the continued 
existence of the United States in the western portion of the country.45  In the inaugural issues 
of the Kentucky Gazette, for instance, those tensions were writ large by the paper’s publisher, 
John Bradford, who wrote that Kentucky was faced by two major challenges.  For one, the 
country was ‘harassed by savage enemies,’ whilst, for another, it faced being ‘drained of money 
by its present intercourse with the Eastern parts of America.’46  By identifying the eastern 
portions of the country as a threat as imposing and dangerous as the Indians, Bradford was 
making a powerful statement indeed. 
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By 1790, the west was beginning to head down the path that would ultimately 
culminate in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1795.47  However, the government’s refusal to give up 
on the Northwest Territory presented them with an opportunity to foster support in the region 
for the larger nation before the outbreak of that crisis.  By ordering Josiah Harmar to engage 
the Indians, the government was hoping to force a cessation of northern lands and an end to 
hostilities; more importantly, by engaging in a direct military intervention it was taking a 
prominent and proactive leadership role in the western country.48  By taking advantage of the 
existing hostilities between the settlers and the Indians – the vast majority of Harmar’s force 
would be comprised of Kentuckians and other frontier veterans – the government could thus 
lead an army to invade Ohio dealing, apparently head on, with one of the key issues marring 
that part of the nation.49  In preceding years, Indian raids had served to terrorize the frontier 
population but, aside from a number of peace treaties which had failed almost as soon as they 
were signed, the government had yet to take any direct, effective action in the region.50  In 
1790 this situation was reversed, at least temporarily, when Harmar’s campaign became the 
vehicle through which those still affected by the war could hope to strike back.   
On the campaign itself, anti-Indian sentiment was rallied in an even more obvious way 
as a means of shoring up the relationship between eastern commanders and western 
militiamen.  Following some acts of deliberate psychological warfare designed to unsettle the 
settlers, Harmar had offered a bounty of wine for the ‘first Indians’ head brought in,’ an 
incentive that increased morale and trivialised the Indians’ threats.51  Regardless, the offer was 
too good for a number of the company’s militiamen to ignore and, in short order, they had 
lured an Indian within firing distance of the camp.  Having shot but not killed the interloper, the 
injured Indian had begun ‘pleading for his life,’ but his assailants, unmoved by his pleas, 
butchered him, decapitated the body, and presented the head to Harmar who, apparently 
surprised by the settlers’ bloodlust, failed to offer them the promised bounty.  Seeking to 
rectify this situation and remind Harmar of his obligation, the settlers had hung the Indian’s 
head from a beanpole outside the general’s tent.52  In this instance, the Kentuckians’ desire to 
kill Indians had certainly been harnessed, but certainly not within the context of a battle.  
                                                            
47 For the development of a desire for western independence on the lead up to the Whiskey Rebellion 
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Instead, it highlighted a problematic reality which Harmar would, in short order, have to 
confront directly.  The settlers were willing to kill Indians – indeed, they could be manipulated 
into doing so with relative ease – but their desire to act did not require an explicit framework 
to be provided by the expedition’s officers.  To commandeer the words of one contemporary, 
the government had the frontier wolf by the ears and was unable to either let him go or hold 
him safely in check.53  In many ways Harmar’s expedition represented, in microcosm, all of the 
difficulties the government faced when it came to taking an active leadership role in the west.  
The common enemy offered by the northern tribes presented a broad framework of unity for 
the nation, but western settlers were hardly willing to submit to eastern authority, even when 
the interests of both parties aligned against the Indians.  Harmar certainly benefited from 
widespread anti-Indian sentiment in the west but it quickly became evident that he could not 
hope to control this impulse in the manner he desired.  
When the Indians launched an attack upon a detachment under the command of 
General Hardin – Harmar’s second in command – for instance, the settlers had simply refused 
to stand and fight.  Believing that the attack to be a hopeless ambush, they had instead 
retreated ‘at the very onset’ of the assault, leaving the regulars who accompanied them to be 
decimated by their attackers.  It was not that the settlers did not want to engage the Indians, 
but they insisted upon doing so strictly on their own experienced terms.  Quite naturally, the 
expedition’s commanders reeled when news of the defeat reached them and the entire force 
was quickly ordered back south.54  However, news of a second, smaller Indian force some way 
behind the army gave Harmar hope that he could salvage something from the debacle and, 
once again, a force under Hardin’s command was dispatched to fight the Indians.  Initially, this 
force once again struggled against the Indians but, as Hardin’s officers were wiped out, the 
Kentuckians were freed to begin fighting in the irregular manner to which they were 
accustomed and, though they did not gain the unqualified victory that would later be claimed, 
they were able to take the field.55  Moreover, they also reclaimed their martial dignity, but only 
after Hardin’s regulars and their officers had been almost completely destroyed.  Put simply, 
the Kentuckians left the field victorious only once they were freed of the regular army’s 
stringent – and as far as Indian fighting was concerned, ineffective – chain of command.  Such 
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was the problem faced by the government in the west; the settlers were a potentially 
invaluable body of Indian fighters, hardened by sixteen years of prior experience with the 
tribes.  Unfortunately, that same group was not easily led, particularly when their would-be 
commanders demonstrated an almost complete inability to fight the Indians.  This situation 
reached its climax on Harmar’s return journey when relations between the officers and the 
Kentuckians broke down completely.  Responding to an ordered flogging of one of their 
fellows, the Kentuckians had turned their weapons upon Harmar and his regulars, a crisis which 
was only averted when Harmar, in turn, had the artillery turned upon them.56   
As a microcosm for the relationship between east and west during the early 1790s, 
Harmar’s campaign did not bode well for the future of the nation.  However, this expedition – 
in spite of the mutiny which marred its conclusion – demonstrated that east and west could be 
united when a common or shared goal could be identified.  By emphasising the danger posed 
by the tribes in public forums such as the Kentucky Gazette supporters of the government had 
succeeded in turning fear of the tribes and general anti-Indian sentiment into the crucible of 
unity around which they could leverage, albeit imperfectly, the frontier population to serve its 
ultimate agenda of pressurising the Indians into surrendering vast portions of Ohio.57  Of 
course, the consistent failure of the regulars, and their officers, during this campaign 
chronically undermined the nature of that relationship, ultimately leading to a breakdown in 
the dynamic which bound these groups together.  That their relationship broke down should 
not, however, overshadow its existence.  In spite of an escalating disparity between west and 
east, the government had, nevertheless, been able to rally the settlers of the frontier to its 
banner by emphasising a shared enemy against whom they could fight together.  Although the 
‘proposed severment’ of west from east, resulting in the creation of ‘independent dominion’ 
was ‘THE QUESTION [sic]’ of the period for many, the war with the Indians could – and by 1790, 
did – provide something of a fulcrum of unity.58  The government may have been holding the 
proverbial wolf by the ears, but that same beast still knew how to bite and such knowledge did 
not go unnoticed.   
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Still, there remained a significant difference between the settlers’ and the 
government’s expectations of one another.59  In spite of this, the government would continue 
to turn to the settlers in 1791 as a means of forcing peace upon the Indians.60  To be sure, the 
government did not abandon its hopes that it could bring the frontier war to a conclusion 
without escalating the situation but, as 1791 drew on, it became increasingly obvious that most 
hostile Indians were unwilling to submit to any peace which did not see their lost lands in Ohio 
returned to them, let alone any peace which demanded the surrender of yet more territory.61  
Though Harmar – or rather, the Kentuckians under his command – had gained the government 
its first national victory against the Indians, it was hardly decisive and certainly not enough to 
convince most hostile Indians that the United States was an insurmountable juggernaut.  
Accordingly two expeditions were planned in 1791 for the purpose of pressurising the Indians 
to accede to the government’s demands for land.  Although soured by the failure of Harmar’s 
campaign and reluctant to rely wholly upon frontier militias, the government nonetheless 
turned to the inhabitants of the backcountry in order to people these campaigns.62  
Fortuitously for them, the number of raids against the backcountry had intensified significantly 
in the wake of the preceding year’s expedition.  These increasingly prominent assaults had left 
a highly visible and emotive trail of bodies which had helped to stir up further anti-Indian 
sentiment across the region.63 
                                                            
59 The difference in outlook that separated them is perhaps best summarized by the limitations which 
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News of attacks in the north, attacks in Kentucky itself, and attacks upon Kentuckians 
travelling to southern locations, such as Tennessee, helped to reinforce the image among many 
settlers that they were not just at war with a select few northern tribes, but all Indians.  
Reflecting upon the losses incurred during these latest attacks, ‘a correspondent’ would 
editorialise in the Kentucky Gazette that ‘every hour produces fresh evidence, of the futility of 
treating with a race of beings, who acknowledge no laws, human or divine, and who can be 
restrained from outrage and hostilities, by a sense of personal danger only.’  Having described 
all Indians as natural enemies of the settlers, the correspondent continued to push his 
advantage by dismissing the notion that peace could be obtained through any means other 
than the rifle and tomahawk.  Calling his fellow settlers to arms against all Indians, the 
correspondent finished by declaring that ‘the people of Kentucky, with one heart and with one 
hand [should] go to the glorious work,’ of destroying the Indians, ‘and never cease their 
exercises, until it is happily terminated.’64  Even in the eastern part of Ohio, a region settled by 
groups of New Englanders who prided themselves upon being able to engage peacefully with 
the Indians, increased raids served to radicalise the population.  As Patrick Griffin put it, these 
one-time Indian sympathisers ‘had become Kentuckians.’65  With Indian raids on the increase, 
the settlers were already primed for further hostilities by the time the government’s planned 
expeditions began to materialise in the summer.66  Although the United States was hardly 
responsible for the panic caused by increased raiding upon the frontier, they fully capitalised 
upon it.  Once again, the government found itself in a position to take a direct leadership role in 
the west and, it hoped, a position to force the northern tribes to capitulate to its demands.  
Harmar’s campaign may have flirted with disaster but the effects of Indian raids were such that 
the divisions between east and west could once again be sidelined by a common set of goals.  
John Jay’s failure in 1786 to open the Mississippi River to western inhabitants may have 
demonstrated a failure on the part of the eastern states to recognise the interests of those in 
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the west, but campaigns such as those taking place in 1791 served to provide a very physical 
counterpoint to such ideas.67   
The first of the year’s major expeditions set off on May 23rd and was comprised of 
around eight hundred and fifty settlers under the command of future Kentucky governor 
Charles Scott.  In spite of being a relatively ineffective military exercise, this campaign did serve 
to boost the community’s morale when the force returned from the north without having 
received a single fatality at the hands of the Indians.68  In addition to this remarkable 
preservation of settler life, the expedition’s commanders claimed credit for killing over fifty 
warriors whilst taking a similar number of Indians prisoner.  Moreover, the commanders of this 
campaign were also able to claim that the Kentuckians had worked proficiently, following 
orders, and showing considerable levels of restraint.  According to a narrative of the expedition 
published shortly after its completion, ‘no acts of inhumanity have marked the conduct of the 
volunteers of Kentucky on this occasion, even the...habit of scalping the dead ceased.’69  Such 
an assessment of the Kentuckian’s behaviour reflected the desire of many in the country to see 
them rise above their prior approach to the war, an attitude to which this writer was happy to 
pander.  According to this narrative, the settlers were indeed capable of operating as an army, 
and not just as a rabble.  That army, however, had consisted entirely of settlers and unlike 
Harmar’s campaign the previous year there was simply no one for the Kentuckians to rebel 
against.  Rather than having a direct relationship with the US army, Scott’s expedition was 
instead a government sanctioned campaign carried out by the frontier community.70  Scott may 
have marched with the blessings of the government, but his forces were free of the perceived 
interference that could be expected from outside officers and generals.   
Although Scott’s expedition was a relative success it failed to bring the war any closer 
to a favourable conclusion.  Still, the Indians raided the frontier as they had before.71  If the 
government hoped to bring hostilities to an end it could not rely upon the whims of the frontier 
population to accomplish this goal.  To be sure, the government fully intended to utilize the 
settlers in its coming plans but it only intended to do so within a context over which it had 
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direct authority and, even before Scott had led the Kentuckians into Ohio, government officials 
had begun planning a second expedition which, it was hoped, would finally force the Indians to 
sue for peace.  This ‘matter of immediate importance’ was to be commanded not by a 
Kentuckian, but by the governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair and, in addition to 
a body of regular soldiers, his force was to be supplemented – in an echo of Harmar’s campaign 
– by a large body of settlers.72  For his part, St. Clair was certainly aware of the growing 
challenges posed by the nascent movement for western independence.  Writing to John Jay at 
the very end of 1788, he had made his concerns plain, writing that States with western claims, 
such as Virginia, would ‘lose not only their people,’ and the ‘value of their soil,’ but risked, if 
this movement continued, ‘laying the foundation of the greatness of a new country.’73  
However, St. Clair also recognised that the recent success of Scott’s campaign would send 
those same potential rebels to his banner in droves.74  Like George Clark, Benjamin Logan, 
Charles Scott and even Lord Dunmore before him, St. Clair was providing the settlers with an 
opportunity to strike back as a collective at the Indians.  A spectrum of issues may have 
complicated the relationship between east and west but the chance to attack Indians remained 
enough to unite them. 
In spite of the unity provided by the promise of killing Indians, St. Clair’s force echoed 
that led by Harmar the previous year in both composition and underlying tension.  Although St. 
Clair did not have to face an open mutiny, he was faced with a no-less potent challenge to his 
authority; desertion.  As his force moved north it appears that large numbers of the frontier 
militia and the levies – men commissioned into the regular army for just six months – lost faith 
in their federal commander.75  Almost from the outset, St. Clair had failed to demonstrate any 
understanding of how warfare with the Indians would have to be conducted if there was to be 
any hope of success.  Those under the governor’s command may not have elected him to lead 
this army, but they were certainly willing to vote with their feet when he demonstrated time 
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and again how unsuited he was to the position.76  Even among those who stayed, discipline 
remained a serious issue.   Before St. Clair’s forces had had an opportunity to engage the 
Indians in a large scale battle, his army was already in serious danger of collapsing under the 
weight of its commander’s incompetence and the settlers’ lack of faith.77  By the time the 
expedition lumbered towards its final destination, St. Clair could count only a little over 
fourteen hundred men under his command; over a third of his force had abandoned him.  If 
that situation was not bad enough, the defeat suffered by St. Clair’s army when it finally did 
engage the Indians was not only the worst defeat suffered by any group during the frontier 
war, but was also the worst single defeat the United States would ever suffer at Indian hands 
with over six hundred dead and over two hundred and fifty wounded.78  In one fell swoop, St. 
Clair had justified the lack of faith shown in him by the Kentuckians.   
Almost immediately, however, the governor had attempted to spin the disaster to the 
government’s advantage.  In a letter printed in the Kentucky Gazette, St. Clair wrote of the 
‘great regret I feel for the loss [the militia] have suffered.’  Going further, he attempted to 
emphasise the cooperation which had occurred between the settlers, the west, and the regular 
army and its commanders, the east.  ‘It is with pleasure,’ he wrote, ‘[that] I acknowledge the 
satisfaction received from their general orderly behaviour, and the harmony and good 
understanding that prevailed between them.’79  Although St. Clair had led the United States 
into its worst ever defeat against the Indians, the governor was keen to extract whatever 
political mileage he could from the situation.  By emphasising the level of cooperation between 
the settlers and the army, St. Clair was effectively attempting to marry the interests of the east 
and west, even in the face of absolute defeat, around the struggle with the northern tribes.  
Indeed, going further he would attempt to lay the blame for his defeat squarely upon those 
settlers who had not been willing to stand with their national government.  According to the 
governor, ‘the cause of the misfortune that befell us,’ could be laid upon the shoulders of those 
who ‘did desert the service of their country at a critical moment.’80  If the government had first 
hoped to harness the power of the settlers to pressurise the Indians into accepting peace, and 
to shore up the relationship between the western and eastern parts of the county, St. Clair was 
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demonstrating that they could also act as scapegoats in a last ditch attempt to shore up the 
government’s position.81 
St. Clair’s defeat was not just a calamity for those directly involved in the affair, but a 
calamity for the entirety of the frontier exposing, as it did, the weaknesses of the United States 
in the west.  Within one week of the army’s destruction news had reached Kentucky of the 
disaster, ‘alarming’ settlers who prepared themselves for further raids from the sure-to-be 
emboldened northern tribes.82  If the settlers had been suspicious of following their 
government into battle before, St. Clair’s defeat did little to change that situation.  For the next 
two years the inhabitants of the frontier returned to the defensive, individualistic war to which 
they were previously accustomed.  Throughout 1792 and 1793, the northern tribes continued 
to raid the settlements but even victorious they could not undo the natural victory of 
demography which the settlers had already unknowingly secured.83  In 1793, for instance, the 
Indians would successfully sack the settlement of Morgan’s Station in Kentucky however this 
would be their last major victory in that country.84  During that same period, the United States 
was forced to reassess its approach towards the frontier war, moving towards a more a 
complete involvement in the conflict; following St. Clair’s defeat the government was now 
committed to the war and determined to break Indian resistance north of the Ohio River.  Their 
first major accomplishment came not in battle but in 1792 when they finally placed the federal 
army in the hands of a capable Indian fighter, Anthony Wayne.  Unlike St. Clair and his 
predecessors, Wayne did not believe that the settlers could be harnessed as a raw force to 
execute the nation’s western war but instead focused upon training an army for the specific 
purpose of fighting the Indians.  To be sure, Wayne fully intended to draw upon the settlers to 
supplement his army, but he certainly did not intend to rely upon an untrained force – either 
regulars or settlers – in order to overcome the Indians.85  Nor did the government intend to 
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cease its attempts to appeal to the western settlers whose growing sense of a regional identity 
was becoming an ever more prominent issue.86   
1792 represented a turning point in the United States’ attitude towards the frontier 
war.  Rather than attempting to pressurise the Indians into suing for peace, the government 
now intended to defeat the tribes and, throughout the year, they commenced a post-St. Clair 
propaganda campaign designed to lure the settlers back to the banner of the United States by 
highlighting the common foe they shared in the northern Indians.87  Unlike its previous stance 
from 1789 to 1791, the government now looked upon the Indians not as a group that needed 
to be cowed but as a group which needed to be defeated.  This shift in attitude brought 
western and eastern ideas about the northern tribes into much closer alignment and, through 
secretary of war Henry Knox, the government appealed to the settlers of the west to once 
again align behind their shared national interests.  Writing in an open letter which appeared in 
the Kentucky Gazette that summer, Knox sought to remind the inhabitants of the frontier of 
‘that great numbers of inoffensive men, women and children...[who] fell a sacrifice to the 
barbarous warfare practiced by the Indians.’  Like so many contemporaries, Knox not only 
ignored the aggressions committed by the settlers, but effectively attempted to erase them 
from history when he stated authoritatively that the Indians’ ‘aggressions were entirely 
unprovoked.’  Essentially, Knox was attempting to demonstrate that the government’s interests 
in the west were the same as the region’s inhabitants; the campaigns of 1790 and 1791 had 
been commissioned not for the betterment of the national government, but to ‘establish peace 
with all [the northern] tribes,’ a plan ultimately designed to protect the inhabitants of the 
backcountry.88  To be sure, the government’s unwavering focus upon obtaining land in Ohio, or 
as St. Clair put it, ‘provi[di]ng a fund for paying our national debt,’ restrained any realistic hope 
that peace could be obtained but it did, nevertheless, provide ostensible proof that the 
government’s interests concerned the betterment of the settlers.89   
                                                            
86 Harry S. Layver ‘Rethinking the Social Role of the Militia: Community-Building in Antebellum Kentucky’ 
The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 68 (2002): 777-816, pp. 784-785 
87 ‘Letter from George Washing to the Editor of the Kentucky Gazette, January 16th, 1792’ Kentucky 
Gazette (Bradford), June 23rd, 1792, p. 1 
88  ‘An Open Letter from Henry Knox on the Causes of the Indian War (I),’ Kentucky Gazette (Bradford), 
June 23rd, 1792, pp. 1-2 
89 The importance of the United States’ desire to confirm their ownership of Ohio should not be under 
estimated during this period.  Following the conclusion of the frontier war the government 
demonstrated a significant ability to arbitrate and defuse conflicts between settlers and Indians on its 
frontier territories when its own demands for lands were either absent or manageable.  To be sure, 
relations with the northern tribes would decline on the lead up to the War of 1812 but it is telling that 
the vast majority of the Shawnee refused to follow Tecumseh and his brother, the Prophet, into 
renewed hostilities against the United States during this period.  Indeed, with the exception of the War 
of 1812, the government would demonstrate a particular ability to negotiate and defuse potentially 
disastrous occurrences in both the trans-Appalachian and trans-Mississippi western territories.  Put 
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More vivid still was the extensive list of estimated costs which the war had thus far 
exacted from the settler community since the end of the Revolution.  According to Knox, the 
Indians had, between the years 1783 and 1790, ‘killed, wounded and took prisoners, about one 
thousand five hundred men, women and children, besides carrying off upwards of over two 
thousand horses and other property to the amount of fifty thousand dollars.’90  The message 
was clear; the United States may have stood as a defeated force in the face of the Indians, but 
their defeat had been glorious, occurring in the name of the western population.  At any rate, 
that was the impression which Knox and the government hoped to foster.  More than a 
justification for St. Clair’s defeat, Knox’s letter sought to tie the settlers once again to the 
federal government by harnessing the pervasive and enduring anti-Indian sentiment which 
abounded in the west.  In particular, the government hoped to capitalize not just upon 
communal anger, but the fear that the embryonic settlements of Ohio – upon which many 
westerners were now beginning to focus their attention – would be subjected to a frontier war 
as intense and as enduring as that which had plagued the areas south of the Ohio River for the 
past eighteen years.   
Nor was Knox the only person attempting to harness the settlers’ attitude towards the 
Indians in order to shore up the relationship between east and west.  A month prior to Knox’s 
public correspondence, adamant federalist and known Indian hater Hugh Henry Brackenridge 
wrote a similar appeal to the people of the frontier filled with spin and anti-Indian sentiment.91  
According to Brackenridge, only three friendly Indians had been killed in the Ohio Valley since 
the end of the American Revolution, and even the loyalty of those individuals was, at the very 
least, questionable.  In his open letter, Brackenridge was intensely critical of those who decried 
the frontier war as unjustified, describing ‘men who are unacquainted with the savages like 
young women who have read romances, and have an improper idea of the Indian character in 
one case as the female mind has of real life in the other.’  The implication in Brackenridge’s 
remarkable letter was clear; the Indians were the natural enemies of the settlers whilst those 
who supported the anti-Indian cause, such as the government, shared a direct interest with the 
inhabitants of the frontier.  Whatever could be said about the effectiveness of the 
government’s choice in generals, their motives – in the eyes of Brackenridge, at least – had 
                                                                                                                                                                              
simply, it was the government’s desire for the Ohio valley which held back its own attempts to establish 
peace within the region.  See Calloway The Shawnee, pp. 126-154, Stephen Aron American confluence: 
The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), p. 206, for quote from St. Clair see ‘Letter from Arthur St. Clair to John Jay, December 13th, 
1788’ in Smith (ed.) The St. Clair Papers, p. 103 
90 ‘An Open Letter from Henry Knox on the Causes of the Indian War (II),’ Kentucky Gazette (Bradford), 
June 30th, 1792, pp. 2 
91 Claude M. Newlin The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1932) 
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been just.92  Such words and sentiments were powerful devices, but they were not the only 
tools which the government and its supporters employed to regain the support of the settlers.   
Policy changes towards the army, particularly regarding the pay offered to privates, helped to 
shore up the image that the government was taking its attempts to win the war against the 
Indians seriously.  To dispel any ambivalence towards the government’s motives, an extract 
from a letter written by a ‘member of Congress’ was published in the Kentucky Gazette which 
once again made the connection explicit by describing the legislation then being passed 
through the house as ‘a bill providing for the defence of the frontier.’  Curiously, that particular 
piece was sandwiched between a letter written by St. Clair describing further Indian atrocities 
and a public notice informing the inhabitants of Woodford County that Colonel John Finne had 
been appointed to collect the unpopular taxes now being levied upon whiskey.93 
  Whatever the intent of those in power, the years before Anthony Wayne was ready to 
take to the field saw the frontier continue to labour under the hardships inflicted by the war.  
Indian raids were frequent, affecting not just the settlements of Ohio, but the frontier regions 
south of the river also.  These continued raids and assaults along with the apparent failure of 
the United States to intervene served to undermine the government’s credibility in the west.  It 
was within this context that those with anti-federal leanings occasionally attempted to 
commandeer the governments’ continuing failure against the Indians to further widen the 
divide between the settlers and those in command of the nation.  When soldiers from New 
England, for instance, arrived at Fort Washington one newspaper correspondent described 
them as cutting a ‘shocking figure,’ looking as they did ‘more like a band of beggars than 
Federal soldiers for the defence of our frontiers – God help us if we had no other defence.’94  
Such observations mirrored attempts made in 1775 to smear Dunmore’s name following his 
victory against the Indians in 1774; in this case such accounts were attempting to underline the 
idea that federal soldiers were useless Indian fighters.  Put simply, the writer of this piece was 
suggesting that the government would never be able to lead the west effectively in their war 
against the Indians.  After all, what did soldiers from New England know about fighting the 
Indians?  
Rarely, however, did such accusation go unchallenged by federal sympathisers with one 
such individual describing these very same soldiers as being ‘as well clothed as any Kentucky 
beau.’95  The state of attire worn by federal soldiers may have been a cause for concern among 
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93 Kentucky Gazette (Bradford), March 24th, 1792, p. 3 
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some settlers, but the government was nonetheless moving forward with its plan to bring the 
frontier war to a decisive and profitable end.  Running alongside treaty negotiations – which 
could not succeed whilst the United States refused to remove the settlers now living north of 
the Ohio River – were continuing preparations  for another campaign designed to succeed 
where St. Clair’s had failed.96  With Anthony Wayne continuing to train and drill his Legion, 
government officials attempted to capitalise upon its prior public relations campaign in order 
to mobilize the settlers for a final push against the Indians.  The division between the federal 
government and the settlers, however, remained large and even Charles Scott struggled 
throughout most of 1793 to gather sufficient support south of the border to supplement 
Wayne’s new army of Indian fighters.  According to the army’s quartermaster, James O’Hara, 
Wayne was ‘labouring all that a mortal man could do,’ in order to rally support from a reluctant 
frontier population.97 
Distrust and division may have worked to separate the settlers from their government, 
but continuing raids and rumours of a forthcoming assault by thousands of Indians helped, by 
the beginning of 1794, to overcome the chasm which separated these two bodies.98  By the 
summer of that year, Wayne was able to call for volunteers from Kentucky and Ohio in order to 
round out the army with which he intended to force the Indians to sue for peace.  By the 
middle of July, the general had led his combined force north into the Indian’s territory, camping 
briefly upon the site where St. Clair had been defeated almost three years before.  According to 
one veteran of Wayne’s campaign, ‘the battleground...was literally covered with the bones of 
men who had fallen in battle.’99  If such a sight had served to undermine the settlers’ 
confidence in the government appointed general who led them, it also served to underline why 
they believed their invasion of the Indian’s country was necessary.  Undeterred by the sight of 
the potential failure that awaited his forces, Wayne pressed his army forward until it met a 
large multi-tribal force at the site known simply as Fallen Timbers.  The resulting battle – 
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although a victory for the United States – hardly resulted in the Indian’s suffering a defeat 
comparable to that suffered by St. Clair, but it was, nevertheless, a decisive victory.100  
 In many ways, Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers was a physical representation of 
demography in motion as the beleaguered Indians who had fought to retain control of their 
lands came up against a force far larger than anything they could conceivably field.101  Even 
though the tribes had inflicted a loss upon the Americans that would have crippled their own 
war effort in 1791, the appearance of Wayne’s monumental army was a harbinger which the 
Indians could no longer ignore.  The frontier war may not have ended in the massacre many 
settlers would have preferred but it had, finally, come to an end.  Crucially, its conclusion was 
inseparable from the actions of the national government who, in spite of all the misgivings that 
had plagued its ability to execute a successful war in the west, had finally accomplished what 
the settlers alone had failed to do throughout the past two decades.  As Wayne himself put it, 
‘[T]he fire kindled at the Miami of the Lake [was] extinguished by the blood of the hydra.’102 
 
Closure 
Throughout the 1780s, the United States government had grown increasingly estranged from 
the western part of the country, a process which seemed, at times, to suggest a near inevitable 
separation of the two.  By pursuing peace with the Indians whilst attempting to restrain its 
frontier population, the government appeared, from a western perspective, to be working 
against the best interests of the trans-Appalachian population.  For the United States, an Indian 
war in the Ohio Valley was something to be avoided; for the settlers of this region, however, it 
was simply an inevitable part of the frontier experience.  This division underlined the growing 
schism which marred the early years of the republic but the government’s ambitions in Ohio 
ultimately served to bring east and west together around a common enemy – a common Other 
– in the northern tribes.  Over the course of the frontier war, resentment and fear of the 
Indians had been building, a process fuelled by physical and psychological warfare, the 
destruction of lives and livelihoods, and the breaking of familial ties.  This social cataclysm had 
initially served to underline the differences between east and west but, as the United States 
continued to fixate upon securing the Ohio Valley whilst their peace initiatives with the Indians 
failed, these same forces proved to be an invaluable method of rallying western settlers to an 
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eastern banner.  By taking advantage of deep rooted anti-Indian ideas created and perpetuated 
by the frontier war, the government found that it was able to accomplish two goals 
simultaneously. 
First, it was able to furnish expeditions sent against the Indians with a body of 
experienced, albeit difficult to manage, Indian fighters.  Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, this same residue of war allowed the government to take a more fundamental 
leadership role in the west since any period following the end of the American Revolution up to 
that point.  The United States may have fixated upon Ohio for its own economic purposes, but 
that single minded determination to secure lands nevertheless brought the government into 
alignment with its radicalised western population.   More than an incidental side effect, 
communal anger and resentment generated by prior fighting provided the government with an 
essential tool it could, and ultimately would, employ to bring the settlers of the west into the 
national fold.  By aggressively pursuing sovereignty in Ohio, the United States set itself up as a 
figurehead around which the masses of the west could rally.  In so doing, the government 
renewed the bond of nationhood in the west and, simultaneously, secured the lands in Ohio 
they so badly coveted.  The government may not have wanted a war against the Indians, but 
they certainly made the most of it. 
Indeed, by 1792 – when almost all pretence of negotiating a settlement with the 
Indians was abandoned – agents and sympathisers of the government began to proactively 
take advantage of widespread anti-Indian sentiment in the west in order to shore up federal 
power beyond the Appalachians.  Fear, resentment and anger were more than just the fallout 
of the frontier war.  They were an abstract impulse, sentiments and ideas that served to 
ideologically separate the settler population from the Indians.  Through the cumulative 
experience of combat, the loss of life, and the destruction of social networks, a wedge was 
driven between the competing peoples of the backcountry.  Or, to put it another way, the fear 
and resentment generated by the frontier war built walls which served to separate settler from 
Indian; fear built a wall of division along the frontier.  To be sure, such a summation drifts 
towards the purple end of the prose spectrum but it does, nonetheless, capture in a very few 
words one of the core arguments of this chapter.  After years of continuous warfare, the 
settlers and Indians grew to fear and resent one another, a process which created, 
reconstituted, and reinforced walls of division between these two peoples.  The fear and 
resentment in question was not necessarily an everyday, conscious experience but it was 
certainly a subtext of each culture; it was experienced daily in the abstract if not the literal 
sense.  The Indians feared the settlers would take their lands.  They feared that their way of life 
would be disrupted, if not destroyed by the arrival of Euro-Americans west of the Appalachians.  
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They also came to fear settler attacks, the destruction of their corn, the loss of loved ones 
through the ensuing violence, and the transformation of the landscape to suit settler ends.  The 
settlers, of course, feared much also.  They feared that the Indians would deny them land and, 
with that, any meaningful sense of freedom in the early modern world they inhabited.  They 
feared the loss of companions, compatriots and family members.  They also feared captivity, 
torture, and mutilation.  For that matter, so too did their enemies; on both sides, they feared 
for their lives.   
Throughout the duration of the frontier war, these forces had been utilized to advance 
a spectrum of personal agendas, ranging from Logan’s quest for revenge in 1774, to Dunmore’s 
attempt to shore up his position in the aftermath of the subsequent war which bore his name.  
Similarly, charismatic individuals such as George R. Clark had been able to gain large amounts 
of personal prestige and authority when they presented themselves as the solution to the more 
immediate dangers which so concerned the settlers throughout the 1770s and 1780s.  Likely 
the most significant attempt to take advantage of these forces, however, came in the 1790s 
when the United States utilized fear and anti-Indian resentment to assume a leadership role in 
the final years of the frontier war, a process which benefitted the government through the 
legitimising process of victory and the resultant windfall of Ohio lands it would receive as a 
result.  If fear and resentment built walls which separated settler from Indian, they could be 
used to build bridges between potential allies.  These forces, however, did more than that.  
They also endured, long after the Treaty of Greenville brought the frontier war to a close in 
1795.  Indeed, they would endure – along with the lines of division they helped to enforce – for 
decades to come, underlining, informing and driving national policy towards the Indians 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.  As this chapter has demonstrated, the fear 
and resentment generated by the war could, and was, manipulated by a number of parties 
over the course of the conflict, culminating with the actions of the United States government in 
the 1790s.  As the nineteenth century dawned, however, that same force would take on an life 
of its own as it was perpetuated through strong oral traditions, shared with neighbours and 
passed on to children.   
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Conclusion 
 
By the 1830s and 1840s the frontier war in the Kentucky country was a memory.  Where hard 
and bloody battles had been fought settlements now stood.  Where settlers and Indians had 
once utilized the natural features of the land – the trees, the shrubbery, and the rivers – to 
disguise themselves and launch secret attacks, now stood open fields.  Where once two groups 
had met in mutual animosity now stood only one, unquestioned in its victory; the war was a 
memory.  As John Shane travelled across Kentucky and southern Ohio, collecting interviews 
with survivors of the frontier war, he thus moved across a landscape necessarily different from 
the one experienced by his subjects four or five decades before.  He moved across the land 
free from the danger posed by raiding parties, ignorant that the call of an owl could herald an 
ambush into which he was about to wander.  He moved unhindered by the thought that in his 
absence a dear family member or treasured acquaintance was, even then, having their brains 
dashed out by a tomahawk.  He moved across roads which had once been trampled into 
existence by the buffalo, now three decades gone from a country which showed signs that 
they had ever been there only to those who knew where to look.  He walked those traces 
unhindered by the threat that had once been posed to his progenitors by a people whose 
livelihood they were destroying.  The war was a memory.   
In short, Shane was free from the life and experiences which had been described to 
him hundreds of times before but, for all that, he was not free of the war.  The war was a 
memory, to be sure, but it was a powerful one shaped by formative encounters, reinforced by 
collective experience, and integrated into a world view that continued to shape and guide 
actions and understanding.1  Indeed, Shane’s quest for narratives began around the time that 
Black Hawk had stood against the settlers of Illinois – a group filled with Kentuckians and their 
descendents – in his last stand against Andrew Jackson’s final solution to the Indian issue 
which had plagued his western home since his first arrival in the region in the late eighteenth 
century.2  Indian removal and resistance were events linked to how western Americans 
                                                            
1 Shane, born in Cincinnati in 1812, demonstrated that his own attitude towards the Indians was 
influenced by the experience of his predecessors.  See David Barrow and John D. Shane (ed.) ‘Journal of 
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understood the tribes, and that understanding was tied to decades of violent experience 
gained during the frontier war.3  The war was a memory, but in this form it continued to 
endure, passed to succeeding generations via oral and print traditions, informing the heirs of 
the west of the horrors experienced, the violations endured, and losses incurred at Indian 
hands.4  In short, the violence which had plagued the trans-Appalachian west found an Indian 
summer, so to speak, in the imagination of those who followed in its wake. 
 For all its significance in early American history it can be easy to forget that violence is 
not an event – some grand battle or memorable confrontation – but a process which is 
fundamentally connected to those who experience and remember it.  Whatever the 
significance of a given confrontation, behind the clash of swords and tomahawks, muskets and 
arrows, is a chain of events which stretches back into its participants’ past and, often, into its 
survivors’ future.  More than a physical expression of larger social, political and economic 
forces, violent confrontations – physical clashes, threatened attacks, and psychological assaults 
– were highly formative affairs, informing how the settlers and Indians of Kentucky, Ohio and 
the larger trans-Appalachian west came to understand one another.  True, settlers and Indians 
shared a variety of nuanced contact points throughout the colonial and early republican 
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Perdue and Michael D. Green The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears (New York: Viking Penguin, 
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periods but in the trans-Appalachian west, particularly the Kentucky country, they primarily 
encountered one another not through nuanced, firsthand experience of their respective 
cultures but the experience of violence which both parties fostered, imposed, and, ultimately, 
helped to bring about.  Conflict, then, was not merely a physical act, the conclusion or 
beginning of some grand political meta-narrative, but one of the core social driving forces 
upon the frontier in the Kentucky country and trans-Appalachian region.  When John Shane 
began his quest to recover the otherwise unrecorded stories and narratives of the aging settler 
population he encountered a set of memories that were more than the sum of their parts; he 
encountered a collective memory, shaped by shared experience, which linked their 
revolutionary past to their antebellum present. 
Through a period of more than two decades, the settlers of the trans-Appalachian 
west had encountered their Indian adversaries in a context of physical violation, threatened 
atrocity, and psychological horror.  Of course, these were the wartime tools not only of the 
tribes but the settlers also. Regardless of their mutual use, however, the settlers primarily 
remembered their victimization at Indian hands rather than the brutality of their own anti-
Indian campaign.  Their own acts of war may have been as bloody and horrifying as those 
enacted by their enemies, but the memory of their losses created an understanding among the 
settlers which emphasised brutality and fear as the context in which they came to view, 
understand, and remember the Indians.  Played out over a span of time measured not in 
months and years, but decades, this perspective was continually renewed and compounded, a 
series of events, stories, and ideas which would ultimately serve to drive the settlers and 
Indians further apart than they had ever been before.  This changing relationship between 
western settlers and the tribes emphasises something which should not be forgotten: violence 
brought significant change to the west and, ultimately, America.  It served to reinforce 
perceived difference, underline perceived savagery, and highlight perceived cultural 
incompatibility, all issues which would help to shape American interactions with the Indians for 
decades, particularly in the period which created and saw the enactment of the Indian 
removals from the east.5 
                                                            
5 For violence associated with this movement see 5 Black Hawk, Antoine LeClair (Translator) and J.B. 
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In the Kentucky country this reality was a part of life’s everyday experience.  Violence 
was carried out routinely between settlers and Indians and, even where it was not 
encountered directly, the nature of settler society, combined with the nature of frontier 
warfare, ensured that a given settler was never separated by more than a few degrees from 
the unfolding conflict.  Moreover, the war fought in and around this country lasted longer – in 
continuous terms, at least – than virtually any other war in North America up to that point.  
Indeed, the experience of violence was so fundamental that it is not possible to understand 
the development of this region without understanding how it impacted the society developing 
in its midst; this has been the core line of enquiry undertaken by this thesis.  Beginning in 
chapter one, the significance of vendetta driven conflict between relatively small groups of 
settlers and Indians was emphasised within the context of Dunmore’s War.  Although typically 
analysed through a lens of political intrigue or economic necessity, the actions and reactions of 
those on the ground had far more impact on the outbreak of conflict in 1774 than the 
machinations of men such as Lord Dunmore.  Rather than being a war driven by top-down 
forces, this chapter analysed, explored, and emphasised the agency of ordinary settlers and 
Indians in fostering, building, and escalating conflict upon the frontier.  More importantly, it 
explored how the nature of violent interactions – particularly where third parties were harmed 
– served to motivate those same individuals to engage in violent acts of their own.  This was 
not a conflict driven by something as simple as Indian-hating, even at this early phase.  Instead, 
a small number of settlers and Indians began to see their views of each other radicalised as a 
direct result of the violence being carried out in the backcountry.  Both groups acted, to a 
certain extent, in a reactionary manner against the perceived atrocities committed against 
their people, a pattern which would later come to be repeated across a much broader section 
of both societies.  Even at this early stage in the war, violence was not merely an expression of 
larger top-down issues, but a force which drove the conflict forward in its own right. 
Violence, however, is far more complex than a simple physical interaction and, in 
particular, its psychological dimension added significant depth to its impact upon places such 
as Kentucky.  Indeed, deliberate psychological warfare became one of the Indians’ core tools 
against settler expansion west of the Appalachian Mountains, something explored in detail in 
the second chapter of this thesis.  Although not as deadly as its physical counterpart, 
psychological warfare – by its very nature – could produce long lasting effects indeed.  By 
deliberately targeting the settlers’ morale and emotional wellbeing, the Indians were able to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of the Black Hawk War of 1832, his Surrender and Travel through the United States.  Dictated by Himself.  
Also Life, Death and Burial of the Old Chief, together with A History of the Black Hawk War, by J. B. 
Patterson, Oquawka, 1882 (Rock Island: J.B. Patterson, 1882), pp. 162-164 and Patrick J. Jung The Black 
Hawk War of 1832 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), pp. 87-89 
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drive huge numbers back east without engaging in an excessive amount of physical violence.  
However, psychological warfare relies not upon the reality on the ground but the perceived 
reality of its intended victims and though the idea of an ever-present Indian threat certainly 
served to drive away large numbers of settlers, it also served to compound growing anti-Indian 
sentiment among those who stayed.  Although the numbers killed between 1775 and 1777 in 
Kentucky was relatively small, the graphic display of bodies (and body parts), the continuous 
harassment of parties in the wilderness, and highly strategic attacks and false sieges all served 
to compound negative perceptions of the tribes.  Actual physical violence may have been 
relatively rare during the first years of Kentucky’s settlement, but by fostering an environment 
of fear and paranoia among the settlers its presence or absence came to mean very little.  
Rather, it was the perceived reality of violence and the perceived level of danger that was 
important and both of these remained high throughout Kentucky’s formative years.  Put 
simply, the Indians carried out a campaign which deliberately fostered fear among the settlers, 
but in so doing they also served to foster stronger anti-Indian ideas among their adversaries.  
To compound this issue, psychological warfare remained a strong part of the Indians’ arsenal 
throughout the frontier war, but the type of practices it employed served – in the long term – 
to further alienate settler from Indian. 
In a very real way, then, vendetta inspired conflict and psychological warfare informed 
how the settler community interacted with and understood the Indians from an early phase in 
the war.  Indeed, the broader impact of this growing concert of violence was the division in the 
settler mind of the world they inhabited, those zones they controlled – the settlements – and 
those zones controlled by the tribes – the wilderness – a subject explored throughout chapter 
three.  This division of the land, a response to the Indians’ apparent dominance beyond the 
settlers’ stockade, served to reflect the everyday impact the war had upon the developing 
settler community.  By dividing the landscape into these two broad zones, the settlers also 
created a new division which helped to define their community; those who were able to 
operate in the wilderness, and those who were not.  Such a division cut across existing barriers 
within settler society.  Although most of those individuals able to operate within the 
wilderness were men it does not follow that most men were willing to brave the outside 
world.  Instead the world defined by the stockade defined not a gendered space but one 
marked by ability, experience and, sometimes, determination.  Outside of their fort towns, the 
settlers were equally vulnerable to the growing Indian threat, a reality which saw ethnic – and 
sometimes racial – divisions dissolve in the face of necessity and a shared ordeal.  Even within 
the stockade the experience was a shared one with many across the country holding a 
common set of experiences generated by the realities of war.  These experiences were a core 
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part of the frontier experience within the Kentucky country and though continuous 
immigration ensured that large areas within this region stabilised over time, newly settled 
regions continued to share the experience of a divided environment.   
Indian dominance within the wilderness, their successful use of psychological warfare, 
and the growing presence of physical violence on the frontier represent – in martial terms – a 
high point in their struggle to reverse settler incursions into Kentucky.  However, their success 
was never total; the Indians may have controlled the wilderness but that control lessened over 
time as land hungry settlers wrestled growing areas of this region from the raiding parties who 
held them.  Problematically, even at its height the use of physical and psychological warfare 
failed to empty the Kentucky country.  The lure of cheap, affordable, high quality land was 
simply too much for the settlers to resist.  Still, however, the Indians resisted and, by the late 
1770s and early 1780s, that resistance began to produce, as shown in chapter four, a 
significant counter-movement among the settlers who, by this point, were growing ever more 
radical in their view of the Indians.  Confined to stockades, afflicted by a culture of fear, and 
often having firsthand experience with combat, the settlers’ anti-Indian zeal increased 
significantly.  Even more problematically, this growing anti-Indian sentiment manifested itself 
in a proactive desire to strike back at the Indians, a desire which culminated in a growing series 
of assaults north of the Ohio River.  Whereas the settlers had previously demonstrated little 
interest in attacking the Indians directly, by the 1780s men like George R. Clark were able to 
capitalise upon this movement, drawing vast numbers from the country – in some cases 
almost the entire adult male population – for grand assaults upon the Indians’ homeland, a 
process which, in turn, influenced many Indians to likewise revisit harm with harm, assault 
with assault, and atrocity with atrocity.  This system of communal revenge and retribution 
reflected some of the issues which led to a spiral of violence in 1774 but, rather than the small 
numbers involved during that earlier period, the late 1770s and 1780s were marked by a much 
broader involvement from the community.  The frontier war had become a social war. 
Key to this development, the desire of the community to extract revenge for past acts 
of violence and perceived atrocities, was the nature of the societies which occupied the 
frontier, the subject of chapter five.  Personal connections between individuals, within the 
family, and throughout the community were no small issue during this period.  Parents and 
their children, husbands and wives, siblings, and companions were all tied to one another by a 
network of concern and affection which defined their everyday world.  The violation of these 
connections, the destruction of lives and relationships, was a major issue with sorrow, loss, 
and anger echoing through the available source material and the actions of the frontier’s 
inhabitants.  Logan’s response to the death of his family in 1774 is an early example of this, but 
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Logan’s actions were hardly unique and across the frontier broken familial and fraternal 
connections helped to fuel the growing war.  Indeed, the violation of social networks and the 
community was one of the most important factors in fostering widespread conflict upon the 
frontier.  It contextualised the experience not only of the individual but the community.  
Moreover, this reality was one shared by both settlers and Indians who placed significant value 
on the lives and wellbeing of their family and compatriots but, whatever the similarities shared 
by these communities, it speaks to the power of violence that – as a rule – neither group 
showed significant sympathy for  the losses their wartime activities inflicted upon their 
enemies.  What mattered were not the social and familial losses one’s enemy had incurred but 
those losses experienced firsthand by the local community.  The importance of familial and 
fraternal connections also serves to underline the danger or reducing the frontier war to a 
discussion of Indian-hating; both settlers and Indians alike were driven to fight not by a 
simplified racial understanding, but a nuanced engagement with their own communities.  To 
be sure, settlers across the region no doubt developed a mentality which reflected a growing 
anti-Indian sentiment but that was a product of the interaction which occurred between 
wartime violence and the breaking of precious social networks and connections.  Put simply, 
many settlers may have become Indian-haters, but that development was the result of a far 
more fundamental interaction between conflict, loss, and one’s valued social networks.   
Across the trans-Appalachian west, then, the war with the Indians was a highly loaded 
and, often, emotional affair.  The destruction of families, kin, and social networks fed a much 
larger system of reciprocal violence which, given the correct conditions, could come to be 
exploited, an issue explored in chapter six.  George R. Clark, for instance, was able to utilize the 
settlers’ growing animosity towards the tribes throughout the late 1770s and early 1780s, 
reversing his previous failures to rally the settlers to his banner.  By the late 1780s and 1790s, 
however, the exploitation anti-Indian sentiment reached a new peak when the United States, a 
body which had proven largely ineffective in the west, utilized this force in order to rally the 
settlers to its cause.  Although the United States had made numerous attempts to end the 
frontier war throughout the 1780s, its attempts to do so peacefully – and with minimal 
expense – contradicted the self-sustaining cycle of conflict which had developed in the region.  
Leaders on both sides of the frontier may have been keen to end the conflict following the 
conclusion of the American Revolution, but those whom they sought to lead continued to fight 
in spite of their efforts.  Particularly problematic for the United States, this division between 
east and west threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the new nation beyond the 
Appalachians with the government and its western subjects sharply divided over the Indian 
issue.  Indeed, the disparate attitudes demonstrated by eastern leaders and western settlers 
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appeared to underline a fundamental division within the new nation.  However, by the late 
1780s the United States altered its approach and, rather than attempting to restrain the setter 
population, it instead began to manipulate and take advantage of its inhabitants’ anti-Indian 
zeal in order to achieve unity with its western population and ownership of the Indians’ 
remaining lands.  Such an approach drew upon a legacy of violence and its social aftermath, 
manipulating and exploiting attitudes, fears, apprehensions, and long held resentments.  By 
the 1790s, then, the violence generated by the frontier war had become a commodity of sorts, 
something which could be taken, repackaged, and redistributed to meet the larger goals of the 
national government. 
By the time the Treaty of Greenville was signed in 1795 the Kentucky country and 
larger trans-Appalachian west had undergone an extended period of violent intercultural 
contact which had fundamentally informed its frontier experience.  Violence and society in this 
region were fundamentally linked, each informing the other.  Indeed, even after the war 
concluded its impact upon western society would continue to be felt for decades, something 
John Shane would experience firsthand as he travelled the country collecting memories, 
narratives, and glimpses into the events which informed the western world view.  Veterans of 
the war shared experiences with one another and, in the process, generated a communal 
narrative which they would pass on to succeeding generations of westerners.  Particularly in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, resentments continued to fester among the veterans 
of the war who never considered the Indian question settled.  Instead, they agitated for a final 
solution to this issue which would finally be granted to them only when one of their own, 
Andrew Jackson, ascended to the White House.  Over time, the social memory of the war took 
on a life of its own as those who bore it migrated throughout the trans-Appalachian region 
and, ultimately, across the western portion of the continent.  Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio would 
all receive significant injections of Kentucky blood including, in the case of Illinois, Abraham 
Lincoln who would later authorise the hanging of thirty eight Santee Sioux, the largest mass 
execution in American history.6  In Missouri, the Boone family would continue its tradition of 
frontier occupancy where Daniel, his youngest son Nathan, and various other family members 
and acquaintances would have numerous run-ins and confrontations with the territory’s 
aboriginal population.7  During the War of 1812 Nathan Boone would be mustered by the 
                                                            
6 Kenneth Carley The Dakota War of 1862: Minnesota’s Other Civil War (1976; reprint, St. Paul: 
Minnesota Historical Society, 1961) 
7 It is also worth pointing out here that Daniel Boone in his old age attempted to live peacefully with the 
Indians wherever he could, even visiting his former Shawnee relatives (captors) who now resided in the 
region.  But as significant as Boone’s sympathy for the Indians became, this was a characteristic of his 
particular personality, not the people to whom he belonged.  By the end of his life Boone had – largely 
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state’s governor, William Clark who was himself the brother of the famed Indian fighter, 
George R. Clark.  It was also in Missouri that the Kentucky-born Kit Carson would be raised 
prior to his prolific career exploring America’s far west.8 
Along with provisions, land grants, and whatever property they owned, this outward 
stream of settlers carried upon their shoulders the legacy of the frontier war which they 
would, in turn, pass on to their children and the wider community.  To be sure, there were 
some veterans who took very different perspectives following the end of hostilities – even 
Simon Kenton, the confirmed Indian fighter, would eventually find peace with the tribes he 
had hated with such vehemence – but these individuals were the exception rather the rule.9  
As westerners spread across the Mississippi, so too did their legacy travel, told in tales, stories, 
and song.  Books, too, played a crucial role in helping to spread the resentment felt by those 
who had fought in the war, informing settlers across the nation that wherever Indians resided 
they would likely have to fight.  And suffer loss.  These were powerful concepts shaped and 
moulded by war, but carried and maintained by communities.  Although the question of 
slavery may have been the overriding issue which dominated the United States throughout 
much of the nineteenth century it was not the only concept to separate the peoples of North 
America.  They may not have belonged to the same nation, but the settlers and the Indians 
provided a mirror for one another.  Although these peoples were, on many levels, 
fundamentally different they both reflected the impact of war upon communities and 
societies, each having been changed on one level or another by the experience.  Materially 
speaking, there was little to separate the pioneer from the tribesman at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, but still the experience of war would drive an ideological – followed by a 
geographic – wedge between these peoples.10   
Throughout this thesis the formative power of violence – a force which altered and 
shaped societies – has been considered at every step.  In the short term it had a significant 
impact upon the shape of society in the trans-Appalachian region but in the long term its 
impact, though less obvious, was no less important.  The settlers could certainly claim victory 
on virtually every level in 1795 and, again, in 1832, but the impact of war can never truly be 
distilled into such two dimensional terms.  Of course, for the Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, 
Wyandot, Miami and numerous other Indian tribes of the Ohio Valley the situation was clear 
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Draper ‘Interview with Nathan and Olive Boone,’ pp. 119-133.   
8 Harvey Lewis Carter Dear Old Kit: The Historical Christopher Carson (1968; reprint, Norman: University 
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9 Alder and Nelson (ed.) A History of Jonathan Alder, pp. 175-176 
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cut.  Indeed, it was clear to the settlers as well, however both communities had fought, both 
had suffered loss, and both would suffer lasting consequences that would affect them for 
generations to come.  Neither side walked away from this war unscathed or unchanged.  
Moreover, neither could walk away and consign these events entirely to the past.  Just as the 
Indians had been largely unable to prevent their removal, so too were the settlers unable to 
escape the legacy of a war which had driven them down this path in the first place.  There can 
be no denying that the settlers had won the frontier war – and that the eastern Indians had 
suffered a defeat from which they would never recover – but that victory must be qualified by 
a complex legacy which would haunt, drive, and follow this group for decades, if not centuries, 
afterwards.   The Indians may have walked the Trail of Tears alone, but both they and the 
settlers had walked the line of fire together. 
Throughout the course of this work the impact of warfare and violence upon society 
has been a key concept that has been analysed in the context of the frontier war which took 
place from 1774 to 1795.  Rather than think of war or conflict as a consequence of existing 
tensions – be them racial, economic, social, or political – this work has instead sought to 
analyse how violence itself can affect, mould and change societies, driving them into new 
conflicts and perpetuating old ones.  At various point throughout the two decades primarily 
studied in this work, the goals of the political élite converged with those who fought on the 
ground but, in many instances, the war fought in the Ohio Valley was a struggle independent 
of the top down world historians tend to concern themselves with.  Of course, issues 
concerning land ownership, greed, and ethnic distrust all played a role in providing this war 
with its particular shape but, examined from the bottom up, the impact of violence upon those 
who fought becomes not only clearly visible, but essential to understanding why the battle for 
the trans-Appalachian west took the form that it did.  Put simply, violence is not merely an 
aftershock of other, more prominent forces but can be, in its own right, a reason to continue 
fighting.  The settlers of the Kentucky and trans-Appalachian regions did not fight for the sake 
of quenching their own thirst for blood.  Instead they fought because they lived in a world 
where violence was the only realistic answer to past acts of violence.  Conflict was thus one of 
the primary products of the war, and war was one of the primary products of conflict.  This 
circular system pressed the settlers and the Indians against one another, even when peace was 
sought by leaders on both sides, and even when peace was by far the most positive and 
rational outcome each group could hope to achieve.  Even following the end of hostilities, the 
settlers were simply unable to set aside the desire for revenge which had been generated by 
the fighting and, for decades after Fallen Timbers, they continued to agitate against their 
onetime foes.  For decades, the Indians of the Ohio Valley would be remembered by the 
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region’s new settler population as their natural enemies and, as a consequence of this, the 
tribes would have to face exile from the eastern states.  The conflict between the settlers and 
the Indians cannot truly be said to have come to an end in 1795 and, thus, the settlers cannot 
truly have a victory attributed to them.  Instead they, along with the Indians, were caught in a 
system of their own making which would fundamentally influence both peoples for decades to 
come.  The term of a given war, the settlers discovered, was not limited to the arbitrary dates 
set upon it by politicians and historians, but was instead dictated by the actions of the people 
who fought, remembered, and experienced it.  The war was a memory, but the memory lived 
on. 
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